韓國의 農業分化에 관한 硏究 : 獨寡占構造와의 關聯을 中心으로 Mainly on the Relation to Monopoly = A Study on the Differentiation of Agriculture in Korea
저자
都禹鉉 (法經大學)
발행기관
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
1975
작성언어
Korean
KDC
040.000
자료형태
학술저널
수록면
1-173(173쪽)
제공처
소장기관
Chapter 1: Introduction
1) The economic structure of capitalistic society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former gradually through differentiation of agriculture. The primitive accumulation is the historical process of divorcing the immediate producer from the means of production. The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process through differentiation of agriculture. The history of this expropriation, the process of polarization of the peasant, in different countries assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different periods. In England alone, it has the classic form. In Korea this process had been carried out forcibly under the direct control of Japanese imperialism (monopolistic capitalism) from 1910 to 1945 because Korea was annexed to Japan unjustly and against its will. A major effect of the coming of capitalism to Korea was the worsening the lot of the peasant.
Laws were made to enable Japanese firms and individuals easily to acquire land in Korea, but the main instrument for depriving of their farms was what was called the Land Survey. The effect of the survey was that many Korean peasants were deprived of land they and their ancestors had farmed for centuries. Meanwhile, Korean peasants were differentiated downwards through differentiation of agriculture. The type of differentiation of Korean peasants was different from that of Japanese at the same period.
After Liberation, the agrarian reform in 1949 served that the tilled land formerly possessed by Japanese and Korean landlords were distributed with compensation to landless peasants or peasants with little land. However, after the agrarian reform tiny holdings increased. The structure of Korean agriculture is still weak.
In short, the process of getting agriculture involved in capitalistism is various in indifferent countries which are at different stages of economic development. But the basic linkage between the two is the differentiation of agriculture.
2) This dissertation primarily intends to analyse the differentiation of agriculture after the establishment of Republic of Korea with reference to the modern historical background which is the process of development of capitalism in Korea. The most important factor of differentiation of agriculture is the price conditions between agricultural products and manufactured goods. So, this analysis is focused on the price conditions under the rule of the monopolistic economic structure.
Chapter 2: The Modern Historical Background of Differentiation of Agriculture in Korea
Korean economic historians generally concur that the embryo of capitalism was found before Kanghwa Treaty, but the Japanese invasion expunged it in Korea.
Japanese policy in Korea after the Russo-Japanese War was clearly directed toward eventual annexation of the country to Japanese Empire. In December of 1905, the first Resident-General of Korea was appointed by the Japanese Emperor. The Resident General was charged not only with overseeing Korean foreign relations but also with protecting and advancing Japanese interests generally. He was under the direct authority of the Japanese interests generally. He was under the direct authority of the Japanese Emperor, and had the power to use Japanese troops at his direction. The Korean army disbanded.
One of the Japanese main objectives was the Korean Economy. Law was revised so that Japanese could freely purchase land, In addition, land was often used as collateral for loans, and when the poverty-stricken Korean peasants could not pay, their land was taken over by Japanese money-lenders. The Korean currency was reformed to conform with that of Japan and to do the financial transactions between the countries.
New methods were applied to increase rice production so as to make Korea a supplier to Japan. Numerous Japanese left their overcrowded home-land so that in addition to government officials and police there were merchants, financiers, money-lenders and farmers, subsequently joined by the unemployed and numerous undesirables who had been unsuccessful at home. The number of Japanese much increased during 1897-1910. Korea had become a Japanese colony.
The so-called Korean-Japanese Annexation Draft was signed in 1910. On annexation, the first Governor-General was installed. One of the main purposes of the Government-General, of course, was to exploit the Korean economy for the benefit of Japan. After the annexation the main concern was land ownership and agriculture. The main instrument for expropriating Koreans of their farms was what was called the Land Survey. Ostensibly, the purpose of the survey was simply to set up a modern system of land ownership, with title deeds recording the necessary information field with the appropriate government office. A date was set by which all landowners had to report the location of their land, its precize size and its quality, together with their names and addresses. Korea had never had such a system before, and many of the ignorant peasants did not understand it. The effect of the survey, as the Japanese must have known it would be, was that many peasants failed to report to the government before the deadline, and were deprived of land. In addition, all village common land was nationalized.
