Essays on Political Economics : Intergenerational Resource Conflicts and International Labour Standards
저자
발행사항
Cambridge : University of Cambridge, 2004
학위논문사항
Thesis(doctoral)-- University of Cambridge: Economics and Politics 2004
발행연도
2004
작성언어
영어
주제어
KDC
340.32 판사항(4)
발행국(도시)
England
형태사항
xi, 177p. : Charts ; 26cm.
일반주기명
References: p. 154-164
소장기관
This thesis studies some issues related to intergenerational conflicts and resource management and international labour standards within a political economics frame- work. The thesis includes a collection of four self-contained essays. The thesis is based on the idea that politics is an essential factor in the formation of economic policy. We argue that policy making should be viewed as a endogenous process in which the interests of politicians, voters, and lobby groups over the relevant policy are traded off. The thesis has two parts. The first part (ch. 2-3) is concerned with theoretical models of intergenerational conflicts over resource depletion. The second part (ch. 4-5) presents theoretical models of labour standards.
In chapter 2, we study the political economy of resource management in an OLG framework with an intertemporal externality problem. The externality arises because a common resource used for production is depleted by production of "dirty" goods.
An intergenerational conflict arises because the young generation cares about the level of current production of dirty goods. This is so because production of dirty goods affects the future availability of the resource. The old, on the other hand, has no such a concern and tries to maximise current resource use. We assume that the interests of the two generations are represented by two pressure groups. They lobby the government to affect the policy choice - an upper limit on the resource use allowed for production of dirty goods - in their favour. The game between the two lobby groups and the government is modelled as a dynamic common agency.
We study stationary equilibria focussing on a particular class of strategies which we called "Take It or Leave It" (TIOLI) strategies, where a principal makes a positive contribution only when her payoff maximising policy is implemented. It is shown that political competition may lead to a "greener" environment policy and to less resource exploitation than in an unregulated economy. More surprisingly, we also find that resource exploitation may be lower in political equilibrium than in an economy run by a social planner.
In chapter 3, we consider a simple two-period version of the model analysed in chapter 2 and study political equilibria in "truthful" strategies, as suggested by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). In contrast to the "TIOLI" strategy equilibrium, the "truthful" equilibrium is efficient. The comparison between the truthful and the TIOLI equilibrium highlights the difference between the logic of political compromise and that of partisan politics.
The second part (ch.4-5) of the thesis is concerned with the political economy of labour standards. The key issues here are impacts of labour standards on globalisation, race to the bottom, and endogenous mechansims for labour standards implemetation. Chapter 4 investigates the controversial relationship between labour standards and globalisation (a fall in transportation costs) within a two factor-two sector Heckscher-Ohlin-Mayer political-economy trade model. The model focuses on labour standards that have distortionary effects on the economy but improve the working conditions of workers. We adopt the median voter model to characterise the labour standards chosen under majority voting. We find that labour standards are more lax in economies with large income inequalities. More importantly, we also show that globalisation may or may not promote stricter labour standards depending on the factor abundance of each country. Thus, a race to the bottom is not an necessary implication of globalisation. The model's predictions are empirically examined using panel data. The dependent variable used as a measurement of labour standards is the number of hours of work per week. This measure is then regressed on such variables as income inequality, transportation costs, and foreign direct investment. We find some evidence that is consistent with the predictions of the model.
The right to collective bargaining is one of the core labour standards. Chapter 5 develops a two-country model of political competition between industry lobbies and unions that can explain regulation that relate to this labour standard. We compare equilibrium outcomes in a number of different institutional frameworks. In the benchmark, the two governments do not cooperate and we show that this leads to labour standards that are too low. Cooperation between the two governments can internalise the negative externality associated with unilateral policymaking. More importantly, we demonstrate that cooperation between lobbies in different countries can serve as a substitute for cooperation between the two governments. Analysis of the latter case is nontrivial and requires that the standard common agency model is extended to a situation with multiple agents and multiple principles (Prat and Rustichini, 2003).
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