페트로그라드 군사혁명위원회와 10월 무장봉기 = Petrograd Military-Revolutionary Committee and October Uprising

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

On October 9, 1917, the Petrograd Military District command issued an order to send some units of the Petrograd garrison to the front to defend the approaches to Petrograd. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of Petrograd Soviet on the same morning, the Mensheviks proposed organizing a “Revolutionary Defense Committee” to cooperate with the Provisional Government and the military command in defending the capital from a German attack, and their resolution was adopted amid the division within the Bolshevik faction. However, that evening, at a plenary session of the Petrograd Soviet, the Bolsheviks united to pass a resolution to organize a “Revolutionary Defense Committee” to monitor and prevent the Provisional Government and the military command from using troop movements for counter-revolutionary purposes. This unity among the Bolsheviks was led by more moderate figures such as Kamenev. Given that the Bolshevik Central Committee (BCC) did not adopt the line of armed uprising until October 10, it is clear that the Military-Revolutionary Committee emerged as an institution unrelated to the armed uprising at that point.
The so-called “Razimir’s Plan”, drafted by the left socialist-revolutionary Razimir was approved at the plenary session of the Petrograd Soviet on October 16 after going through several discussions. In the process, the name was changed to “Military-Revolutionary Committee,”(MRC) the number of participating institutions expanded, and not only the Petrograd garrison but also the garrisons in the surrounding areas went under its control. At the same time, to facilitate communication between the MRC and the garrison units, the Garrison Council, consisting of representatives from the garrison units, was organized. After its formation, Razimir, symbolizing the alliance between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, was elected as its chair, with the secretariat composed of three Bolsheviks and two left socialist-revolutionaries. This composition symbolized that the MRC was not a subordinate organization of the Bolshevik Party but rather of the Petrograd Soviet.
Meanwhile, the BCC adopted the line of armed uprising at its meetings on October 10 and 16, in which Lenin personally participated. However, due to the open opposition of some leaders and the resulting deep divisions, the BCC was unable to act as the leading body for the armed uprising. As a result, the Petrograd Soviet and the MRC played a crucial role in preparing and executing the armed uprising. Trotsky's defensive line gained prominence: while the Soviet Congress would ultimately decide on the question of power, the armed uprising should be prepared as a firm response to any counter-revolutionary attempts to thwart the Congress's decisions. This defensive line continued even after the Provisional Government and the Military District Command began provocative actions using some military forces in the early hours of October 24.
By around midnight on October 24, the defensive posture of the Petrograd Soviet and the MRC began to change. At this time, Lenin, who had arrived at Smolny, pressured his Bolshevik comrades to initiate the armed uprising, and as the MRC’s military superiority became increasingly clear, the Committee began to take more aggressive action. In particular, at 2 AM, it launched a full-scale operation to seize key positions. The MRC now assumed the role of the command center for the armed uprising, aiming to overthrow the Provisional Government and seize power. By the morning of October 25, the armed uprising succeeded, and the MRC declared itself the provisional revolutionary government until the All-Russian Soviet Congress could establish a new government.