신용회복제도의 도덕적 해이 유발가능성에 관한 실증연구 = Article : Empirical Study on Possibility of Moral Hazard Caused by Credit Recovery Plan

국문 초록 (Abstract)

신용회복제도는 개인파산자에게 소비유연화의 기능을 제공하고 과도한 채무상환의 부담을 덜어줌으로써 금융소외자들이 정상적인 경제활동을 가능하게 하는 사회안전망의 기능을 수행한다. 반면 신용회복제도는 채무자의 상환노력을 낮추어 도덕적 해이를 유발할 것이라는 우려도 있다. 본 연구는 과거 국내에 시행된 3개의 주용 신용회복제도가 채무자의 도덕적 해이를 유발하는가에 대한 실증분석을 수행하였다. 본 연구에서는 모 전업카드사의 신용카드 사용자의 자료를 이용하여 3개 신용회복제도 발표일을 사건일로 하는 사건연구를 수행하였다. 대부분의 국외의 선행연구에 따르면 신용회복제도는 채무자들의 자발적 파산수요를 늘린다는 결과를 제시하면서 도덕적 해이에 대한 우려를 나타냈다. 그러나 본 연구의 결과에 따르면 일부그룹의 도덕적해이의 개연성이 나타나기는 했지만 전체적으로 신용회복제도가 도덕적해이를 유발한다는 유의한 결과는 관찰되지 않았다. 이러한 결과를 통해 국내의 채무자들의 도적적해이가 없다고 단정할 수 없다. 국외의 연구는 연체율이 급증한 시점에서 이루어진 결과이고, 본 연구의 분석기간은 연체율이 하락하는 시점에서 수행되었기 때문에 나타난 결과일 수 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

When the credit recovery plan offers big advantages such as delays in repayment of debts and exemption of interests, debtors with moral hazard will not make repayments but intend to take benefits from the plan. As consumers with such a behavior increase, the society will have to bear the massive economic losses. In this sense, the plan is controversial due to the possibility to stimulate moral hazard. The plan does not always give benefits to its applicants. Applicants for the plan have to take disadvantages as their information is submitted and strictly managed by all financial organizations. In addition, they have to bear the direct expenses including the legal counseling fee for application, and the indirect expenses of losing social reputations. Accordingly, introduction of the plan is not always regarded as a stimulator of voluntary defaults. The plan should be considered from the long-term perspective and in the context of the national economy, since the plan serves as the social safety net allowing financially isolated citizens to normally make economic activities again. Most of the previous literatures, studied mostly in the US, found the empirical evidence that the plan increased voluntary defaults demand, and expressed concerns over moral hazard of delinquents. This study aims to verify whether the credit recovery plan, which has been introduced or being introduced in Korea, has increased the number of delinquent cardholders. For this, we compared the three cases before and after introducing the plan specified in <Table 1>, in order to verify the influences of the plan on the voluntary delinquency demand. As classified in Chapter 2, the three cases included the work-out plan for multiple debtors (announced in July 2002), the overall rescue programs for credit delinquents (announced in March 2004), and the credit recovery plan for financial delinquents with low income (announced in March 2005), and the cases were analyzed based on the announced month. Using logistic regression model, we control other factors influencing the delinquency rate used in Min et al.(2007) and Gross-Souleles (2002), and add the dummy variable implying the plan enforcement (Six months before the introduction: 0, and six months after the introduction: 1). If the introduction of the plan increases voluntary delinquents, the coefficient of dummy variables will show a significant positive value. Also, we analyzed the influences of the plan on voluntary delinquents with the differences between the estimated delinquency rate and the actual delinquency rate. This approach was added to improve robustness of the results of the formula (3.1). First, I excluded dummy variables and calculated the estimated delinquency rate through the logistic regression model. I calculated the difference between the estimated delinquency rate and the actual delinquency rate, and then verified the hypothesis by finding out the significance of the difference. As empirical data for the study, we used data of a large Korean credit card company. Not all applications for the plan are resulted from the use of credit cards. However, most of studies including major researches on the plan such as the one of Fay, Hurst, and White (2002), and the one of Gross and Souleles (2002) depended on data of credit card users. In addition, according to the surveys in Korea, 67.3% of respondents answered that credit card debts resulted in application for the credit recovery plan, proving that the credit card data is representative. In this study, credit card users were classified into three grades to analyze the influences of the plan on each group of users. According to the credit rating, users from grade one to grade four were classified as "High grade Users," those from grade five to grade six as "Potential group," and those in grade seven as "Marginal group." The finance limit utilization rate was used for detailed classification of groups. Those of grade five or higher show the utilizatio

참고문헌 (Reference)

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