한국전쟁 초기 중국군 조기파병을 둘러싼 스탈린, 마오쩌둥, 김일성의 동상이몽 = Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-sung' Different Objectives in the Early Phase of the Korean War

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Most of the existing researches on the intervention of China into the Korean War argued that if U.S. did not cross over the 38th parallel China would not intervene. But recently declassified China's and Russia's archive documents showed evidently that in July and August 1950 both Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung wanted strongly to dispatch China's troops to North Korea in period of U.S. and South Korean forces in extreme predicament.
Notwithstanding the promise that only after the U.S. forces cross over the 38th parallel China would intervenes, Mao Zedong desired to send troops in early phase of the war, at aim of protecting China's achieved revolution, solving Taiwan question, and acquiring influence on unified Korea. He regarded early dispatch of the China's troops as a way of maximum gains with minimum costs. But after the landing of UN forces at Incheon, China's determination for intervention was weakened gradually and sometimes decided even not to intervene.
In the beginning of U.S. air force's fire, North Korean leadership believed low possibility of victory through his own efforts and wanted for the participation of Soviet air force and China land force. However, considering negative effects of China’s early intervention, Stalin did not agree to Mao and Kim’s requests. It is noteworthy that Stalin satisfied with the new international situation produced after the war and changed his attitude towards the Korean War from quick victory to protracting it. In conclusion, Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-sung dreamed different dreams respectively from the early phase of the Korean War.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

중국의 한국전쟁 참전에 관한 기존 연구는, 미국이 38선을 돌파하지 않았다면 중국의 참전도 없었을 것이란 주장이 주류를 이룬다. 그러나 최근 공개된 중국과 러시아의 당안 자료들은 유엔군과 한국군이 수세에 몰려있던 7~8월에 이미 마오쩌둥과 김일성이 중국군 파병을 적극 희망하고 있었음을 보여준다.
중국은 “미군의 38선 돌파 후 중국군 참전”이라는 스탈린과의 약속에도 불구하고, 혁명성과 보존, 대만문제 해결, 북한에 대한 영향력 확보 등을 위해 조기파병을 희망했고, 그 뜻을 북한과 소련에 전달했다. 마오쩌둥은 중국군 조기파병을 최소비용으로 최대효과를 낼 수 있는 수단으로 보았다. 그러나 유엔군의 인천상륙 이후 동요하기 시작했고, 38선 돌파 이후에는 참전 불가를 스탈린과 김일성에게 통보하기도 했다.
김일성을 비롯한 북한지도부는 미 공군의 폭격이 시작된 직후부터 자력으로 승리가 어렵다고 보고, 소련공군과 중국군의 참전을 스탈린에게 요청했다. 그러나 스탈린은 중국군 조기파병이 가져올 부정적 영향을 고려하여, 김일성과 마오쩌둥의 조기파병 요청에 동의하지 않았다. 주목할 것은 스탈린이 한국전쟁이 야기한 새로운 국제정세에 크게 만족하고 있었으며, 따라서 한국전쟁에 대한 목표를 속전속결에서 전쟁 장기화로 수정했다는 점이다. 이렇듯 스탈린, 마오쩌둥, 김일성은 한국전쟁 초기부터 각자 다른 꿈을 꾸고 있었다.

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