Ⅰ. The Purpose of the Study

The policy fiasco in location of radioactive waste facilities due to massive opposition from neighboring residents for the past two decades had dramatically turned to the eclat by active invitation competition in 2005. The government had mobilized various means (i.e., the increase of economic incentives, the enhancement of procedural democracy, public relations for safety of radioactive waste disposal facilities, and large-scale policy modification by changing related government agencies) to reduce residents' antipathy through correcting policy errors. Unfortunately, these governmental endeavors were not sublimed to the improvement of policy acceptance of the public. Rather, more enthusiastic and violent resistance to nuclear facilities in Ahnmyondo, Gulupdo, and Buahn seemed to make it impossible to get nuclear policy acceptability.
However, the location decision in 2005 had showed pro-nuclear facilities activism. Considering the fact that there was a civil anti-nuclear violent upheaval in Buahn just a year ago, it can be said that policy acceptance for nuclear facilities was surprisingly raised. Despite the lack of visible policy transformation such as the increase of economic incentives and the change of agencies in charge of nuclear policies, residents' responses in 2005 showed attitudes wholly different from those in 2004. This dissertation focuses on such rapid change of location policy acceptance. As a theoretical framework to analyze facets of that change, the Catastrophe Theory that emphasizes both artificial input elements from timely flows and interaction among situational conditions is applied to the case of location policy of radioactive waste disposal facilities. Moreover, the discussion based upon this theory indicates problems inherited in variables and analytic methodologies to which prior studies paid a great attention.

Ⅱ. The Arguments of the Study

It is true that economic incentives, trust in governments and institutions, and risk perception have a great influence on policy acceptance in the process to select a particular site of a radioactive waste disposal facility. Though all of these factors reach the satisfactory level, we can never guarantee the completeness of policy acceptance. Since such factors have the interaction with diverse situational conditions by timely flow, they may hamstring policy intention of government agencies. Though, government authorities have considered not how situational conditions change artificial input components but what are estimated as simple (linear) causal factors. In other words, incorrect analyses on the cause-and-effect relationship (policy analyses grounded on spurious relationship) evoke the misleading correction of policy errors. This fallacy in policy process was the consequence of not carefully - with the blind concentration on achieving policy goals - investigating the interaction through which policy acceptance was formed.
On the basis of Catastrophe Theory, this research on location process of radioactive waste disposal facilities in 2005 explores the process by which interaction determines policy acceptance. In the first phase, the new policy trial of a government re-generated pro-opinions and anti-opinions about radioactive waste disposal facilities. Such opinion re-generation itself could not warrant the increase of policy acceptance because the creation of bipolar opinions has also been showed in the past location decision-making processes, when the strengthened power of anti-nuclear groups made local politicians not free from political pressure and let them not express their support for nuclear facility location. The spread of pro-nuclear opinions was very uncertain because of still more visible activism of anti-nuclear groups.
Second, Kyoungju anti-nuclear civic groups that had been the center of strong anti-nuclear opinions publicly supported to invite a radioactive waste disposal facility with the emphasis of local specificity. This reverse turn of local anti-nuclear group reduced political burdens on local politicians' shoulder so that Kyoungju City Council immediately and officially announced the support for inviting that facility. The pro-nuclear facility proclamation of Kyoungju City Council led open discussions in other localities. The vitalization of local open discussions shrank anti-nuclear activism so that favorable conditions for spreading pro-opinions were shaped. Local politicians who explore the momentum of local development actively expressed the enthusiastic support for inviting a radioactive waste disposal facility right after pro-opinions became more dominant. Official supports from four local councils (Kyoungju, Gunsan, Pohang, and Youngduk) generated invitation competition phase.
Third, the formation of competition made four localities not only set the new goal to win over rival communities but also mobilize inner capacity to disseminate pro-opinions. Each local community detected competitors' strategies and tried to actively block activities of anti-groups. While this situation stagnated the diffusion of anti-opinions, it led that of pro-opinions. The prevalence of residents' competition anxiety and crisis argument ("we must never lose in the invitation competition") mobilized psychological factors for permeating pro-opinions. Also, the voluntary participation of local civic groups multiplied the extent of support rather than simply increased it. Consequently, all of competing localities exhibited a high level of agreement on inviting the facility and rapid turn of policy acceptance.
This analysis result demonstrates that policy acceptance is determined not merely by artificial input elements that government authorities project but also by maturation of situational conditions through which those elements are positively operated. Especially, it identifies that who participate in the site selection process affects policy acceptance.

