환경개선을 위한 국가와 지방자치단체 간의 재원배분체계에 대한 연구 : 지방재정조정제도를 중심으로 With Special Reference to the Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System = A Study on the Resource Allocation System between Central and Local Governments for Environmental - Improvement

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The purpose of this paper is to study on the intergovernmental fiscal transfer system for environmental improvement in Korea. The intergovernmental fiscal transfer system consists of the Local Share Tax, the Local Transfer, and the National Subsidies.
There are several findings and suggestions through this research. First, there must be some additional weights on measure items relating to environmental improvement when we calculate the Ordinary Share Tax. Second, the Regional Pending Demand which is comprised in the Special Share Tax should be reduced and at the same time environment-related items in the Political Task Demand should be increased. Third, since the Regional Development Project has been introduced for the compensation of reduced Local Share Tax, it is not suitable to the Local Transfer. Therefore the size of the Regional Development Project should be reduced, some of which should be switched to Water Pollution Prevention Project(WPPP). Fourth, the concrete and scientific allocation formula on each item of WPPP should be devised to enhance objectivity of the system. Fifth, subsidy rate of WPPP should be increased, which is much higher both in the US and in Japan. Sixth, the active application of graduated subsidy rate system is suggested with regard to environment-related national subsidies. With this, a poor local government can perform the environment-related national projects which is assigned to the local government. Seventh, the incentive system should be introduced to manage the environment-related national project efficiently.
A simple theoretical model is established to derive the conditions under which both open-ended matching grant and non-matching grant induce the socially efficient level of environmental quality. The major findings are as follows. First, when the central government set the subsidy rate equal to the ratio of local government's spillover effect, the central government's mandate leads to socially efficient environmental quality. Second, such subsidy rate is just equivalent to one derived in Harford(1977). Third, the efficiency condition of non-matching grant has been derived, which depends on the size of spillover effect, and on the parameters of both benefit and cost functions of environmental improvement.