바람직한 경⋅검 관계에 대한 연구 - 미국 형사사법제도에 대한 미시적 분석 - = A Study on The Proper Relationship Between Police Investigators and Prosecutors - Microscopic Analysis of US Criminal Justice System -

국문 초록 (Abstract)

연혁적으로 형사사법제도는 인권 보호라는 방향성을 기준으로 최종 단계의 주체인 재판관에게 집중되어 있던 권한들 중 일부가 이전 단계의 주체들에게 분배되는 과정을 거쳐 왔다. 그 과정을 통해수사, 기소, 재판이라는 서로 연속되는 기능이자 권한으로 구분함으로써, 상호간 견제와 균형을 이룰수 있도록 하였다. 하지만 우리나라는 일본 제국주의로부터 해방 이후 형사사법제도를 설계함에 있어서 견제와 균형을 확립하는데 실패하였다. 형사소송법 제196조 3항의 수사지휘권을 통해 본디 검찰의기능인 기소 뿐 아니라 경찰의 기능인 수사마저 지배하는 제왕적 검찰을 탄생시켰고, 이로 인해 검찰에 대한 외부통제와 감시는 적절하게 작동하지 않아왔다. 그리고 이는 곧 형사사법절차의 공정성과 객관성에 대한 심각한 훼손을 불러왔다.
이처럼 왜곡된 형사사법제도를 바로잡고자, 2018년 6월 청와대 주도로 도출된 경⋅검 수사권 조정안은 경⋅검 간의 관계를 대등한 협력 관계로 정립하였다. 그럼에도 불구하고 검찰은 아직까지 경찰을범죄에 대한 처벌이라는 공동의 목표를 함께 이뤄나갈 협력의 대상인 동료가 아닌 지시의 대상인 부하로 간주하게 하는 수사지휘권 유지를 고수하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 이에 본 논문은 동 조정안이 향후국회 논의 과정을 통해 제도적 결실로 이어지게 하기 위하여, 당해 논의의 밑거름이 될 수 있는 자료로서 기능적 권력 분배를 통한 견제와 균형의 원칙이 뿌리 깊게 자리하고 있는 미국의 형사사법제도 상수사기관과 기소기관 간의 대등한 협력 관계에 대하여 보다 미시적인 관점에서 분석하고자 한다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Historically, the criminal justice system has went through separation of powers by transferring a part of powers concentrated to judges-the ultimate subject in the criminal justice process-to the subjects located prior to judges in the criminal justice process for the purpose of human rights protection. The powers were separated based on the functionality into investigation, prosecution and judgement thus attaining checks and balance between distinguished functions.
However, in organizing the criminal justice system after the independence from Japanese imperialism, the Republic of Korea failed to secure checks and balance in its criminal justice system by giving birth to the imperial prosecution’s office. The authority to direct the police investigation under the Article 196(3) of the Criminal Procedure Law allowed prosecutors to dominate not only the prosecution-its inherent function-but also the investigation which is a separate function inherently exercised by the police. Such failure has undermined the fairness and impartiality of the criminal justice system.
To correct the misshaped criminal justice system, the agreement led by the Blue House between National Police Agency and Prosecution’s Office on investigative authority established the relationship between the two institutions as an equivalent-cooperative relationship. However, the Prosecution’s Office still adheres to maintain its authority to direct police investigation which allows prosecutors to regard police investigators not as colleagues to cooperate with to attain the shared goal of punishing criminals but as subordinates to direct. Accordingly, to lead the agreement to institutional reform though the upcoming discussion at the congress, this paper studies, as a foundational material for the discussion, the criminal justice system of US where the investigative agencies and prosecuting agencies are structured as equivalent-cooperative relationship rooted in the functional separation of powers and checks and balances.

참고문헌 (Reference)

