美國의 親日政策이 日本의 韓國侵略에 미친 影響 = The Influence of American Pro-Japanese Policy on Japan's Aggressive Policy toward Korea, 1880~1910
저자
金源模 (檀國大學校 史學科)
발행기관
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
1987
작성언어
Korean
KDC
349.000
자료형태
학술저널
수록면
13-45(33쪽)
제공처
To sum up, if the Asia policies of the European and American Powers are to be divided into two patterns, one was leaving or further degenerating the Asian continent in a weak condition thereby to pursue commercial concessions for their own benefit and to gain territorial conquest, and the other was helping he Asian countries to establish strong sovereign states in their native lands. The former was pursued by the West European powers and the latter by the United States. In order to drive back the aggression of the West European powers in Asia the United States wished for the births of strong indigenous governments while opposing the control of Asia by the European powers. Thus the United states blocked the Chinese claim of suzerainty over Korea and gave full recognition to Korean independence by signing the American Korean Treaty of Amity and Commerce, based upon its political ideology. On the other hand, Britain and other West European powers wished for a “weak Asia”up to the termination of the Sino-Japanese War as they checked the Japanese advance toward the Asiatic continent, where they promoted their own schemes of political and economic aggression. The Hamilton (komundo)affair and the retrocession to China of the Liaotung Peninsula by the three-power intervention is regarded as restraining Japanese influence in a narrow sense and accelerating a “weak Asia”in a broad sense.
With this view on mind, the United States opened doors of Korea by signing a treaty, but the “good offices”stipulated in Article I of this treaty is open to criticism as to its performance. Since the conclusion of the Korean-American Treaty took place in 1882, the unhappy country had expected that the United States would support her independence. The Korean people, including the helpless Emperor, regarded the clause of “good offices” as “intervention” or “alliance”in an emergency. Up to the outbreak of the Sino Japanese War the United States recognized Korean independence as a link in the realization of a “strong Asia” and checked European aggression in Asia. In the meantime the United States Minister and American missionaries in Korea performed their roles of “good offices” for the korean Government. For instance, Minister john M. B. Sill made efforts to see the withdrawal of the troops of both China and Japan from korea and Dr.Horace N.Allen made arrangements for the participation of Korea in the 1893 Chicago Fair Except these and the recognition of Korean independence in the American-Korean Treaty of 1882, signed by Rovert W.Shufeldt, we cannot see any official performance of “good offices”by the united States Govenment The united States made a flat refusal to the appeals of Korea for “good offeces” in the Hamilton Affair and in the withdrawal of the troops of China and japan, because it wanted to avoid military intervention on the Asiatic Continent or the korean peninsula. However, such a policy for a “strong Asia” became promoted the appearance of a “strong Japan” in the Asian theater. With the Sino-Japanese War as a turning point, the United States took the direction of pro-japanese policy and non -intervention in Korean affairs because of the possible danger of military participation in the course of saving Korea. Thus the united States by the State Department Instruction No.64 made a declaration of non-intervention in the political question of Korea.
In order to preserve a balance of power in the Far East, President Theodore Roosevelt was ready to sacrifice Korea to Japan. He did not want to see Russia penetrating Manchuria and korea. He guaranteed Japan “a free hand” in Korea, and then expected that japan would be left face to face with Russia. Thus Roosevelt approved japan’s control of Korea at portsmouth, and recognized japan’s suzerainty over Korea in the Taft-Katsura Agreement for the sake of the Philippines. Finally Korea was annexed to the Japanese Empire in 1910.
As we look back on the treaty of Portsmouth and America’s secret pact with Japan, we find that they did not provide a solution to the problems of Korea, including the Far Eastern question. We can point out that Roosevelt’s policy regarding East Asia was unsuccessful because of the betrayal of Japanese militarists. First, in the secret pact, Katsura confirmed that “Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the philippines.” But this statement was false, for the Japanese army attacked pearl Harbor in 1941. Second, in order to maintain the general peace in the Far East, the united States was in accord with the Anglo-Japanese alliance. But this policy rather run counter to the all-out war in the Far East, for japan took control of korea and Manchuria, and then escalated the war to mainland China and Southeast Asia in World War Ⅱ. Third, the united States recognized Jpanese suzerainty over Korea. This was based on Roosevelt’s pro-Japanese policy. In maintaining friendly relations with Japan, it was Roosevelt’s good fortune to have Korea for a scapegoat. But japan’s aggressive designs did not stop with the acquisition of korea. And in the yield their interests in the far East and finally would cross swords with the United States and Britain.
Then, why did the united States deny Korea’s demand for “good offices”and follow a non-intervention policy toward Korea?
first, the United States asserted that it could only exert good offices within the bounds of a common understanding of both interested parties in the dispute, the victim and the assailant, but there could be no interference by hearing one side only. Herein lies America’s basic motive for non-intervention in Korea.
Second, should the united States interfere in the Korean question by a combination with the European powers it would fall into their scheme as a fellow-traveler with the policy for a “weak Asia”, which was pursued by the european powers against the political ideals of the was pursued by the European powers against the political ideals of the united States wishing for a “strong Asia”. Hence, even at the cost of all American concessions in Korea and the transfer of the whole of Korea to Japan, absolute aid to the growing strength of Japan was necessary in order to stop European aggression in Asia with that strength, thereby to let Japan play the part of the united States.
Third, after the outbreak of Russo-Jananese War the United States recognized that Korea was unable to maintain its independence beyond relief by “good offices” and, if the United States were to interfere in the Korean question, that must be an armed interference, but it did not want to cross swords with Japan on the Asiatic continent, and it refrained from arbitration for Korea against Japan.
Fourth, as a result of the Spanish-american War of 1898 the United States acquired the philippines, which it wished to protect from Japanese aggression with a pro-Japanese policy, and for that price it left the national fate of Korea to Japan. Since the United States placed more importance on the security of the Philippines than on the relief of korea it turned down all Korean requests for good offices in order to get japan’s guarantee for the security of the Philippines.
After all, we have seen a ruling principle in international relations, which holds that treaties signed between weaker nations and big powers cannot guarantee their just rights of treaty obligations unless they are supported by the national strength of the weaker nations themselves, that is to say, any foreign treaty without the support of national strength is of no more value than a scrap of paper. Of course, the non-reaction of the United States to the appeal of Korea for “good offices” may be pointed out as a plain repudiation of its treaty obligations and a flagrant breach of faith on the part of the United States, but on the other hand, the Korean people, who had not even minimum supporting national strength, ought to subject themselves to criticism and self-reflection for their breach of faith against their breach of faith against their own country-Korea.
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