A Study on the Marine Strategy Reorientation of China After the Cold War Era
- Focusing on Naval Strategy -


Son, Suk Joo
Dept of International Relations
The Graduate School of
Hankook University of Foreign studies


This dissertation analyzes the Chinese marine strategy reoriented since the 1991 post-cold war deductively on, not by means of the response, to certain affairs, but by the realistic macro viewpoint of the affairs. The Chinese marine strategy analyzed from this position illustrates that it has the characteristics of expansionism different from the defensive strategy during the cold-war period. Since the Hu government, the Chinese marine strategy has shifted its direction to its role as one of the superpowers based on its enlargement of the comprehensive national power due to economic growth. The change of the national security environment after the post-cold war era has driven the Chinese government to modernize navy power step by step by focusing its defense tactics from the northern region to the neighboring islands. In this process, the Chinese government escalated its role of navy forces as the driving means of the national strategy and the defender of the marine power including territorial sovereignty. These improvements of Chinese naval forces are evaluated as still falling far behind that of the United States, Russia and Japan, however, the Chinese naval forces overwhelm neighboring countries in quantity. With these reinforced naval forces, the Chinese government has demonstrated that it could become a hegemonic state in the region whenever it wishes by occupying the Mischief atoll by force, which is the natural resources treasure and the strategic point. This shows that it is possible for China to be aggressive and dogmatic in pursuing foreign policies like other powers in the past. From this point of view, it is expected that China will take its course toward the expansion of marine jurisdiction to become a world power in accordance with the present policy of economic development as a priority, which is dependent upon the development rate of the current level of the economic growth aiming to establish the overall well-off society (Xiao Kang society) by 2020. If this is so, the Chinese hegemony will meet strong confrontation from the USA and Japan and as a result, this hegemony rivalry is hardly avoidable from escalating to the hegemony war in the region. Chinese future marine strategy will rest on directions set by Chinese leaders, however, the current marine expansion policy is expected to continue judging from their strong military policy to pursue world power emerging from their defensive posture. The Chinese pursuit of marine domination will be the most variable factor affecting the Northeast Asian security order and bring about the following consequences:

First, for the present, it will bring about the arms race of naval forces and intensify marine conflicts. Each of the East Asian countries will escalate the arms race focusing on strengthening naval forces in order to protect its own marine right and establish its own safe marine transportation routes. If China extends its control over coral reefs and sunken rocks building artificial islands on them in the Southern China sea, feuds among the countries involved will be amplified. The recently emerging dispute over the Senkakyu islands between China and Japan is the center of attention considering the situation in which the possible development to the arms conflict is increasing steadily in the wake of full-scale oil production in neighboring waters.
Second, for the mid-term, the marine hegemony competition will be keen due to the aggressive diversionary movement toward China by the USA and Japan. As China seeks expansion of its marine sovereignty based on its naval forces and strengthens its influence to neighboring countries, China will contemplate enlarging its own role by reorganizing the international order in East Asia toward the direction desirable for China. In this matter, the USA and Japan will cooperate by consolidating the defense agreement to check actively the Chinese marine advances and by switching from their position of passive involvement in the marine dispute to positive intervention, which will cause the tension to rise to a high point.
Third, for the mid to long term, the tension in the Taiwan Strait will keep on owing to the strengthening of Taiwanese naval forces in the defensive movement against the probable arms use by China. For China, Taiwan's issue is the first priority to solve in any matter. It is expected that China could possibly use armed forces according to the Taiwan's attitudes such as the independence movement amidst continued arms race between China and Taiwan.
Finally, for the long-term, the international order in East Asia will develop toward a power balanced system of the bipolar regional framework by the USA and China. As China heads for the nation of wealth and military power, it will emerge as the only country that could challenge the influence of the USA, and pursue its role as the one axis of power balance in the region. Considering the recent Sino-Russia close ties, this trend will evolve to the power-balance system in which USA-Japan is one point and Sino-Russia the other in each axis, and in this process the confrontation and hegemony competition are expected to be magnified. On the other hand, China regards the Korean peninsula as one of great importance in its pursuance of the omnidirectional diplomacy towards the world as well as the East Asian policy. Especially, the balance of power policy in the Korean peninsula assuming the survival of North Korea is thought to be a pivotal factor in the East Asian policy. We have thus far discussed the China's expansion policy and from this background knowledge, here are some suggestions:
First, China will promote the interest in the demarcation of economic waters in the West Sea currently unsettled between Korea and China and the marine jurisdiction over the waters. Establishing stability to some degree in the dominion dispute over the South China sea, China is expected to avert its interest in the North. In this case, it is anticipated that China will take a probable repressive posture mobilizing naval forces to solve the boundary problem in the West Sea that is yet to be settled.
Second, China will attempt to blockade the possible connection of military buildup and the role scale-up in Korea with the inamicable policy against China by the USA and Japan. While keeping an attentive eye on the recent relocation, the role and restructuring of the US forces in Korea accompanying the reduction of the US forces in Korea, China is on the watch against the escalation of the positive role performance and participation of Korea since the US-Korea alliance is not confined to the Korean peninsula but include even the security issue in the Pacific region. This seems to be caused by the probable limited role of Korea as well as the entry into the war of the US forces stationed in Korea in case of an emergency in Taiwan.
Third, China will intervene by all means when there is any crisis in Korea. China recognizes the Korean peninsula as being under its influence and considers any crisis in Korea as being an opportunity for an effective dominion over Korea. On the other hand, China fears that a crisis could bring to a close a permanent division of the Korean peninsula and thus it not only affects the ethnic Koreans living in the three northeastern provinces but also it could promote national consciousness of minorities in China. In particular, Chinese naval forces are expected to enter the war in order to deter or delay the US military buildup to intervene in a conflict.
Fourth, in response to the US strategic points of Korea and Japan in the Great Northeastern Asian region, it is anticipated that China will seek a possibility of using the Tumen river in North Korea or of hiring a long-term lease in the Najin and Sunbong regions in North Korea so that China could use these areas for their frontier bases to advance to the Pacific. In connection with the above, it is assumed that North Korea could probably approve this suggestion to establish the ally ties systematically considering relative weak personal relationships with leaders of the post-fourth generation in China. This will play a factor to undergo a change in the power balance in Northeast Asia.
Finally, the relationship change among the four powers around Korea will have a great effect on the Korean peninsula in the future. Accordingly, Korea should prepare against the probable tactical reorientation by the neighboring four powers keeping in mind that the dynamic relations of the four powers are in a state of flux. Considering this situation, Korea should reinforce naval and air forces to get ready for the possible small scale marine disputes in a short period and build a defensive power to reject any large scale armed challenges in the long term. But the most important of all is that Korea should solidify the Korea-US security cooperation and make use of this as a deterrent for China not to opt for the use of armed force.
In addition, Korea should expand the bilateral cooperation between Korea and China in order to have the Chinese leaders think that exchanges and cooperation, and the maintenance of peace with Korea are beneficial for the Chinese economic development so that they acknowledge the need of a partnership with Korea. Especially, Korea should establish a comprehensive diplomatic security policy against China reflecting the Chinese adjustment in the relationship with the US and Japan.