미 트럼프 행정부의 남중국해 정책과 국제법의 관계

국문 초록 (Abstract)

미 트럼프 행정부는 국제법에 대해 부정적 시각을 가지고 있었다. 이 시기 미국 외교정책의 특징은 ① 유엔 기구의 국제사회에서의 역할에 대한 불신과 세계무역기구(WTO) 시스템에 대한 회의론, ② 국제사회의 법원과 재판소 기피, ③ 중국에 대한 적대적인 접근으로 정의될 수 있다. 하지만 이 시기 미국의 남중국해 정책의 근간은 상설중재판소라는 유엔 기관이 유엔 해양법협약 을 해석⋅적용하여 내린 남중국해 중재판정이었다. 2016년 7월 12일 상설중재재판소는 남중국해의 85% 이상을 차지하고 있는 중국의 ‘남해 9단 선’ 주장을 무효화하는 판정을 내렸다. 그런데 트럼프 대통령은 이 같은 남중국해 중재판정 자체 에 대해 단 한 번도 언급한 적이 없다. 이는 트럼프 행정부의 국제규범과 국제기구에 대한 비판 적 시각, 국제분쟁의 사법적 해결에 대한 부정적 시각, 강경한 대중 정책에서 일관되게 도출될 수 있는 귀결이다. 하지만 트럼프 행정부의 외교, 국방 부문의 최고위급 실무자는 중국이 남중국 해를 자국의 영향권 하에 두려는 어떠한 시도도 용납하지 않겠다는 내용의 성명을 발표하면서 항상 남중국해 중재판정을 원용하였다. 트럼프 행정부 고위관리의 공식 발언은 일견 국가 최고의 대외정책 결정자이며 군통수권자인 트럼프 대통령의 남중국해 정책 성명과도 다르고, 트럼프 행정부 시기 익히 알고 있던 미국 외교 정책의 특징과도 차이가 있어 보인다. 하지만 결국 트럼프 대통령이 아닌 트럼프 행정부 고위관 리의 공식 발언이 미 트럼프 행정부의 남중국해 정책이고, 미국의 남중국해 정책은 국제법에 대한 회의적 시각과 관계없이 부시 행정부, 클린턴 행정부, 오바마 행정부, 트럼프 행정부를 관통하여 연속성이 있다는 것을 알게 된다. 이전 행정부에서도 일관되게 ① 지역 안정 유지, ② 국제법 존중, ③ 해양에서의 항행의 자유 의 보장, ④ 분쟁의 평화적 해결 원칙을 강조하였는데, 이는 미국의 국익과 밀접하게 연관되어 있다. 미국의 국익은 이 지역의 항행의 자유와 원활한 에너지 교역 및 에너지 안보를 확보하는 데에 있다. 상설중재재판소는 직무상 독립성과 전문성이 있는 사법절차에 따라 미국이 국익에 꼭 필요하 다고 생각하는 요소에 대해 긍정적인 판단을 하였다. 구체적으로 ① 중국의 남중국해 9단선 주 장은 무효이고, ② 스프래틀리 군도와 스카버러 암초에 대해서는 영해 12해리를 넘어선 해양관 할권을 주장할 수 없으며, ③ 중국의 인공섬 건설과 중국 어선단의 행위는 필리핀의 유엔 해양법 협약상 권리를 침해하였고, 마지막으로 ④ 스프래틀리 군도 내의 대규모 매립과 군사기지 건설 은 해양환경을 파괴하므로 유엔 해양법협약에 위반된다고 판시하였다. 따라서 미 트럼프 행정부 는 미국의 일관된 남중국해 정책을 규범적으로 지지해주는 남중국해 중재판정의 효력을 유지해 야 할 필요가 있었고, 이를 위해 더 많은 정치적 자원과 외교적 노력을 확대해 나갔다. 트럼프 대통령은 남중국해 중재판정에 대해 한 번도 언급한 적이 없고, 트럼프 행정부는 국제 규범, 국제기구, 사법적 분쟁해결절차에 대해 부정적이었다. 하지만 미국이라는 국가는 행정부 의 변경과 관계없이 여전히 남중국해 정책의 일관성을 유지해야 했고, 상설중재재판소의 남중국 해 중재판정에 계속해서 규범적 가치를 부여해야 할 유인이 충분히 있었다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The Trump administration had negative views on international law. US foreign policy during this period can be characterized as follows: (1) distrust of the role of the UN in the international community and skepticism on the World Trade Organization (WTO) system, (2) avoidance of international courts and tribunals, and (3) hostile stance toward China. However, the keynote of US policy in the South China Sea at this time was the South China Sea arbitration award made by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a UN agency, by interpreting and applying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration made a ruling invalidating China’s claim to the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea, which occupies more than 85% of the South China Sea. However, President Trump had never mentioned the arbitration award itself. This is a result that can be drawn consistently from the Trump administration’s critical view of international norms and international organizations, its negative view on the judicial resolution of international disputes, and its hardline policy against China. However, the administration’s top diplomats and defense officials have always referred to the arbitration award, issuing a statement stating that their country will not tolerate any attempt by China to place the South China Sea under its sphere of influence. The official remarks of high-ranking officials of the Trump administration seem to be different from the South China Sea policy statements of President Trump, who was the country’s top foreign policy maker and commander-in-chief, and also differ from the characteristics of the typical US foreign policy typical during the administration. However, high-ranking officials’ statements are the administration’s South China Sea policy and regardless of skeptical view on international law, it can be argued that there has been a continuity in US policy on the South China Sea since the Bush administration through the Clinton and Obama administrations, and the Trump administration. Previous administrations have consistently emphasized: (1) maintaining regional stability, (2) respecting international law, (3) guarantee of freedom of navigation at sea, and (4) the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts and this is closely related to the national interest of the United States. Such national interest is to ensure uninterrupted energy trade, and energy security in the region. The Permanent Court of Arbitration made a positive judgment on the factors that the United States considers critical to its national interest, abiding by judicial procedures with official independence and professionalism. Specifically, they have ruled that: (1) China’s nine-dash line claim of the South China Sea is invalid, (2) maritime jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Reef cannot be claimed beyond 12 nautical miles of territorial waters, (3) China’s construction of artificial islands and the actions of Chinese fishing fleets violate the Philippines’ rights under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and lastly (4) large-scale reclamation and construction of military bases in the Spratly Islands violate the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as it destroys the marine environment. Accordingly, the Trump administration needed to maintain the validity of the South China Sea arbitration award, which normatively supports the consistent US policy in the South China Sea, and to this end, it expanded more political resources and diplomatic efforts. President Trump never commented on the aforementioned award, and the administration was negative about international norms, international organizations, and judicial dispute resolution procedures. However, the United States still had to maintain consistency in terms of its South China Sea policy regardless of the change of administration, and there was sufficient incentive to continue to grant normative value to the South China Sea arbitration award of the Permanent Court.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 요약
• I. 서론
• Ⅱ. 트럼프 행정부의 외교정책
• Ⅲ. 트럼프 행정부의 남중국해 정책
• Ⅳ. 트럼프 행정부 내 남중국해 정책의 혼선?
• Ⅴ. 결론
• 참고문헌

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