은행의 소유·지배구조와 위험 = The Ownership-Governance Structure and Risk Appetite of a Bank

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study analyzes the effects of banks’ ownership-governance structures on their risks. First of all, using the data of Korean commercial banks from 2000 to 2011, the empirical result indicates that the risk appetite of a bank is a reversed U-shaped function of the insiders ownership (or the largest shareholder ownership). This means that, as the insiders ownership (the largest shareholder ownership) increases, a bank’s risk initially increases and, thereafter, decreases. This result can be explained by the agency theory of outside equity. That is, as the insiders ownership (the largest shareholder ownership) increases, the managers’ incentives become more closely aligned with those of the entire shareholders and they increase the bank’s risk to improve the shareholders value. However, when the insiders ownership (the largest shareholder ownership) exceeds a certain level, the managers can have their positions more secured and become more interested in their private interests instead of the shareholders value. This induces the managers to reduce the bank’s risk. Second, the risk appetite of a bank is not influenced by the characteristics of the insiders. The empirical results shows that whether a bank is foreign-owned or government-owned does not affect the bank’s risk. These results provide an implication regarding the Korean bank industry. Recently, there is increasing concerns about the Korean banks’ governance structures, which provoke more shareholder-oriented structure. As the banks’ managers emphasize shareholders value more heavily, the banks may take higher risks. Inevitably, this will require more refined risk management.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

이 연구는 은행의 소유 ․ 지배구조가 위험성향에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 실증분석에서은행 위험성향은 BIS자기자본비율 또는 예대비율에 의해 측정되며, 주요 결과는 다음과 같다. 먼저, 우리나라 은행의 위험성향은 내부지분율(또는 최대주주지분율)의 역 U자 형태 함수이다. 즉 내부지분율이 비교적 낮은 영역에서 내부지분율이 증가하면 위험성향은 상승하고, 내부지분율이 비교적 높은 영역에서는 내부지분율이 증가하면 위험성향은 하락한다. 이결과는 모형 설정을 변화시켜도 일관된다. 은행 위험성향과 내부지분율 사이의 추정된 관계는 전형적으로 외부지분의 대리인 이론에 의해 설명될 수 있다. 즉 내부지분율이 상승하면, 내부자들의 이해와 전체 주주의 이해가 더 밀접하게 연계되고 은행은 주주가치를 제고하기 위해 위험을 증가시킨다. 그러나 내부지분율이 일정 수준을 초과하면, 경영진의 안주현상 때문에 은행의 여신정책은 소극적으로 변화할 수 있다. 한편, 은행의 위험성향은 지배적 주주의 성격에 의해서는 큰 영향을 받지 않는 것으로 나타난다. 외국자본 또는 정부에의해 지배되는 은행은 특수한 예외를 제외하면, 다른 은행들에 비해 더 높거나 낮은 위험성향을 보이지 않는다. 이 연구의 결과는 이사회의 주주대표성 강화, 배당확대 등 지배구조의 변화 조류 속에서, 우리나라 은행의 소유‧지배구조와 위험관리/감독정책에 관해 실용적가치를 가진 시사점을 제공하고 있다.

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