최근 기관투자자의 ESG (Environment, Social, Governance) 요구 강화에 따른 회사법의 쟁점과 과제 = Issues and Challenges of Company Law in the Recent Reinforcement of ESG Demand from Institutional Investors

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

As shareholder rights are strengthened through institutionalization of shareholders, shareholder activism, which is actively involved in the governance structure of the investee, is spreading all over the world. There are two types of shareholder activism that have different characteristics. "Hedge fund shareholder activism," which seeks to increase the short-term share price of the target company, and "Stewardship shareholder activism," which pursues sustainability of the company. In some cases, two types of shareholder activism strategies overlap, but in general, the former pursues the company's short-term profit and the latter pursues long-term profit. The corporate governance structure pursued by 'stewardship activism' differs not only from the shareholder-oriented model pursued by hedge fund activism but also from the stakeholder-oriented model emphasizing corporate social responsibility. The new governance model pursued by Stewardship shareholder activism does not force us to choose either shareholder interests or corporate social responsibility as in existing governance models. ʻʻStewardship shareholder activismʼʼ focuses on the impact of non-financial factors (ESG) such as corporate governance, social and environmental issues on the long-term value of shareholders and companies. And they actively ask the investee companies to systematically manage social and environmental risks within the governance structure. This shareholder activism is called 'ESG risk-related activism'.
Under current company law, the company's directors do not bear the new obligation to establish a governance system to manage the E&S-related risks systematically in accordance with the ESG risk-related activism's needs. However, it is not desirable to impose these obligations under company law through the amendment of the Companies Act. Even without enforcing legal obligations on companies that do not manage ESG risks properly, capital market pressures still work, for example, ESG risk-related activist are actively seeking improvements, opposing the appointment of directors, or offering shareholder proposal. It is desirable for the Company Law to refrain from judicial review by applying 'business judgment rule' to companies that have effectively constructed and operated the ESG risk management system in advance for internal control. And by allowing the pressure in the capital market to work in the direction of pursuing long-term interests rather than short-term interests of shareholders, Policy authority should prevent the spread of hedge fund activism, which is only bent on pursuing short-term profits, and allow companies and shareholders to establish constructive ESG activism that voluntarily improves ESG and pursues the sustainability of the company.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

주주의 기관화(institutionalization)현상으로 주주권한이 강화되어 감에 따라 투자대상 회사의 지배구조에 적극 관여하는 주주행동주의가 전세계적으로 확산되고 있다. 주주행동주의에는 성격이 다른 두 종류의 행동주의가 있다. 투자대상 회사의 단기주가 상승을 추구하는 '헤지펀드 행동주의'와 회사의 지속가능성을 추구하는 '스튜어드십 행동주의'가 그것이다. 두 유형의 주주행동주의 전략이 중첩되는 경우도 있지만 일반적으로 전자는 회사의 단기적 이익을, 후자는 장기적 이익을 추구한다. ʻ스튜어드십 행동주의ʼ가 추구하는 회사지배구조는 헤지펀드 행동주의가 추구하는 ʻ주주중심 모델ʼ과 다를 뿐 아니라 기업의 사회적 책임을 강조하는 ʻ이해당사자중심 모델ʼ과도 다르다. 기존의 회사지배구조 모델들처럼 주주이익과 기업의 사회적 책임 중 하나를 선택하도록 강요하지 않는다. ʻ스튜어드십 행동주의ʼ는 투자대상 회사의 지배구조(governance)와 다양한 경영활동과정에서 수반되는 사회적(social) 및 환경적(environment)이슈와 같은 비재무적 요소들(ESG)이 주주와 회사의 장기적 가치에 미치는 영향에 주목하며 투자대상 회사의 지배구조(G)내에서 E&S 관련 리스크가 체계적으로 관리될 수 있도록 적극적으로 관여(shareholder engagement)한다. 이러한 기관투자자들의 행동주의를 'ESG 행동주의(ESG risk-related activism)'라고 한다.
우리 상법에서는 회사의 이사가 ESG행동주의의 요구에 따라 E&S측면을 고려해 경영판단을 해야 하고 E&S 관련 리스크를 체계적으로 관리하기 위한 지배구조 시스템을 마련해야 할 회사법상 신인의무를 이사에게 부담시키고 있지 않다. 그렇다고 이러한 의무를 부담시키는 것이 항상 바람직한 것은 아니다. 이러한 법적 의무를 강요하지 않더라도 ESG 리스크를 제대로 관리하지 못하는 회사에 대해서는 ESG행동주의자들이 적극적으로 ESG 개선을 요구하거나, 이사선임에 반대하거나 주주제안을 제기하는 등 자본시장의 압력은 여전히 작동한다. 회사법은 사전에 ESG 리스크 관리체계를 내부통제차원에서 효율적으로 구축하여 운영하고 있는 회사에 경영판단의 원칙을 적용해 사법적 심사를 자제함으로써 회사가 자발적으로 ESG 개선 및 리스크 관리체계를 구축해 나가도록 하는 것이 바람직하다. 그리고 자본시장의 압력이 주주의 단기이익이 아닌 장기이익을 추구하는 방향으로 작용할 수 있도록 함으로써 단기이익 추구에만 급급한 일부 헤지펀드의 행동주의가 확산되는 것을 방지하고, 회사와 주주들이 자발적으로 ESG를 개선하며 회사의 지속가능성을 추구해 나가는 건설적인 ESG행동주의가 정착될 수 있도록 해야 할 것이다.

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