규제의 목표, 수단, 자원의 관계에 대한 연구

국문 초록 (Abstract)

일반적으로 규제목표는 높을수록, 규제수단은 강력할수록 더 높은 규제효과를 얻어낼 수 있을 것이라는 단순논리에 사람들은 별 의심을 갖지 않는다. 이 글은 흔히 간과되고 마는 경향이 있는 규제집행과정과 단계에서 드러나는 규제자와 피규제자의 특징적인 의사결정패턴과 행태, 그리고 이 단계에서 지배적인 요인으로 작용하는 규제집행자원의 제약이란 강력한 제약조건(strong resource constraints)에 주목하면서, 이런 접근방법이 규제효과의 달성에 도움이 되지 않을뿐더러 규제의 불합리성을 오히려 심화시킬 뿐이라는 사실을 논증하고 있다. 이어서 규제목표를 이용가능한 자원의 수준에 맞게 설정하는 것이 규제의 실질효과를 높이는 올바른 접근방법임을 주장하면서, 그 실천방안으로서 “현상 대비 x% 개선”이나 규제총비용을 제한하는 방식의 도입을 제안하고 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Regulatory goals tend to be set as high as possible, and its instruments chosen as strong as possible. This tendency is usually justified on such ground that regulations designed as such must accomplish regulatory goals most effectively. This study casts strong doubt about this naive belief. Paying particular attention to the inherent vagueness and lack of concreteness of policy goals in nature and the typical behavior both on the part of regulators and the regulated at the stage of regulatory enforcement, and also taking cognizance of the utmost strong influence that resources constraints exert at this stage, this study argues, from the perspective of incremental approach, that such a synoptic approach to regulatory goal setting must end up with greater dissatisfaction, for those regulations designed in such a fashion-mostly input standards in sort-would only further increase unreasonableness of regulations. In the spirit of incremental approach, this study suggests an alternative way of setting regulatory goals in such a manner as to make “X% improvement from the status quo” -which can be derived from an expert survey or international comparisons of states achieved under current regulatory structures of advanced countries-a realistic goal to be achieved next year. This method would help increase economic efficiency of allocating limited resources available for regulatory enforcement, set policy priorities right in the midst of unending requests for ever higher regulatory goals from the society, and make it far easier to appraise and compare the levels of achievement of regulatory goals.

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