Negotiation Model of Design Optimization Profit Distribution with Fairness Concerns in Construction Projects

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Design optimization is an effective strategy to reduce construction project costs. This study focuses on the benefit of designoptimization, which should be allocated to the designer. Furthermore, the distribution ratio can be determined through negotiation. Inline with this view, this paper initially analyzed the benefits of engineering design optimization and the basic mechanism of itsdistribution. Second, we established the negotiation model of design optimization profit distribution by considering the fairnessconcern behavior of subjects. Finally, we set up the following three experimental scenarios: the designer solely has fairness concernbehavior, the owner exclusively has fairness concern behavior, and both negotiators have fairness concern behavior. From theengineering projects perspectives, we further analyzed the effects of the fairness concerns of both negotiators in terms of engineeringdesign optimization and negotiation performance using negotiation simulation experiments. Our experimental scenarios results showthat the appropriate behavior of fairness concerns by the two negotiators is valuable in improving their own advantages. However,excessive attention to the behaviors of fairness concerns by the two negotiators may lead to an increase in the negotiation cycle,which is not beneficial in attaining optimization. This study aims to provide references for the construction project management.

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