关于创业板股票发行和市盈率的法律思考 = The Legal Thinking about GEM Stock Issuance and the P/E Ratio

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

GEM companies can obtain huge income when listed. However, the listed companies are no better than the non-listed ones, no matter compared in law or in company’s performance, in that Hi-Tech technology which GEM companies depend on may be updated every day and may also be replaced by other new technologies. Therefore, it is necessary to fully prompt risks of company development to investors. In order to minimize the risk of company development, it is hoped that regulation system is established to forbid sponsors to from transferring stock before the company makes continuous profit, because sponsors should not escape responsibility for the investment and bear the risk entirely on non-sponsors. In order to effectively safeguard the interests of the company, sponsors are objectively required to undertake stricter responsibility compared to non-sponsors, which should at least include: sponsors who do not serve as executives in the company can not transfer stock until the company makes continuous profits for 2 years or makes accumulated earnings for 4 years; sponsors who serve as executives in GEM company (including executives recommended by corporation sponsors) can not transfer stock during the period of being served as executives. The person who serves as an executive after the company is listed is likely to hold a large share of the company. To maintain the prosperity of GEM, appropriate restrictions should be made towards P/E ratio in IPO of GEM companies. No regulations of P/E ratio in IPO mean that all the interests of premiums are yielded to the issuers, and restrictions of P/E multiple mean yielding part of the premium benefits to investors. Realizing the premium of the stock issuance in the secondary market is equivalent to the fact that a part of premium income transfers from the issuers to the investors, which plays a role on balancing interests in the securities market. If it is considered that the investors receiving so many stocks premium at one time is a little unfair, it may establish the 10% daily limit system to share benefits to more investors, thus more conducive to stimulating investments. Therefore, the conclusion comes that as to support and maintain investors’ confidence in GEM, the policy of limitation on high P/E rate should be implemented in the GEM IPO, and the premium income should be slowly released to more investors.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

创业板公司一旦上市便可获得天文收益，但无论从法律上比较、还是从公司业绩上比较，能够上市的公司的前景并没有明显比不能上市的公司强,因为高科技术每日都可能更新，创业板公司赖以上市的高科技也可能被其他新技术取代,所以要向投资者充分提示公司发展风险。为了尽量降低公司发展风险，希望有制度规定发起人在公司持续盈利前不得转让股票，不能在投资责任上溜之大吉，将公司经营风险完全让非发起人承担。为了切实维护公司利益，客观上要求发起人应对公司利益承担比较严格的责任，至少应包括：发起人没有担任公司高管的，在公司连续2年盈利或累计盈利4年之前不得转让股票；发起人担任创业板公司高管的（包括发起人为法人推荐自然人为高管的），在担任高管期间不得转让股票。；公司上市后担任高管的，其本人应持有较大份额的本公司股份为维护创业板市场的繁荣，对创业板公司IPO市盈率应有适当的限制，不规定IPO的市盈率就是将溢价利益全部给发行人，规定IPO的市盈率倍数就是将部分溢价利益让给投资者，将股票发行溢价收益到二级市场上变现，相当于将股票发行的一部分溢价收益从发行人转移到投资者，对证券市场将会起到一种平衡利益的作用，如果认为让投资者一次得到那么多股票溢价收入有点不公平，那可以在创业板股票初次上市时就采用10%的涨停板制度，把好处让更多的投资者获取，从而更有利于刺激投资。所以结论是对创业板IPO应实行市盈率高限政策，将创业板股票溢价收益慢慢释放给更多的投资者，以支持和维护投资者对创业板市场的信心。

참고문헌 (Reference)

• 1 叶林, "证券法教程" 法律出版社 2005
• 2 范健, "证券法" 法律出版社 2007
• 3 周友苏, "新证券法论" 法律出版社 2007
• 4 徐明, "新证券法解读" 上海社会科学院出版社 2005
• 5 彭冰, "中国证券法学" 高等教育出版社 2005