THE REGIONAL MARKET ENTRY AND STORE-NETWORK GROWTH OF CHAIN RETAILERS: THE CONVENIENCE STORE INDUSTRY IN JAPAN
저자
발행기관
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
2018
작성언어
English
주제어
KDC
325
등재정보
01
자료형태
학술저널
수록면
1504-1507(4쪽)
제공처
Introduction
Japanese convenience-store (CVS) chain retailers have grown by establishing store networks. In fact, Seven-Eleven, Lawson and Family Mart continuingly have opened about 1000 new stores per year. The reason for the rapid growth of their store-networks is that a key aspect of a chain retailer’s marketing strategy is the number of stores its needs to reach its customers (Srinivasan et al. 2013). In particular, CVS chain retailers seek to open new stores and obtain spatial dominance in a particular geographical area, which is called “area-dominance strategy,” so they can save on logistical costs, increase consumer proximity and loyalty, and prevent rival from opening new stores in the area (Ogawa 2004, Tamura 2014, Nishida 2014). Thus, a retailer’s decision of how to expand store-network in a given regional market is important to improve its sales. However, little attention has been paid to this problem in Japanese academic research. This study attempts to explain the influence of entry of rivals on a focal retailer’s store-network in regional markets of Japanese CVS industry. Especially, the author focuses on the regional competition between a focal retailer who is the first entrant and rivals who are late entrants in the region. First, we review prior research, and then propose hypotheses about the influence of entry of rivals, the degree of dominance of a focal retailer, and entry of rivals in multiple regions, on the number of the focal retailer stores. This is followed by an empirical analysis with panel data. Last, we discuss some implications and direction for future research.
Literature Review and Proposed Hypothesis
Entry of rival stores
Prior research suggests that the existence of rival chain stores in the same market decreases the store-revenue of the focal retailer (Erickson et al. 2013, Nishida 2014).When rival retailers open the large number of new stores in a regional market, the focal retailer may be taken away their business of existing stores and latent new stores, so the focal retailer will be forced to close existing stores and slow down the pace of opening new stores. Then, we propose following hypothesis:
H1: In a regional market, the higher the number of net increase of rival stores is, the lower the net increase of focal retailer stores is.
Dominance of the focal retailer
According to prior research, CVS chain retailers benefit from area-dominance (opening own stores aggressively in a given region), because it enables retailers to reduce their distribution and promotion cost, increase consumer loyalty and their power against manufactures (Ogawa 2004, Tamura 2014, Nishida 2014). If the focal retailer has already established a high density store-network, and had strong relationships with its customers and manufactures in the regional market, they will be less likely to suffer from entry of rival chain stores, and they will be able to continue expanding their store-network. These arguments lead to:
H2: In a regional market, the higher the degree of dominance of the focal retailer is, the smaller the negative effect of entry of rival stores is.
Entry of rival stores in multi-market
Though H1 and H2 do not consider multi-market competition among chain retailers, this macro-level competition may have a great impact on their competitive action in a given region (Chen 1996). When a rival entries to multiple regions simultaneously where the focal retailer has already operated, the focal retailer will delay its decision making and competitive responses, so the impact of entry of rival will be larger (Poter 1980, Ferrir 2001, Boyd and Bresser 2008). Therefore, we propose following hypotheses:
H3a: The higher the number of regions which rival entry is, the bigger the negative effect of entry of rival chain stores is.
H3b: The higher the number of net increase of rival stores across the regions is, the bigger the negative effect of entry of rival chain stores is.
Methodology
To test the proposed hypotheses (see FIGURE 1), we collected panel data from the Census of CVS Market, which includes the number of stores of Japanese CVS chain retailers in each prefecture. Due to the restriction of data availability, we treated prefectures as the unit of regional market, and focused on the cases that Lawson was the first entrant, and Seven-Eleven and Family-Mart ware the later entrants in prefectures. Accordingly, the sample was limited in space to 17 prefectures, and limited in time to the period from the year that Seven-Eleven or Family-Mart opened their stores for the first time to 2014.
Results
We tested the hypotheses using panel date analysis by fixed effects model. The estimated results are shown in FIGURE 2. Regarding our hypotheses H1, involving the negative effect of rival entry on the focal retailer’s store-network, is not supported. However, the interaction of “the dominance of the focal retailer” with “rival entry” and the interaction of “rival entry in multiple regions” with “rival entry” are significant, although their signs of coefficients differ depending on whether the rival is seven-eleven or family-mart. Thus, hypotheses H2 and H3b are supported in part.
