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일반 논문 : 기업형수퍼마켓 규제와 경쟁정책 = Regular Papers : The SSM Regulation and Competition Policy
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발행기관
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
2012
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Korean
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KCI등재
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이 글은 중소사업자 보호가 경쟁정책에서 어떤 경제적 근거를 가질 수 있는지를 검토하고, 이런 시각에서 최근 시행된 기업형수퍼마켓(SSM) 규제에 관해 살펴본다. SSM 규제의 핵심은 진입제한에 있으며 따라서 일견 반경쟁적이다. 경쟁정책은 ``경쟁자가 아니라 경쟁을 보호한다``는 말은 흔히 인용되는 바이지만 경쟁의 장이 항상 이상적으로 평평한 것은 아니다. 경쟁법의 일부는 어떤 기업을 다른 기업의 남용행위로부터 보호하는데 관한 것이다. 오늘날 경쟁정책은 대체로 소비자후생을 추구하고 있는데, 그렇다면 그것은 (준)빠레또기준에 입각하고 있는 것으로 해석될 수 있다. 이런 관점에서 본다면 중소사업자 보호가 전통적인 경쟁정책과 반드시 상충하는 것은 아니라고 하겠다. 즉 SSM 규제는 중소유통업에 대한 진흥 및 지원 정책에 대한 보완수단으로 이해될 수 있을 것이다. SSM 규제의 현황을 간략히 정리하고 이에 관한 다양한 찬반론들을 비판적으로 검토한 다음, 예상되는 정책효과 및 부작용들, 그리고 개선방향 등을 제시하였다.
더보기This paper attempts to suggest some economic rationale of protecting small business in competition policy and, in this context, assesses the regulation against SSM (super supermarkets) openings, which has recently been legislated in Korea. Modern competition policy is mostly enforced along the objective of securing consumer welfare. But the competition policy in America or the European Union was born with multiple, and sometimes contradictory, goals. The Sherman Act in America, for instance, was allegedly ``special interest legislation, and the principal protected class was small business.`` And in the European competition law, protection of competitors has been included in its objective, too. Though people seem to routinely remark that competition policy pursues economic efficiencies, it is quite a recent case. It is often necessary to protect ``competitors`` in order to protect ``competition`` or competitive process itself, not least because competition does not always take place in a ``level field.`` Competition in actuality may not always be competition ``on the merit,`` i.e. ``fair`` competition. Competition policy can actively intervene and protect weak, small businesses in some asymmetric market conditions. In this perspective, protection of small business may not necessarily conflict with promotion of consumer welfare as the legitimate goal. It is frequently disputed whether what competition policy is supposed to pursue is consumer welfare or allocative efficiency. This is whether to aim at consumer`s surplus in particular or total surplus (producer`s surplus added) as a whole. Protecting consumer welfare can be interpreted as a (quasi-) Pareto welfare criterion whereas pursuing total surplus implies the Kaldor-Hicks (compensation) criterion. Though there are some persuasive economic cases for the total surplus goal, competition authorities in many countries tend to (at least implicitly) choose the consumer welfare goal in practice. Thus it can be argued that competition policy as usually enforced is based on a Pareto welfare criterion, which means losers should not be entailed or should be adequately compensated for a business action to be allowed or a change to be implemented. Meanwhile, when there is conflict of interests between consumers and producers, there are quite strong cases for the priority of consumers. The case for free trade for instance can also be understood as based on a Pareto criterion in practice, though it corresponds to a Kaldor-Hicks criterion in the literal sense. Whatever disputes it may cause in theory, in practice any policy change might be hard to justify or cannot be realized without some adequate compensation for those thereby harmed. The SSM regulation is a ``business coordination`` scheme to restrict or prohibit store opening by large retail firms in a designated area. The only purpose of the scheme is to protect small incumbent retailers. It is an entry restriction in essence and might cause consumer harm, and is thus prima facie anticompetitive. As with the case for free trade, however, it can be argued that the regulation could only be revoked on the precondition of some compensating measures. Actually a specific, direct compensation toward small retail businesses would be almost impossible to arrange, and the compensation schemes usually take the form of a support or promotion policy. But such indirect compensation schemes tend to be limited in scope or quite ineffective. The SSM regulation may be rationalized as a supplementary measure to those indirect schemes. In sum, the SSM regulation as a business coordination scheme, possibly anticompetitive, can be considered as a practical, temporary device to supplement the required compensation for the damage to small retail business. We need to briefly overview the current state of SSM regulation and the relevant experience of foreign countries. SSM may be roughly defined as a medium-sized supermarket owned and operated by a large retail firm. They have almost quadrupled in number during the recent decade. In early 2010 numerous bills calling for SSM regulation were proposed in the parliament, and the so-called ``twin laws`` were legislated as substantial amendments to the relevant Acts in November 2010. Formally a mandated arbitration procedures as it is, the regulation would very probably work as an entry restriction. Major countries also have similar experience in the conflict between small incumbent retailers and large incoming retail firms. In Europe in particular, entry by large discount retailers has been regulated with a view of protecting small business, apparently in the form of urban planning. Since the 1990s, however, along the market opening trend under the WTO system, direct schemes for small business protection have been abolished or weakened in most developed countries. There have been heated disputes on SSM regulation, and the main points of the pros and cons are summarized and critically reviewed. First, the core case for regulation is the necessity of protecting small business. Whatever is the normative position, any social change may not secure enough support without adequate concern for the underdog in the change. SSM regulation, though anticompetitive in itself, can be taken as a practical, temporary supplement to compensate the damage done to small retailers. Some people worry that local markets will be monopolized by SSMs. But such a result seems a quite remote possibility, and consumer choices could be enlarged rather than curtailed. As for the competitiveness of the retail industry, though it is argued regulation can have a positive effect, that is not so convincing. Entry regulations mostly tend to induce inefficiency and thereby reduce business competitiveness. There is the unconstitutionality issue, too, which looks somewhat far-fetched. Finally, those arguing against regulation fear the bursting of trade conflict, specifically the potential infringement of the GATS provisions. Such a problem may be technically possible, but practically not so plausible given the current situation in many European countries. In concluding remarks, the expected effectiveness and the unintended consequences of regulation are addressed. It is far from clear what consequences SSM regulation as a business coordination scheme will have and how effective it will turn out. Given the present conditions and policy environment, it seems that regulation may not have a significant effect in the long run, which is confirmed by the experience of foreign countries. Potentially serious problems are the uncertainty that regulation inevitably involves and the wrong signals it can transmit to small business in general. And regulation will lead to a perverse result that it effectively protects the incumbent SSMs from the further entry by other SSMs. The scheme needs to be limited temporally as well as spatially. It is advisable for the competition authority to have some role as the advocate for consumer welfare in the business coordination procedure, and try to restrain the potential anticompetitive effect of the regulation. The discussion so far is not only specific to the SSM regulation, but extended to retail markets in general. Changes will incessantly occur and what follows could be viewed as an ongoing restructuring process rather than a problem of conflict from a dichotomous perspective.
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