배출권거래제에서 무상할당 비율을 낮추는 것이 항상 바람직한가?: 한계 비효율성의 관점에서 = Is Reducing Free Allocation Always Desirable in Emissions Trading Schemes?: A Perspective on Marginal Inefficiencies

국문 초록 (Abstract)

많은 국가에서 배출권거래제를 도입할 때 기업의 급격한 비용부담을 완화하고 정책의 수용성을 제고하기 위해 도입 초기에는 높은 비율로 무상할당을 시행하고, 이후에는 탄소누출의 위험을 고려하며 점차 그 비율을 낮추어 가는 것이 일반적이다. 이는 ‘오염자 부담 원칙(Polluter-Pays Principle)’에 따른 것으로, 낮은 무상할당 비율을 고도화된 배출권거래제의 요소 중 하나로 흔히들 간주한다. 이에 본 연구는 배출권 시장이 완전경쟁시장이 아닌 경우, 무상할당 비율을 낮추는 것이 한계 비효율성의 관점에서 바람직하지 않을 수 있음을 간단한 배출권 시장 모형을 통하여 확인한다. 특히 특정 시장 조건에서 배출권 시장의 왜곡으로부터 초래되는 비효율성을 최소화하는 무상할당 비율이 존재함을 입증함으로써 낮은 무상할당 비율이 반드시 배출권거래제의 개선을 의미하는 것은 아님을 보인다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In introducing emissions trading schemes, many countries start with a high level of free allocation to reduce the sudden cost burden on companies and increase acceptance of the policy. The free allocation is then gradually reduced, considering the risks of carbon leakage. This aligns with the “polluter pays” principle and is often considered one of the elements of an advanced emissions trading scheme. In this context, this study uses a simple emissions trading market model to show that decreasing the free allocation rate may not be desirable if the emissions market is not perfectly competitive. In particular, by identifying the existence of a free allocation rate at which the cost inefficiency is minimized, this study demonstrates that having a low level of free allocation does not necessarily imply the improvement of the emissions trading scheme.

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