Ⅲ. Implication of the Study

The analysis on rapid change in policy acceptance derives the following meaningful implications from the application of the Catastrophe Theory to the location policy case of a radioactive waste disposal facility. Firstly, the dependence upon linear causality in policy analysis makes it impossible to explore the substantial dynamics of policy phenomena; furthermore, the misleading conclusion of policy analysis by spurious correlation provokes a chronic policy failure. The evidence to the policy failure is the fact that the level of policy acceptance has stayed extremely low despite the continuous stress on the linearity between problems and prescription.
Second, the Catastrophe Theory is a very useful alternative way of explanation in policy analysis in the point that it overcomes limitations of linear explanation by valuing elements in the flow of time and the interaction between situational conditions. The conclusion of the analysis on rapid change of policy acceptance, based on the Catastrophe Theory, remarks that both the level and the strength of anti-group activism which serve as situational conditions greatly affect policy acceptance.
Third, socially rapid revolving is not created by some specific factors, but rather the addition of a tipping point (an impetus that spurs rapid change) to the long-term accumulation of those presumptive factors. This means that seemingly rapid social phenomena actually follow incremental and evolutionary change. The quick turn of policy acceptance is impossible without the precedence of gradual institutional changes.
Fourth, policy acceptance is not decided by individuals' rational choice. Pro-nuclear facility activism as well as the participation of local politicians and residents in the movement against abominated facilities was because they could not but help recognize political pressure from and stigma within local society. Rather than the individual expression of preference, policy acceptance is the consequence of collective action made by political particularity of local society.
Finally, the discussion about policy acceptance should be accompanied with the great attention to the participatory map. Who participates in policy-making process is an important tipping point that determines whether the perception of residents as policy target is positive or negative. The information provided by anti-groups with ideological foundation tends to be communicated not rationally but sentimentally; as a result, the dissemination of emotional information lacking logical ground has a negative influence on policy acceptance.

이 논문은 우리나라 방사성폐기물처리장 입지정책에서 나타난 정책수용성의 급격한 변화를 카타스트로프 이론을 원용해 분석하였다.1989년부터 2004년까지 극심한 주민반발로 실패를 답습하였던 방사성폐기물처리장 입지정책은 2005년 대규모 찬성운동이 벌어지면서 성공적으로 마무리되었다. 정부의 대규모 정책오차수정에도 변화를 보이지 않았던 정책수용성이 별다른 정책수정을 가하지 않았음에도 급격하게 변화된 것이었다. 이 논문은 이러한 급변현상을 설명함으로써 그동안의 정책수용성 연구의 문제점을 발견하고, 새로운 설명방식을 제시하는데 초점을 두었다. 그동안 강조되어온 경제적 보상, 정부 및 제도신뢰, 위험인지 등이 정책수용성에 영향을 미치는 중요한 변수임에는 틀림없다. 그러나 기존의 연구는 정책수용성이 어떠한 과정을 거쳐 만들어지는지 확인하지 못하였다는 단점을 지니고 있었다. 행정학을 비롯한 사회과학 전반에서 인과관계만을 지나치게 강조하면서 선형적인 설명구조가 확산되었고, 이는 시간의 변화에 따른 상황조건의 변화를 간과하도록 유도하였다. 그 결과 정책수용성이 어떠한 과정을 거쳐 형성되고, 변화되는지에 관심을 기울이지 않았다. 카타스트로프 이론은 시간의 변화에 따른 상황적 조건의 변화가 인위적으로 투입된 요인들을 어떻게 변화시킬 수 있는지를 분석할 수 있다는 장점이 있어 선형적 설명구조가 지니는 단점을 보완해줄 수 있다. 분석결과 그동안 논의되지 않았던 참여지형의 중요성을 강조할 수 있었다. 누가 입지선정과정에서 찬성과 반대여론을 형성시키는지에 따라 대규모 반대운동이 일어날 수도 있고, 대규모 찬성운동이 일어날 수도 있다는 의미이다. 즉 대실패를 겪었던 입지선정과정에서는 반대단체의 활동이 강화되기에 우호적인 조건이 형성되었고, 대성공을 거두었던 입지선정과정에서는 반대단체의 활동이 강화되기 어려운 상황이었는데, 이것이 정책수용성에 막대한 영향을 미칠 수 있음을 확인하였다. 이는 정책수용성이 개개인의 합리적인 선택에 의해 결정되지 않고, 집단행동이라는 사회적인 과정을 포함함을 의미하는 것이었다. 그러나 이러한 조건들이 정책수용성을 결정하는 핵심이라고 주장하기는 어렵다. 사회적 급변현상은 몇몇의 요인들에 의해 만들어지는 것이 아니라 장기간에 걸쳐 변화의 요인들이 축적되고, 여기에 급격한 변화를 견인하는 순간적인 요소(조건)가 첨가될 때 가능하기 때문이다. 이는 사회적인 급변현상이 점진적이고, 진화적인 관점을 견지하고 있음을 의미한다.