代理理論下에서의 配當政策決定에 관한 實證的 硏究 = (An) empirical study on the dividend policy under the agency theory
저자
발행사항
서울 : 明知大學校 大學院, 1996
학위논문사항
학위논문(박사)-- 명지대학교 대학원 : 경영학과 1996. 2
발행연도
1996
작성언어
한국어
주제어
KDC
325 판사항(4)
발행국(도시)
서울
형태사항
123p. ; 26cm
일반주기명
참고문헌: p. 106-115
소장기관
The studies on corporate dividend policy have focused their attention on its determinants, but had not considered the effects of agency costs on it except the stuty on the dividend policy under the agency theory that Rozeff(1982) had suggested for the first time. However, in a form of firm that ownership and control are separated at present, agency costs induced due to agency problem are very serious, and since cash dividend to reduce agency costs induces transaction costs associated with external financing, these two costs may have an important effect on financial decision making. Hence, this study theoretically and empirically attempts to perceive the importance of agency costs and the effects of agency costs and transaction costs on determination of corporate dividend policy.
Due to information asymmetry, agency problems are generated by the incentives that agent deceives positively information inferior or is negligent intentionally for his profit maxization and the hidden characteristics of peculiarity. These agency problems can be existent in accordance with completion of agency relationship, and an agency relationship comes into being through an equilibrium contract that principal and agent can maximize their expected utilities.
As adverse selection and moral hazard to be agency problems are existent in insurance market, labour market, credit market and equity market, they cause failure and reduction of the market. And as they are also existent between shareholder and manager, shareholder and bondholder to be constituents of firm, agency costs occur.
Agency costs defined as the difference between first-best solution and second-best solution to settle agency problem may be classified into agency costs of equity and debt according to source. And then the former may be reclassified into perquisites and underinvestment incentives, the latter, into over-risk-seeking incentives, underinvestment incentives and bankruptcy costs.
Agency costs may be resolved through monitoring and bonding activities. When managers raise the lack funds from the external due to dividend payment of internal cash flow of the firm, they are powerfully monitored by capital market, and then agency costs reduce. Hence, dividend policy plays the role of monitoring and bonding activities as it induces external financing.
Dividend policy plays a role in resolving agency problems between not only shareholder and manager but also shareholder and bondholder, but this study assumes that agency costs and their effects on dividend policy are optimally resolved by contracting and power of market. However, although agency costs reduce if dividend payment increases to be resolved agency problems between shareholder and manager, as transaction costs increase due to external financing optimum dividend payout ratio in a state of equilibrium of agency costs and transaction costs is necessary. Variables to affect determination of optimum dividend payout ratio and hypothesis what kinds of effect they have on it are outlined as follows.
1. As firms with high growth rate of revenues have a greater need for external funds, which incur higher transaction costs and then allot lower dividend payment accordingly, there is a negative relationship between a revenue growth rate in sales and dividend payout ratio.
2. As larger size firms have relatively lower transaction costs in external financing, they may have higher dividend payment. And they have higher dividend payment to reduce agency costs incurred due to larger information asymmetry. Hence, there is a positive relationship between firm size and dividend payout ratio.
3. Firms with higher operating and/or financial leverage have lower dividend payment due to higher transaction costs in relation to frequent external financing. Hence, there is a negative relationship between leverage and dividend payout ratio.
4. Firms with higher earnings volatility have lower dividend payment due to higher transaction costs incurred by increase of intrinsic business risk. Hence, there is a negative relationship between earnings volatility and dividend payout ratio.
5. Firms whose fraction rate of equity held by insiders is higher may reduce agency costs with lower dividend payment as the result of lower information asymmetry. Hence, there is a negative relationship between fraction rate of equity held by insiders and dividend payment ratio.
6. Firms with diffused outside shareholers may reduce agency costs with higher dividend payment because of difficulty in monitoring mangers' action. Hence, there is a positive relationship between diffused outside shareholders and dividend payout ratio.
7. Firms may reduce agency costs with higher dividend payment as institutional investors prefer dividend to capital gains. Hence, there is a positive relationship between institutional investors' shareholding and dividend payout ratio.
In accordance with selection standards, 81 firms of corporates listed in Korea Stock Exchange over the subsequent five-years from 1990 to 1994 are settled to test these hypothesis, and they are analysed by multiple regression model. In consequence of statistical analysis, the multiple regression analysis model employed for analysing is significant at 10% significance level. However, as the explanatory power of each independent variables for dependent variables is insignificant and the general explanatory power of it is very low as well, they scarcely seem to play a role in deciding optimum dividend payout ratio.
However, as independent variables except β˚, intrinsic business risk, show results equal to theoretical expectation, although the explanatory power as independent variables is low, they seem to have an effect on deciding dividend payment ratio. The fact that β˚ shows different result from theoretical expectation is considered as managers pay unreasonable dividend to outside shareholders to preserve firm value by using the signalling effects of dividend and/or right of management.
