미국연방대법원, 사법심사 그리고 국민

국문 초록 (Abstract)

헌법이 표명하는 바와 같이 국민이 입법, 사법, 행정을 포함하는 모든 권력에 정당성을 부여하는 단 하나의 원천이라면, 이러한 민주적 정당성이 어떻게 사법부에 잠정적으로 위임되고 부여되는지, 즉 사법부의 정당성(legitimacy)에 대한 논의가 필요하다. 사법부의 정당성 문제는 단순한 법의 해석과 적용이 아닌, 헌법에 위반되는 법의 위헌?무효를 선언하는 사법심사의 정당성과 밀접하게 연관되어 있다. 게다가 이러한 정당성의 문제와 밀접하게 관련 있는 것이 사법심사를 행하는 법원의 재판에 있어서 정치의 역할이고, 이 질문에 대한 만족할 만한 대답이나 합의를찾기는 쉽지 않다. 사실상 내면이 복잡다단한 인간의 행위 또는 부작위의 의도와 생각을 정확하게 알아내는 것이 불가능하듯이 법원의 결정에 있어서의 정치의 역할에 대하여 규명하는 것은, 여기서 검토한 사법정치의 개념정의에서부터 벽에 부딪힌다고 할 수 있다. 그러나 사법심사와 이 권한을 행사하는 법원의 정당성이 사법부를 창설한 헌법제정자에 의해 헌법을 통하여 수여되었다고 보고, 법원에게 요청되는 정당성, 민주적 정당성만이 아니라 이 법원이 행한 사법심사가 보여준 다양한 다른 정당성의 충족을 통하여 특히 연방대법원을 포함한 법원의 사법심사는 정당성을 인정받아 왔고, 자신의 헌법적 위상을 견고하게 설립하였다. 그러나 결국 헌법을 수호하기 위하여 가장 중요한 역할을 하는 것은 국민이며, 이것은 곧, 미국연방대법원이든, 우리 헌법재판소든 그 본연의 독립성, 공정성, 정당성을 잃지 않도록 하기 위해서는 바로 국민들이 각성하여 있어야 한다는 것이다. 다른 한편, 헌법재판을 비롯한 정부의 공권력의 작용의 정당성이 국민에게로부터 나온다는 것과 따라서 자신들이 국민에게 위임받은 권한을 행사하고 있다는 것을 항상 기억하여야 할 것이다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The U.S. Supreme Court has been revered by the people for their constitutional adjudications which are admittedly considered to have contributed in the protection and advancement of civil and individual rights. However the judicial review of this court and its legitimacy has been relentlessly questioned and reviewed by scholars of constitutional law and political science even after this institution was established long time ago. In addition, it is impossible to consider separately the legitimacy of judicial review and the one of the institution which exercises that power. The U.S. Constitution does not provide, on its face, the judiciary with the power of judicial review which enables the judiciary to declare the unconstitutionality of and nullify the law-making by the national legislature. Nor does it establish a special tribunal or constitutional court to review the constitutionality of law. Further, closely related to this legitimacy issue is the role of politics in the judgments of the courts, and any satisfactory answer or consensus to this question is to be successfully found, neither. In fact, it is almost as impossible to give a right answer to the role of politics in the decisions of the courts as to search and expose intention or mind of human beings in their DO"s and Don"ts. Nevertheless, the question on legitimacy of the judiciary exercising judicial review power has been brought to a conclusion that the people has democratically legitimized the judiciary through the constitution which empowers it with judicial power that has been admitted to include constitutional adjudication as well. Besides democratic legitimacy, the courts and judges(or Justices)has been supported by the various legitimacy which strengthens and firmly establishes the constitutional status of, in particular, the U.S. Supreme Court. Even the review of role of politics in the decisions of the courts, discussions on anti-majoritarian or majoritarian difficulty of judicial review, and finally the relationship between the people and U.S. Supreme Court makes me draw a concluding thought that the guardian of the constitution and civil and individual rights is the people themselves and the courts which exercises judicial power including constitutional adjudication power are ultimately legitimized by the people initially through the constitution and its legitimacy has been shaped by the continuous interrelation between the court, other governmental institutions, and the people, either in the name of politics or other than that.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• <국문초록>
• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 미국연방대법원과 사법심사의 정당성에 대한 논의
• Ⅲ. 연방대법원과 국민
• Ⅳ. 결론
• 참고문헌

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