감사위원회의 자발적 수요 요인에 대한 연구 : 대리인비용과 경영자 감시유인을 중심으로 = Determinants of Voluntary Audit Committee Formation- Focusing on Agency Costs and Monitoring Incentives

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In this paper we investigate what factors influence voluntary audit committee formation, focusing on both agency costs and corporate governance characteristics of the firm. Considering three kinds of agency costs which can occur between owners and managements, between owners and creditors, and between majority and minority stockholders, we examine whether each category of agency costs is associated with voluntary audit committee formation. Based on the agency theory, we hypothesize that firms with higher agency costs between their stakeholders are more likely to voluntarily form their audit committees than those with lower agency costs.
We also investigate whether the existence of outside monitors such as independent directors, foreign investors and external auditors is associated with voluntary audit committee formation. Since the existence of external monitoring incentives is more likely to induce firms to voluntarily adopt audit committees, we hypothesize that the existence of the external monitoring incentives is more likely to be associated with voluntary audit committee formation.
We use data concerning Korean listed companies for the period 2000-2006. In Korea, listed firms having more than or equal to 2,000 billion won of assets are required to form their audit committees. This paper focuses on the firms of less than 2,000 billion won of assets. We selected non-financing firms voluntarily forming audit committees, matched with those not forming audit committees. The matching criteria used in the paper include year, industry classification and firm size. Our final sample consists of 172 non-financing firm-year data with voluntary audit committee formation and 172 control data without audit committees.
In our paper, the dependent variable is a dummy variable which indicates whether the firm voluntarily adopts its audit committee or not. Independent variables include agency costs and external monitoring incentives. The agency costs between stakeholders are measured in terms of whether or not top management is an owner, the debt ratio, and the number of related firms. External monitoing incentives are measured in terms of the ratio of independent directors on the board, foreign investors' stockholding ratio, and whether external auditors are big or not. We also include control variables such as firm size, board size and fixed asset size.
Our main empirical results are as follows:
We find that among the agency cost variables, the agency costs between the majority and minority owners are positively associated with the voluntary audit committee formation. Since minority owners have few other tools than audit committees to monitor majority owners, firms with higher agency costs between minority and majority owners are more likely to voluntarily adopt audit committees. We cannot document that the other agency cost variables are significantly associated with voluntary audit committee formation. Our results seem to reflect the Korean situation in which the agency problem between minority and majority owners is more striking.
We also find that voluntary audit committee formation is positively associated with the proportion of the independent directors on the board of directors and the stockholding ratio of foreign investors. This result implies that both majority independent directors on the board and foreign stockholders are more inclined to demand audit committee formation to effectively monitor management. However, the quality of external auditors is not significantly associated with voluntary audit committee formation.
One of our interesting results is that voluntary audit committee formation is negatively correlated with firma size which is currently used to require firms to form their audit committees by the regulation bodies in Korea. This empirical result can be interpreted that since large firms can engage high-quality external auditors to monitor managements, they might be less likely to form their audit committees. Our study may also implies that the regulation body should consider the size of agency costs of the firms and the existence of external monitoring incentives such as the proportion of the independent directors and foreign stockholders, instead of the firm size criteria, in order to require firms to form their effective audit committees.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구에서는 대리인문제를 주주와 전문경영자 사이의 관계, 채권자와 주주 사이의 관계, 그리고 소액주주와 지배주주 사이의 관계로 구분하여 감사위원회의 자발적 수요에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 또한 경영자를 감시할 유인을 가진 외부감시주체로서 사외이사, 외국인투자자, 그리고 대규모 회계법인을 선정하고, 외부감시주체의 존재가 감사위원회의 자발적 수요에 미치는 영향을 살펴보았다. 2000년부터 2006년까지 한국증권선물거래소 유가증권시장에 상장된 비금융기업 가운데, 감사위원회를 자발적으로 도입한 171개 기업-년 자료를 분석표본으로, 그리고 분석표본과 동일한 연도 및 산업에 속하며 자산규모가 유사한 감사위원회를 도입하지 않은 171개 기업-년 자료를 통제표본으로 선정하여, 342개 기업-년 자료를 분석에 사용하였다.
연구결과, 관계회사더미, 사외이사 과반수이상 더미, 그리고 외국인지분율은 감사위원회의 자발적 도입 여부에 유의적인 양의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과는 소액주주와 지배주주 사이의 대리인문제가 큰 경우, 사외이사가 이사회 구성의 과반수이상을 차지하여 사외이사의 감시가 효과적으로 이루어지는 경우, 그리고 외국인투자자의 감시유인이 커지는 경우 감사위원회를 자발적으로 도입하는 경향이 높다는 것으로 해석하였다. 또한 기업규모는 감사위원회의 자발적 도입 여부에 유의적인 음의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 기업규모가 큰 기업이 대형회계법인을 외부감사인으로 선임할 가능성이 높기 때문에, 오히려 감사위원회에 대한 수요가 감소할 수 있다는 결과로 해석할 수 있다. 본 연구 결과를 통하여 규제당국이 자산규모를 기준으로 감사위원회 설치 의무화 여부를 결정하는 조치가 큰 효과를 기대하기 어려울 수 있음을 알 수 있다. 따라서 감사위원회 설치를 의무화하는 정책을 수립하기 위한 기준으로 기업규모이외에 대리인문제의 발생가능성이나 감시활동을 위한 통제여건 등을 고려하는 것이 타당할 것으로 판단된다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 선행연구
• Ⅲ. 감사위원회 수요에 대한 이론과 가설 도출
• Ⅳ. 연구모형
• Ⅴ. 실증분석 결과
• Ⅵ. 결론