Consequently, as the mutiple regression equation employed in this thesis is significant, but explanatory power of independent variables for dependent variables is insignificant, agency costs and transaction costs seem not to play a decisive role in deciding dividend policy in our country. However, as almost all results of empirical analysis show sign similar to theoretical expectation, agency costs and transaction costs seem to affect dividend policy. I think that such a phenomenon happens because corporates can not voluntarily decide dividend policy due to indirect control of government and main correspondent bank.
Limitation of this study like other studies which deal with model-building is that all possible variables which may affect determination of payout ratio may not be included in the model. An attempt is made to include all relevant variables into independent variables based on theoretical considerations or findings from earlier research, but variables that can affect determination of dividend payout ratio except independent variables used in this study may be existent.
Another limitation is the selection problem of sample. The samples of corporates were not selected randomly. Only firms with complete data over a five-years period were included. This lack of randomness may lead to selection bias, hence limits the external validity of the conclusion. And since variables used in multiple regression model are pure averages of five of data, the difference of changes of dividend payout ratio over time can not be explained.
In future research, therefore, agency costs and transaction costs that may have an effect on deciding dividend payout ratio must be found further, and also methods that may control other variables able to affect the determination of dividend payout ratio except these costs must be studied.
서지정보 내보내기(Export)
닫기소장기관 정보
닫기권호소장정보
닫기오류접수
닫기오류 접수 확인
닫기음성서비스 신청
닫기음성서비스 신청 확인
닫기이용약관
닫기학술연구정보서비스 이용약관 (2017년 1월 1일 ~ 현재 적용)
학술연구정보서비스(이하 RISS)는 정보주체의 자유와 권리 보호를 위해 「개인정보 보호법」 및 관계 법령이 정한 바를 준수하여, 적법하게 개인정보를 처리하고 안전하게 관리하고 있습니다. 이에 「개인정보 보호법」 제30조에 따라 정보주체에게 개인정보 처리에 관한 절차 및 기준을 안내하고, 이와 관련한 고충을 신속하고 원활하게 처리할 수 있도록 하기 위하여 다음과 같이 개인정보 처리방침을 수립·공개합니다.
주요 개인정보 처리 표시(라벨링)
목 차
3년
또는 회원탈퇴시까지5년
(「전자상거래 등에서의 소비자보호에 관한3년
(「전자상거래 등에서의 소비자보호에 관한2년
이상(개인정보보호위원회 : 개인정보의 안전성 확보조치 기준)개인정보파일의 명칭 | 운영근거 / 처리목적 | 개인정보파일에 기록되는 개인정보의 항목 | 보유기간 | |
---|---|---|---|---|
학술연구정보서비스 이용자 가입정보 파일 | 한국교육학술정보원법 | 필수 | ID, 비밀번호, 성명, 생년월일, 신분(직업구분), 이메일, 소속분야, 웹진메일 수신동의 여부 | 3년 또는 탈퇴시 |
선택 | 소속기관명, 소속도서관명, 학과/부서명, 학번/직원번호, 휴대전화, 주소 |
구분 | 담당자 | 연락처 |
---|---|---|
KERIS 개인정보 보호책임자 | 정보보호본부 김태우 | - 이메일 : lsy@keris.or.kr - 전화번호 : 053-714-0439 - 팩스번호 : 053-714-0195 |
KERIS 개인정보 보호담당자 | 개인정보보호부 이상엽 | |
RISS 개인정보 보호책임자 | 대학학술본부 장금연 | - 이메일 : giltizen@keris.or.kr - 전화번호 : 053-714-0149 - 팩스번호 : 053-714-0194 |
RISS 개인정보 보호담당자 | 학술진흥부 길원진 |
자동로그아웃 안내
닫기인증오류 안내
닫기귀하께서는 휴면계정 전환 후 1년동안 회원정보 수집 및 이용에 대한
재동의를 하지 않으신 관계로 개인정보가 삭제되었습니다.
(참조 : RISS 이용약관 및 개인정보처리방침)
신규회원으로 가입하여 이용 부탁 드리며, 추가 문의는 고객센터로 연락 바랍니다.
- 기존 아이디 재사용 불가
휴면계정 안내
RISS는 [표준개인정보 보호지침]에 따라 2년을 주기로 개인정보 수집·이용에 관하여 (재)동의를 받고 있으며, (재)동의를 하지 않을 경우, 휴면계정으로 전환됩니다.
(※ 휴면계정은 원문이용 및 복사/대출 서비스를 이용할 수 없습니다.)
휴면계정으로 전환된 후 1년간 회원정보 수집·이용에 대한 재동의를 하지 않을 경우, RISS에서 자동탈퇴 및 개인정보가 삭제처리 됩니다.
고객센터 1599-3122
ARS번호+1번(회원가입 및 정보수정)