Silent Military Infiltration: A Study on the CCP’s Covert Front Line Targeting the Armed Forces of Taiwan

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The People’s Republic of China’s rapid military modernization has intensified security pressure on Taiwan, but conventional military coercion is only one dimension of the challenge. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has also conducted sustained intelligence and infiltration activities targeting Taiwan’s armed forces. Although research on PRC’s influence operations has expanded, the military dimension, particularly the mechanisms linking United Front Work, clandestine intelligence activity, and local collaborators remains underexamined.
This study analyzes how the CCP’s “Covert Front Line” and United Front Work interact in defense-sector influence operations against Taiwan. Drawing on the historical development of CCP party-building, intelligence practices, and influence operations, it conceptualizes United Front Work as an access-enabling and network-building instrument and the Covert Front Line as a clandestine mechanism for recruitment, intelligence collection, and organization-building. Methodologically, the study employs qualitative process tracing of two adjudicated espionage networks in Taiwan between 2016 and 2023, focusing on access channels, intermediary roles, recruitment incentives, handling methods, and operational outputs.
The analysis refines the concept of “local collaborators” by distinguishing between primary and secondary collaborators. Secondary collaborators are typically civilians or CCP-linked operatives who use legitimate professional or social identities to facilitate contact, logistics, financial transfers, and intelligence transmission. Primary collaborators generally possess military backgrounds and play more direct roles in recruiting active-duty or retired personnel, developing networks, and acquiring classified defense information. The findings show that United Front Work and covert intelligence activities are analytically distinct but operationally coupled: overt or semi-overt social networks can create access and cover for clandestine penetration. By clarifying these mechanisms, the study contributes to the literature on PRC’s influence operations and provides a more systematic basis for assessing infiltration risks and strengthening Taiwan’s defense-sector counterintelligence and resilience.