농산물 생산자의 정치적 시장지배력 분석 : 쌀소득보전직불제를 중심으로 = Analysis on Political Market Power of Agricultural Producers : Focused on Direct Rice Income Compensation Program

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In Korea where rice has been planted as major food and cash crop, around a half of farming families plant rice. This indicates that rice plantation takes a large proportion of income of farming families. Rice as a main source of income for farmers has been top public agenda for political and social debates. Against this backdrop, the government has focused its energy on protecting the rice industry through political programs such as subsidies and the government's rice purchase program.
As a result of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement for Agriculture, the market for all agricultural produce was fully opened with tariffication. However, in the case of rice, tariffication was delayed for ten years. In renegotiations on rice in 2004, tariffication on rice was, again, delayed for ten year. However, when the grace period is over, tariffication will be put in place. In this desperate situation, the government introduced the direct rice income compensation program in 2005 as a solution for issues relating rice. Its purpose was to discard the government's purchase program, to make rice prices decided in the market, and to directly compensate for farmers' income.
This study intended to approach the direct rice income compensation program currently in force from a political and economic perspective. Its main topic for debate is that rice producers, the main stakeholder for the direct rice income compensation program, exercise their political influence through lobbying to reflect their interest in political decision making and policy makers make policy decision based on rice producers' demands.
If rice producers' wellbeing is increased through such political process, that increase can be understood as an achievement from their political market power. Based on this perception, this research reflected such connection and analyzed the political weights of rice producers placed by policy makers under the direct rice income compensation program and the political market power of rice producers from 2005 to 2008.
The political market power of Korean rice producers was calculated to be from minimum 0.027 to maximum 0.093, which is smaller than 0.1 indicating that their political market power is very weak. Regarding political weights, the weight when fixed and variable income compensations were made at the same time were larger than the weight when only variable income compensation was made. Political weights by year posted minimum 0.089 to maximum 0.373, indicating that the rice producers' group does not represent a monopoly or oligopoly.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론 1
• 1. 연구의 필요성 1
• 2. 연구의 목적 3
• 3. 연구방법 및 내용 5
• 1) 정책선호함수 5
• 2) 관찰된 정책수준과 정치적 가중치 의 도출 6
• 3) 정치적 시장지배력 추정 7
• 4. 선행연구 검토 9
• 1) 쌀소득보전직불제 관련 논문 9
• 2) 정치적 시장지배력 추정 논문 10
• Ⅱ. 쌀소득보전직불제 정책 및 직불금 지급 현황 12
• 1. 쌀소득보전직불제 정책 12
• 2. 쌀소득보전직불제 현황 13
• 3. 쌀소득보전직불금 14
• 4. 쌀소득보전직불제의 연도별 상황 15
• 1) 2008년도 상황 16
• 2) 2007년도 상황 18
• 3) 2005, 2006년도 상황 19
• 5. 쌀소득보전직불제의 생산중립성 21
• 1) 이용기 “한국의 쌀 산업 직접지불제와 디커플링”(2005) 21
• 2) 김윤식 “한국과 미국의 쌀 직접지불정책의 생산 중립성 분석” (2006) 23
• 3) 생산중립성의 판단 26
• Ⅲ. 직불제에 투영된 소비자ㆍ생산자 잉여전환곡선의 추정 28
• 1. 쌀 수요ㆍ공급함수 28
• 2. 소비자ㆍ생산자 잉여전환곡선 도출 30
• 1) 잉여전환곡선 도출 방법 30
• 2) 정책변수의 정책수준 산출 31
• 2. 잉여전환곡선의 도출 38
• 1) 2008년도 잉여전환곡선 38
• 2) 2007년도 잉여전환곡선 39
• 3) 2006년 잉여전환곡선 41
• 4) 2005년도 잉여전환곡선 44
• 5) 정책변수의 수준 및 소비자, 생산자 잉여의 수준 46
• Ⅳ. 정치적 시장지배력 도출 49
• 1 정치적 시장지배력(PM) 49
• 2. 정치적 가중치 49
• 3. 정치적 시장배력과 정치적 가중치 산정 결과 51
• Ⅴ. 결론 53
• 참 고 문 헌 55