The land survey was completed in 1918. The Government-General then proceeded to dispose of the land it had acquired to Japanese at bargain prices. Much of the land went to the notorious Oriental Development Company, some to other Japanese firms, and some to Japanese individuals. The survey's real purpose had been to provide a legal basis for the seizure of Korean land by Japanese, and in this it succeeded.
By the end of the Land Survey, the number of Korean-owned family farms had declined by nearly 40,000. The peasants thus deprived had either to accept the status of tenants, eking out a bare subsistence while most of the profits from the land went to the landlords, become homeless wanderers, or emigrate to Manchuria or Siberia.
Thus, the half feudalistic productive relation was settled on the agricultural sector.
Japanese hegemony was also established in the area of commerce and finance. Laws regarding the establishment of commercial enterprises were written and interpreted in such a way, while Japanese firms could easily be established, it was virtually impossible for Korean to set up business. Such laws had appeared even before annexation. In 1911 a law was promulgated giving the Government-General the power to close any firm which violated in any way the conditions under which it had been granted permission to do business. If the Japanese wanted to take over a Korean firm, in other words, they now had the power to do so.
The Oriental Development Company benefited enormously from these conditions, as did numerous other Japanese concerns. Many of these companies were new establishments based in Korea, while others were branches of Japan-based firms. The grip which Japan took on the economy is shown by figures. Of the 110 companies in Korea after 1011, 101 were owned by Japanese and only nine by Koreans. Nineteen Japan-based firms had branches in Korea, and most of capital invested in banks, electric companies, gas companies and rail ways, which are not included in these figures, came from the two giant Japanese industrial companies, Mitsui and Mitsubishi. Thus, hardly any of the profits to be made in Korea went to Koreans, and the Japanese prospered but the Korean standard of living fell.
Most of this business activity was financed by Japanese banks, which had begun opening branches in Korea very early, soon after the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876. By 1910 they had appeared in almost all Korean cities of any size. In 1909 the Bank of Korea was established by the Japanese to handle government finances and in 1918 the Korea Industry Bank, another Japanese institution, took over provincial finances from the Agricultural Industry Bank.
Thus, whole Korean economy was under the rule of monopolistic Japanese combines. After this, economic exploitation was faclitated, by non-economical (feudalistic) means.
The rapid growth of the Japanese population, coupled with increasing industrialization, resulted in a food shortage. This was to be supplied from Korean rice. A fifteen-year plan to increase Korean rice production was instituted in 1920. Despite of the unrealistic goal of planning, the planned quantity of rice was exported to Japan every year. By 1933 more than half of the annual rice crop was being sent to Japan, while rice consumption by the average Korean dwindled in proportion. The rice-export policy had an unfortunate effect on Korean agriculture quite aside from the depriviations in diet, for it created a one-crop economy so that pleasants were without recourse if the rice was not abundant. Taxes ate up much of the peasant's profit and land rents accounted for the rest, for the transfer of land from Korean to Japanese hands continued at an acclerated pace, and the majority of Korean peasants became tenants. Most of them had to give half of their crop to the landlord as rent and in addition paid fertilizer expenses, and the government land-tax. Large numbers left their farms in despair to eke out a precarious existense in the mountains, using the slash-and burn technique to grow crops on the hillside, then moving on when the land became infertile. By 1939 the number of peasants had increased to 340,000 households, and thousands more had emigrated to Manchuria or managed to go to Japan. Further testimony to the ruthless Japanese exploitation of Korean agriculture is hardly necessary. Korean agriculture and Japanese agriculture were under the rule of same monopoly or oligopoly. Under such circumstances Korean peasants were diffrentiated into tenants but the differentiation of Japanese peasants was characteristic of standardization of middle class peasants. The difference between the two is due to the difference of exploitation. The downward differentiation of Korean peasants was due to severe exploitation. It means that the law of economics was bent by non-economcal means.
Chapter 3: The Differentiation of Aariculture in Korea.
On August 15, 1948, the third anniversary of liberation, the newly formed Republic of Korea was proclaimed to the world. But the net government was having a difficult time. So much money had to be spent on maintaining public order that shortages of essential goods and inflation followed. Under such circumstances early on the morning of June 25, 1950, masses of North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and swept down upon the unprepared south. The causalities and damage inflicted by the war were heavy. More than half of all industrial facilities were inoperative.
