美·佛 大都市의 犯罪와 騷擾와 不平等 = Urban crime, riots and inequality in the U.S. and France

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In early 1990s, the Cite´ des Poe｀tes, a housing project in the town of Pierrefitte, Seine St-Denis, would have been perfect to illustrate the broken window theory. "About fifty youths their domination on Brassens square." Although they did not directly target institutions, "they drank, they had dogs, they fooled around… we were scared to death for our children and also for our wives," a resident complained. Too many assaults, the absence of police, educational and administrative laxity contributed to unbearable collective life. This neighborhood of Pierrefitte was not much different from other pauperized areas in the largest cities of the world. It suffered from isolation and from a concentration of socioeconomic disadvantages, as in Chicago or Harlem. Immigrant families were overconcentrated in public-housing units. The area suffered from disinvestment that resulted in a lack of services, most acutely, police services. Stigmatization linked to space also took its toll through unemployment and ill-paid jobs.
Different historical arrangements affect the current differentiation and social control cities exert. Spatial polarization does not seem to be as severe in French cities as in American cities, due to state authorities, master plans, incentives and national policies mitigating centrifugal forces. Unlike American cities, the growth of inequalities does not produce a dichotomy between the yuppies and the homeless. State transfers in France have kept pauperization under control. The destruction of industrial jobs and the lack of corporate dynamism in France have imposed enormous costs in terms of unemployment, social destructuring, anomie, violence, etc. Segregation and polarization processes do take place, but for the last eighteen years various mechanisms orchestrated within the local governance initiated by the politique de la ville have allowed cities to slow down destructuring trends.
The struggle of government to balance public accounts in the face of rising demands for social welfare, environmental improvement, and economic growth has led to strategies which are undermining welfare policy arrangements. Cities, once perceived as the heart of innovations and cultural force of postmodern society, now appears to be drifting into becoming decaying and dangerous places.
The struggle of government to balance public accounts in the fact of rising demands for social welfare, environmental improvement, and economic growth has led to strategies which are undermining welfare policy arrangements. Cities, once perceived as the heart of innovations and cultural force of postmodern society, now appears to be drifting into becoming decaying and dangerous places.
The market does not favor social cohesion but generates tensions: it reinforces economic polarization and inequalities in cities, and myriads of marginalized people may use their "voice" as a threat to express their claims. Even though a few global cities like New York and Paris take advantage of globalized processes, problems of segregation and social disintegration do not disappear. Even in the midst of an economic boom, inequalities persist and deepen, social tensions abound, and public services and infrastructures remain neglected. The whole system based on global exchanges of capital and goods is fragile, as illustrated by the 1998 economic crises in Asia, Brazil, and Russia.
It would be premature to ignore the power of the powerless. The question of Barrington Moore concerning injustice is still valid : instead of "why do men rebel?" we should wonder why they do not rebel more often. The margins of society can hit the center at its core, as Santo Amaro case showed. The transgressions of the "haves" in the form of excessive accumulation, deregulation, chaos, non-redistribution, etc. must remain limited for their own sake.
The IMF approach to debt crisis will not successfully resolve the problem by punishing the poor and destroying domestic production. Militant crowds and urban communities have said no to politics of hunger and unemployment that would ensure servicing bank loans. They have said they won't be quiet about it in tones that convince the crisis managers.
The ironic feature of the current debt crisis is that its roots sprouted as early as 1960 and grew in the fertile ground of trade deficits accumulated by the United States. The U.S. deficit resulted from the very success of its postwar recovery program. The rejuvenated European and Japanese economies performed so well, and U.S. industrial supremacy wanted so much, that U.S. deficits began to mount dangerously. The looming U.S. debt crisis was averted, in 1971 when the U.S. unilaterally abrogated the Bretton Woods system by twice devaluing the dollar, abandoning the gold standard and converting to a floating exchange rate.
As France feared, international dollar holdings abruptly lost value. The United States used its decided political advantage in the world economy to export its debt and the inflationary cost of the war in Vietnam. Those adjustments inaugurated the "international economic disorder" of the 1970s and the current world debt crisis.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 目次
• Ⅰ. 꺼냄
• Ⅱ. 대도시의 불안과 미국 및 프랑스의 대응
• Ⅲ. 대도시의 폭력과 소요와 도시사회운동
• Ⅳ. 구미 대도시병리의 역사적 분석
• Ⅴ. 세계도시의 양극화와 다국적기업
• Ⅵ. 맺음