유명 최고경영자 교체가전임-후임 최고경영자 유사성에 미치는 영향: 전임 최고경영자 지위의 조절효과 = The Impact of CEO Celebrity on Similarity between Departing and Incoming CEOs: The Moderating Effect of Departing CEO Status

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The impact of Chief of Executive Officer (CEO) on corporate performance and strategy is tremendous and thus CEO succession is one of the most important event for the firm. Scholars have been interested in CEO succession since 1980s, but too much reliance on certain features of the CEO (CEO origin, etc) and static perspective for the succession are the limitations of the existing literature. In order to make up for the limitations, this research highlights CEO celebrity and CEO status and also focuses on departing-incoming CEO similarity which are less discussed in the prior studies. During 2005 and 2012, we find 274 succession cases of firms listed on KOSPI 200. As a result of statistical test, this study finds that the level of CEO celebrity negatively impacts on the level of departing-incoming CEO similarity. In addition, CEO status weakens CEO celebrity-CEO similarity relationship. This study has contributions by expanding CEO-related research areas and providing firms with opportunity to consider new concepts about CEO succession.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

기업의 성과와 전략에 최고경영자가 미치는 영향은 대단히 크고, 최고경영자 승계는 기업이 겪는 중요한 사건이다. 이에 최고경영자 승계에 대한 연구는 1980년대 이후 지속적으로 학자들의 관심을 받아 왔으나, 최고경영자의 특정 특성에 크게 주목한 점이나 정적 시점에서 최고경영자 승계를 바라봐 온 한계를 지닌다. 기존 연구의 한계를 극복하기 위해 먼저 본 연구는 최고경영자의 특성 중 비교적 논의가 덜 되어 온 그들의 ‘유명도’와 ‘지위’에 집중했다. 그리고 퇴임한 혹은 임명된 최고경영자만 단독으로 살피기보다, 전임-후임 최고경영자의 특성을 비교하여 둘 간 ‘유사성’ 측면에 주목했다. 2005년에서 2012년 8년 사이 승계를 경험한 KOSPI 200 기업을 대상으로 가설을 검증한 결과, 유명 최고경영자의 교체일수록 전임-후임 최고경영자 유사성은 낮아지는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 이 부정적인 관계는 전임 최고경영자의 지위가 높을수록 완화되었다. 본 연구는 그동안 주목을 받지 못했던 연구영역에 대한 관심을 통해 최고경영자 관련 연구의 지평을 넓혔으며, 기업에게 최고경영자 승계 관련 새로운 개념에 대해 학습할 수 있는 기회를 제공한 기여점을 가진다.

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