The rehabilitation of the prostrate Korean economy was hampered by the fact that capital was monopolized by a very small group which had, of course, important political connections. This situation had arisen because industrial investments before liberation had been over 80 per cent Japanese. When the Republic of Korea government took over this property, it disposed of it in a very unfair and irregular manner to a few favored people. This favored few were interested in only increasing and retaining their wealth, not in investing in the country's industry. As a result, the growth of small and medium industries was checked and heavy industry stagnated. Low productions meant shortages, which in turn meant inflation. Prices rose, but wages and salaries did not keep pace, while the fall in the real price of rice threatened peasant's livelihoods. A small rise in the price of rice meant little, for example, when the price of fertilizer rose by 500 per cent between 1953 and 1959.
The agrarian reform in 1949 served that the tilled land formerly possessed by Japanese and Korean landlords with more than 3 Chongbo (a Chongdo is 2.45 acres) were ditributed with compensation to landless peasants or peasants with little land. However, it reglected economic problems and served only socio-political functions for Korean authorities. For size of holdings, after the agrarian reform tiny holdings increased. According to the statistics in 1949, 68.2 per cent of farm households had holdings of less than 1 Chongbo, 27.4 per cent held between 2 and 3 Chongbo and 4.4 per cent owned over 3 Chongbo. In 1951 these percentage were 78.5, 21.4 respectively.
Since 1961 Korea has proceeded with extraordinary speed to equip itself with the productive techniques of the western style through the period of successive Five-Year plans. Vast foreign loans were required to import foreign capital goods to be used in the modernization of industry. Meanwhile, under state tutelage and the stimulus given by a high rate of investment, the consolidation of industries was going up leaps and bounds. The characteristics of the industrial structure of Korea can be summed up in a word as "subordination to an advanced economy." Generally speaking, the subordination of industrial structure was onesidedly compelled by advanced monopolistic capitalists at the stage of imperialism in the late 19th century, and today it has changed into a new form by the modern expansionism that has tried to maintain the 19th century's subordinative relations and those of today. In the less-developed economy, all ecnomic sectors is tightly linked with advanced economy. Under such circumstances the following economic policy is inevitable.
In point of fact, the rice policy in Korea have neglected to raise the peasant's income. An industrialization of the country come to the first in the economic policy. An economic policy on the agricultural sector is counted the second target from the view of the national economy. Therefore, the government has not had a substantial policy to make a balance between income level of the agricultural sector and that of others. The peasant's income has rather had a pressure by the policy on low rice price. In Korea the government has collected a large amount of agricultural products every year since 1939 at the low price by the force. Because the purpose of the collection of rice and barley is mainly to check the causes of inflation which is likely to be occured in the process of an industrialization or a cheap living cost for a low level of wages, the government price is low in extent that the price hardly cnmpensate the cost of production. Therefore, the low level of government price is the price for exploitation to the peasant income. In addition, the low level of the government price of rice affects on a market price in the way that the former pull the latter down. The price mechanism of agricultural products is the most important factor for the increase of peasant's income. Even though the products in terms of physical unit increase. it cannot raise the producer's income if the prices of their products are low. This type of phenomena is seen in Korea at times. The inferiorities of price mechanism are found in three factors.
The most important factor is that agricultural sector is under the rule of the monopolistic capitalists in the industrial sector. They want the low level of rice. Accordingly, as above mentioned, the government price policy must be carried out in such a way that the low level of price of rice is maintained. Other factors are a nature of agricultural products which are organic substance and the inferiority of supply which is a kind of dumping by poverty.
Under such circumstances the differentiation of peasants has carried out as follows.
During 1951-1973 according to the statistics, in 1951, 42.7 percent of farm house holds had holdings of less than 0.5 Chongbo and 17.08 per cent held between 1 and 2 Chongbo. In 1973 these percentages were 32.44 and 26.31 respectively.
The middle class of farm households between 1 Chongbo and 2 Chongbo increased greatly. The others decreased. This is a trend in advanced countries at the stage of monopoly. In 1961, 6.13 per cent held between 2 and 3 Chengdo but in 1973, 4.82 per cent held between 2 and 3 Chongbor. In 1973, only 1.51 percent owned over 3 Chongbo and this class did not increase.
Chapter 4: Conclusion
The following are drawn by this analysis.
1) The direction of economic policy should fit the economic structure.
2) The abolishment of the upper limit of land ownership is impossible because the standardization of middle class peasants is a general trend.
3) Under such circumstances it is difficult to develop an agricultural enterprise.
4) The middle class peasants should be increased in number.
5) The cooperative system should be established in marketing of agricultural products.
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