Implication and Future Research
Our findings have several important implications. First, our empirical results suggest that the effect of rival entry on a focal retailer’s store-network depends on (1) rival’s position in CVS industry, (2) the focal retailer’s dominance, and (3) rival’s multiple entry. Second, when a rival has a superior position than the focal retailer, dominance advantage of the focal retailer increases the negative effect of rival entry, which is contrary to our expectation. This implies that enhancement of the density of own store-network will cause cannibalization, so each store of a focal retailer may be highly vulnerable to entry by a rival who has superior competitive position (i.e. Seven-Eleven). Finally, multiple entry by a rival in superior position reinforces the negative effect of their entry on expansion of the focal retailer’s store-network in the regional market. Though this study was a rare attempt to explain regional competition among Japanese CVS chain retailers empirically, it did not include the prefectures that Seven-Eleven and Family-Mart were the first entrants. This may limit generality of the empirical results, hence it is valuable to take this problem into consideration in future research.
분석정보
서지정보 내보내기(Export)
닫기소장기관 정보
닫기권호소장정보
닫기오류접수
닫기오류 접수 확인
닫기음성서비스 신청
닫기음성서비스 신청 확인
닫기이용약관
닫기학술연구정보서비스 이용약관 (2017년 1월 1일 ~ 현재 적용)
학술연구정보서비스(이하 RISS)는 정보주체의 자유와 권리 보호를 위해 「개인정보 보호법」 및 관계 법령이 정한 바를 준수하여, 적법하게 개인정보를 처리하고 안전하게 관리하고 있습니다. 이에 「개인정보 보호법」 제30조에 따라 정보주체에게 개인정보 처리에 관한 절차 및 기준을 안내하고, 이와 관련한 고충을 신속하고 원활하게 처리할 수 있도록 하기 위하여 다음과 같이 개인정보 처리방침을 수립·공개합니다.
주요 개인정보 처리 표시(라벨링)
목 차
3년
또는 회원탈퇴시까지5년
(「전자상거래 등에서의 소비자보호에 관한3년
(「전자상거래 등에서의 소비자보호에 관한2년
이상(개인정보보호위원회 : 개인정보의 안전성 확보조치 기준)개인정보파일의 명칭 | 운영근거 / 처리목적 | 개인정보파일에 기록되는 개인정보의 항목 | 보유기간 | |
---|---|---|---|---|
학술연구정보서비스 이용자 가입정보 파일 | 한국교육학술정보원법 | 필수 | ID, 비밀번호, 성명, 생년월일, 신분(직업구분), 이메일, 소속분야, 웹진메일 수신동의 여부 | 3년 또는 탈퇴시 |
선택 | 소속기관명, 소속도서관명, 학과/부서명, 학번/직원번호, 휴대전화, 주소 |
구분 | 담당자 | 연락처 |
---|---|---|
KERIS 개인정보 보호책임자 | 정보보호본부 김태우 | - 이메일 : lsy@keris.or.kr - 전화번호 : 053-714-0439 - 팩스번호 : 053-714-0195 |
KERIS 개인정보 보호담당자 | 개인정보보호부 이상엽 | |
RISS 개인정보 보호책임자 | 대학학술본부 장금연 | - 이메일 : giltizen@keris.or.kr - 전화번호 : 053-714-0149 - 팩스번호 : 053-714-0194 |
RISS 개인정보 보호담당자 | 학술진흥부 길원진 |
자동로그아웃 안내
닫기인증오류 안내
닫기귀하께서는 휴면계정 전환 후 1년동안 회원정보 수집 및 이용에 대한
재동의를 하지 않으신 관계로 개인정보가 삭제되었습니다.
(참조 : RISS 이용약관 및 개인정보처리방침)
신규회원으로 가입하여 이용 부탁 드리며, 추가 문의는 고객센터로 연락 바랍니다.
- 기존 아이디 재사용 불가
휴면계정 안내
RISS는 [표준개인정보 보호지침]에 따라 2년을 주기로 개인정보 수집·이용에 관하여 (재)동의를 받고 있으며, (재)동의를 하지 않을 경우, 휴면계정으로 전환됩니다.
(※ 휴면계정은 원문이용 및 복사/대출 서비스를 이용할 수 없습니다.)
휴면계정으로 전환된 후 1년간 회원정보 수집·이용에 대한 재동의를 하지 않을 경우, RISS에서 자동탈퇴 및 개인정보가 삭제처리 됩니다.
고객센터 1599-3122
ARS번호+1번(회원가입 및 정보수정)