중국 미사일방어망(Missile Defense)의 역사와 한반도에 대한 함의 = History and Impact of the Chinese MD(Missile Defense): South Korea’s Options

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The Chinese stance on Missile Defense (MD) issues have been contradictory since the 1960s. China’s behavior towards MD had been reactive between 1960s and 1990s as there was no significant development in the Chinese MD technology despite its R&D efforts. From the 2000s, China began progress on its own MD system after acquiring S-300 system form Russia. Based on S-300 technology, China was able to develop and deploy HQ-9 system. The later version of the systems are supposed to be close to Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD. Since 2010, China’s focus on the development of MD intensified. This also resulted in the testing and deployment of ASAT(anti-Satellite) weapon systems. While China is increasingly concentrated on the MD capability enhancement, and conducting joint MD exercises with Russia, China remain highly critical against the US MD deployment. In particular, the US THAAD deployment in Korea has recently become the major target of china’s criticism. China has not fully disclosed its own MD ambition yet refuse to conduct discussion with the US on resolving the differences. China’s such contradictory attitude and ambiguity will increase strategic instability between the two countries. Meanwhile, Korea will become highly vulnerable to China’s MD. China’s MD will be used against the US forces to enforce its own A2AD concept. If China achieves the capability to counter the US presence in the region, the Chinese MD can be used to support North Korea in the case of hostilities by blocking movement of the US forces during a future crisis in the Korean peninsula. Also the success of the Chinese regional MD might compel the Chinese leadership to undertake more oppressive military posture in the region. The reinforced Chinese MD will create a sphere of strategic instability in the Korean peninsula and Korea is not at all ready to counter such a difficult contingency.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

탄도미사일방어(BMD)와 관련한 중국의 태도는 이중적이다. 중국은 시기적으로 6단계에 걸쳐 MD에 대한 태도를 변화시켜 왔다. 그런 변화에는 미국 MD 비난과 자국 MD 개발이라는 두 가지 일관된 흐름이 있었다. 냉전 시기를 거쳐 2010년대에 이르기까지 중국의 미국 MD관련 비판은 일관됐고 강도는 거세져 왔다. 최근 주한 미군의 사드배치 비판도 이런 흐름의 연장선에 있다. 그러나 한편으론 MD 개발 속도가 빨라졌고 내용도 깊어졌다. 냉전기에는 움직임이 느리고 소극적이었지만 점차 적극적으로 변했다. 90년대에는 러시아제 미사일 방어망인 S-300을 근간으로 미국의 PAC-3에 버금가는 중국형 HQ(Hong Qui)-9개량 모델이 양산돼 배치되기 시작했다. 미국의 고고도미사일방어망(THAAD, 이하 사드)에 준하는 MD개발도 시작됐다. 2010년 1월의 1차 MD 실험에 이어 2013년, 2014년, 2016년 계속 MD 시험을 했고 우주의 위성공격무기(ASAT: Anti-Satellite Weapon)실험도 했다. 러시아와 미사일방어 합동 훈련도 했다. 한편으론 미국의 MD를 비판하면서 다른 편으론 MD를 실전 배치하고 새로운 실험을 계속하며, 미국을 겨냥해 러시아와 합동미사일방어훈련을 해 온 것이 중국의 MD 역사다. 중국은 그 과정에서 자국의 MD개발 사실에는 거의 침묵으로 일관하고 미국과의 관련 대화도 지속적으로 거부한다. 중국의 이런 이중적 태도와 불투명성은 전략적 불안정을 높인다. 중국의 MD 능력이 확대될 경우 한국은 피해국이 될 수 있다. 중국 MD는 미국의 대륙간탄도탄(ICBM) 공격을 막는 전략적 수단이라기보다 미 군사력의 중국 접근을 막는 지역방어(TMD)용, 반접근/지역거부(A2AD) 수단이다. 중국의 MD 능력이 고도화되면 한반도 위기 시 미 군사력의 동북아 접근을 막아 북한을 지원하는 용도로 사용될 수 있다. 또 MD자신감이 중국 지도부의 성향을 과격하게 만들어 한국에 미사일과 결합한 군사적 강압 정책을 그렇지 않을 경우보다 편하게 구사하는 상황을 초래할 수 있다. 신장된 중국 MD는 한반도에 전에 없이 새로운 전략적 불안 공간을 만들어 낼 가능성이 높다. 한국은 이에 전혀 대비되어 있지 않다.

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