작품의 의미와 의도주의-반의도주의 논쟁 = Work`s Meaning and Author`s Intention: Intentionalism vs. Anti-intentionalism

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Dealing with the debate concerning the proper role of an author’s intention in the interpretation of her work, this paper goes against intentionalism, the position which maintains that intention is essential for determining the meaning of the work. Since it is well agreed upon that ‘Humpty-Dumpty-ism,’ which is a consequence of radical intentionalism, should be avoided, contemporary intentionalism has evolved into a ‘moderate actual intentionalism,’ a kind of compromised theory. However, even in this move, any particularly persuasive explanation of the motivation for why we should consider actual intention at all has not been given yet. Furthermore, I believe the compromise undermines the fundamental of intentionalism. What the moderate theory amounts to is not really a version of intentionalism. I also discuss a new argument for the actual intentionalism by Maes using the case in contemporary plastic art. I do not find anything favorable for intentionalism here either. On my way to argue this point, the distinction between the categorical intention and the semantic intention comes up. The categorical intention is the one that relates to the ontological status of the work, and for that reason, it is possible that even anti-intentionalists can accept the role of it without being incoherent. And in contemporary art, a certain work possibly has a categorical intention such that the intention of the author has to be considered. Such intention could be considered as constituting an ontological part of the work. So, if a work belongs to this particular category which requires the consideration of author’s intention as an essential point to start the semantic interpretation of the work, then even anti-intentionalists can be justified to consider the intention for determining a work’s meaning. This would be my suggestion for the proper compromise between the basic anti-intentionalistic principle and the so called intentionalistic intuition that is seemingly hard to ignore in some cases.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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