소유지배괴리도가 내부회계관리제도 담당 인적 자원 투자에 미치는 영향 = The Impact of the Ownership-control Disparity on Investment in Internal Accounting Control Team

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study examines the effect of ownership-control disparity on investment in internal accounting control team. As the ownership-control gap increases, controlling shareholders are more likely to pursue their own private interests rather than the interests of all shareholders. In addition, the level of information asymmetry and agency problems increase, and the quality and reliability of accounting information decrease. However, the internal accounting control team, as an element of the governance structure, can resolve the level of information asymmetry and agency problems through monitoring managers and controlling shareholders, and improve the quality and reliability of accounting information. Accordingly, companies with a higher ownership-control disparity will be more active in investing in staffs in charge of the internal accounting control in order to restore trust from investors and stakeholders and increase corporate value.
This study targets non-financial companies listed on the Korean stock market from 2011 to 2018 and December-closing corporations, and the data on the main variables, ownership-control disparity and internal accounting control personnel, were collected manually and used. The empirical analysis results showed a significant positive relationship between the degree of ownership-control disparity and investment in staffs in charge of the internal accounting control. In other words, it can be seen that companies with a high degree of ownership-control disparity are more active in investing in internal accounting control team in order to alleviate information asymmetry and agency problems, restore trust from investors and stakeholders, and increase corporate value. However, the degree of ownership-control disparity did not significantly affect investment in the expertise of staffs in charge of the internal accounting control. These results provide investors and various stakeholders in the capital market with information on the support and effectiveness of internal accounting control personnel in relation to the degree of ownership-control disparity when making investment decisions, so that they can properly evaluate the value of the company. It can be used as data that can verify the effect of mandatory disclosure of ownership-control disparity and staffs in charge of the internal accounting control.

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