• 1 강성용, "활동으로서 수사의 주체와 권한에 대한 소고- 미국 형사사법제도를 중심으로 -" 법학연구소 53 (53): 91-130, 2018
• 2 한상훈, "형사소송의 구조와 검사, 피고인의 지위 - 당사자주의와 증거개시제도를 중심으로 -" 한국형사법학회 21 (21): 397-428, 2009
• 3 한국형사정책연구원, "형사소송법제정자료집" 1990
• 4 강성용, "한국 형사사법제도에서의 견제와 균형의 원칙 회복 : 법이식을 위한 비교형사법적 연구" 법학연구원 42 (42): 111-140, 2018
• 5 강성용, "한국 형사사법제도에서의 견제와 균형 원칙에 대한 비교법적 연구 - 수사권 조정 논의에 즈음하여 -" 한국형사정책학회 30 (30): 199-232, 2018
• 6 박광수, "윤석열, 공수처 찬성했지만…수사지휘권 정부안과 이견"
• 7 "엘에이 시경 홈페이지"
• 8 정병대, "수사구조에 관한 연구" 법무연수원 2007
• 9 박창호, "비교수사제도론-한국 수사구조의 개혁을 향한 기초연구-" 박영사 2004
• 10 한웅재, "미국검찰특별수사조직및실무운용에대한연구-뉴욕지방검찰청을 중심으로" 법무연수원 2007
• 11 허준, "미국 노스캐롤라이나 연방검찰청 방문보고, 검사 유관기관 방문보고" 2014
• 12 Nancy Gertner, "a Former Federal Judge and Senior Lecturer at Harvard Law, at the Intelligence Squared Debate on U.S. Prosecutors Have Too Much Power"
• 13 "Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (1962)"
• 14 Hon. H. Lloyd King, Jr., "Why Prosecutors are Permitted to Offer Witness Inducement : A Matter of Constitutional Authority" XXIX : 155-155, 1999
• 15 "Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878)"
• 16 "United States v. Streebing, 987 F.2d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 1993"
• 17 "United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) (Lucero, J. concurring), cert. denied, No. 98-8758, 1999 WL 185874 (U.S. June 21, 1999)"
• 18 "United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1358–9 (10th Cir.)"
• 19 "United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 84-90 (1st Cir. 2000)"
• 20 Cindy R. Alexander, "Trends in the Use of Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Pleas Agreements in the Settlement of Alleged Corporate Criminal Wrongdoing" Searle Civil Justice Institute 7-8, 2015
• 21 Bennett L. Gersham, "The New Prosecutors" 53 : 393-393, 1992
• 22 John C. Jeffries, Jr, "The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution" 46 : 1095-1104, 1995
• 23 Myron W. Orfield Jr, "The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers" 54 (54): 1027-, 1987
• 24 "The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes and Racketeering and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, Ⅱ.A.(2) & II.B(2)"
• 25 "The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants"
• 26 David A. Harris, "THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE" Oxford University Press 2012
• 27 American Bar Association, "Standards on Prosecutorial Investigations"
• 28 Stephen Landsman, "Reading on Adversarial Justice: The American Approach to Adjudication" 39-, 1988
• 29 Daniel Richman, "Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors" 103 : 751-, 2003
• 30 Heike Gramckow, "Prosecutor Organization and Operations in the United States, in Promoting Prosecutorial Accountability, Independence and Effectiveness" Open Society Institute 408-, 2008
• 31 J. Richard Johnston, "Paying the Witness —i Why Is It OK for the Prosecution, but Not the Defense?" 11 : 21-, 1997
• 32 National District Attorneys Association, "National Prosecution Standard"
• 33 "Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227 (1941)"
• 34 Cynthia Cooper, "Let’s Not Make a Deal: Appeals Court Says Some Inducements for Testimony Constitute Bribery" 1998
• 35 Neil B. Eisenstadt, "Let’s Make a Deal: A Look at United States v. Dailey and Prosecutor-Witness Cooperation Agreements" 67 : 749-752, 1987
• 36 "In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 662 F.2d 875, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1981)"
• 37 RT Brice, "Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Undue Influence" 39 : 761-, 1972
• 38 "Flemmi, 225 F.3d at 91-92"
• 39 Charles Doyle, "Federal Grand Juries: The Law in a Nutshell" 2-, 2015
• 40 The Office of United States Attorneys, "Criminal Resource Manual 719"
• 41 Perroni, "Criminal Contingency Fee Agreements: How Fair Are They?" 16 : 211-231, 1994
• 42 Welsh S. White, "Confessions Induced by Broken Government Promises" 43 : 947-988, 1994
• 43 "Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 313"
• 44 "CAL. PENAL CODE § 913"
• 45 "Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751–3 (1970)"
• 46 "Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)"
• 47 "Aguilar Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 1992)"
• 48 Yvette A. Beeman, "Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agreements" 72 : 800-813, 1987
• 49 Wayne L. Morse, "A Survey of the Grand Jury System" 10 : 101-101, 1931
• 50 "8 U.S.Code § 2516"
• 51 "28 C.F.R. § 59.4(a)(2)"
• 52 "18 U.S.C. § 6003"
• 53 "18 U.S.C. § 6002"
• 54 "18 U.S. Code § 3144"