Payment and Pricing in Service Systems.
저자
발행사항
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020
학위수여대학
University of Kansas Business
수여연도
2020
작성언어
영어
주제어
학위
Ph.D.
페이지수
156 p.
지도교수/심사위원
Advisor: Mallik, Suman;Arikan, Mazhar.
This dissertation consists of three chapters, while each chapter presents one research article. The first two articles are joint work with my co-advisors Suman Mallik and Mazhar Arikan. These two papers focus on studies of alternative payment models for healthcare delivery in the United States. The last article is a joint work with Wei Chen, Yuxin Chen and Chao Liang. This paper is the first attempt to systematically study the problem of whether and how a firm should adopt manufacturer’s suggested retail price. These articles are listed as follows:(1)(included in Chapter 1)Zheng Han, Mazhar Arikan, and Suman Mallik. “Competition between Hospitals under Bundled Payments and Fee-for-Service: An Equilibrium Analysis”. Under Major Revision at Manufacturing & Service Operations Management.(2)(included in Chapter 2)Zheng Han, Mazhar Arikan, and Suman Mallik. “A Study of Prospectively-paid, Performance-based Incentive Payments in Healthcare”. Working paper.(3)(included in Chapter 3)Wei Chen, Yuxin Chen, Zheng Han, and Chao Liang (in alphabetical order). “Cross-Market Reference Effect and Optimality of MSRP”. Working paper.The content of Chapter 1 is the paper “Competition between Hospitals under Bundled Payments and Fee-for-Service: An Equilibrium Analysis”. We noticed that competing hospitals under same or different payment models from an insurer is rather common for healthcare delivery in the United States. However, there is a lack of understanding about the impact of payment schemes on quality outcomes from both the hospital’s and the insurer’s perspective. Motivated by this observation, we formulate game theoretic models to study the quality competition between two hospitals and the choice of the insurer among payment schemes. Our paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to incorporate competition and the insurer’s perspective to study the impact of different payment models on quality.We consider the setting of two hospitals that compete for a common pool of patients under a single health plan from a single insurer. The insurer aims to maximize the overall achievable quality in the system by assigning either the fee-for-service (FFS) or the bundled payment (BP) scheme to each hospital. Then each hospital chooses its quality; and that the demand, and the costs of the hospital as well as the readmission probability of patients depends on the chosen quality. Under such a setting, we study the impact of payment schemes on the equilibrium qualities of hospitals and on the choice of insurer. Specifically, our models seek answers to the following questions. Is BP (FFS) payment scheme always associated with high (low) equilibrium quality in competition? What factors affect the choice of the insurer and how? What factors affect the equilibrium qualities of competing hospitals and how? What insights can a practitioner obtain from the equilibrium outcomes? We show that BP (FFS) is not always associated with high (low) equilibrium quality and that the equilibrium qualities of the two hospitals are strategic complements. The insurer may choose all possible combinations of payment schemes for two hospitals, depending on the parameters of payments, costs, demands and readmission probabilities. Our finding provides a justification for the phenomenon of mixed payment schemes under a single insurer in practice. On a higher level, our findings suggest that a specific quality outcome is achievable not by choosing a specific payment model but by a careful design of its parameters. Further numerical studies show that hospital readmission reduction initiatives are most effective when run in conjunction with cost reduction initiatives.The content of Chapter 2 is the paper “A Study of Prospectively-paid, Performance-based Incentive Payments in Healthcare”. In healthcare policy making, it is long expected that well-known behavior effects should be considered in the design of payments to healthcare providers, in order to incentivize better performance on quality. Recently, as a first step, a program called Comprehensive Primary Care Plus (CPC+), proposed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), is underway to better align payments to primary care practices with their performances, by leveraging loss aversion. Specifically, under CPC+, the insurer prospectively pays and retrospectively reconciles a performance-based incentive, and the reconciliation is based on how well a practice performs on quality measures. Inspired by this reform, we study decision makings of a primary care practice and an insurer under the CPC+ payment scheme, especially under this prospectively-paid, performance-based incentive, which in theory provides practices financial resources and flexibility to make investments and improve quality of care, and also leverages loss aversion from practices. Using the fee-for-service (FFS) payment scheme as a benchmark, we develop insights on the resulting quality of care under CPC+, and propose and compare two new reconciliation schemes with the current linear reconciliation scheme. In addition, we further study the insurer’s optimal choice over these three reconciliation schemes, in order to maximize the quality improvement from the practice. We show that besides the current linear scheme, a simpler scheme that we coin as the step scheme can actually be the optimal choice for the insurer. We further develop implications of such schemes on societal utilities, and study an extension of our model where the insurer decides the reconciliation scheme as well as the parameter of the scheme.The content of Chapter 3 is the paper “Cross-Market Reference Effect and Optimality of MSRP”. When selling a product, a manufacturer can positively impact a consumer’s utility by suggesting a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) that serves as a reference price. Thus, it seems puzzling that many manufacturers do not adopt MSRP in practice. In this paper, we offer a strategic explanation to this phenomenon by studying a manufacturer’s decision of whether and when to adopt MSRP, considering the impacts of reference effect, channel structure (integrated vs. decentralized) and the existence of multiple markets. Our results show that if a decentralized channel structure is absent or there does not exist multiple markets, a manufacturer always weakly benefits from adopting MSRP. In a decentralized channel with multiple markets, however, adopting MSRP can indeed be not optimal. This is resulted from the tradeoff between cross-market reference effect and the impact of MSRP on double marginalization in the channel pricing. We further show that our result is robust through a variety of extensions.
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