창업자 교체의 원인과 결과 = Founder-ceo succession: the antecedents and consequences

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study aims to explain what precedes Founder-CEO turnover in small companies and how Founder-CEO succession affects the likelihood of firm failure. It is hypothesized that there are three antecedents of Founder-CEO turnover, low firm performance, a board of directors dominated by outside directors, and change of a large block shareholder. We also hypothesize the impacts of Founder-CEO turnover on the probability of firm failure. This study seeks to make two contributions. First, I want to verify whether the previously known antecedents of CEO succession (poor performance and outsider dominated board) can be predictors of Founder-CEO succession as well. Second, I would like to add to the literature by focusing on a relatively ignored antecedent of CEO succession: changes of large block shareholders. While firm performance and board power have been widely examined as antecedents of CEO succession (e.g., Kang and Shivdasani 1995; Weisbach 1988), the change of large block shareholders has received relatively less academic attention as an antecedent of succession. In small companies, large block shareholders can play important roles in making Founder-CEO turnover decisions. By focusing on changes among large block shareholders, I believe that I can bring enhanced understanding to the Founder-CEO succession literature. Second, structural inertia theory is used to frame the performance implication hypothesis. While the liability of newness issues discussed by Stinchcombe (1965) are typically associated with newly created organizations, significant change can cause the internal and external challenges of being new to reappear in older organizations - an event often referred to as resetting the clock. Thus, even well-established organizations can experience a renewed liability of newness, In other words, founder turnover will reset the liability of newness clock of the small companies thereby increasing the probability of firm failure.