SSCI
SCOPUS
KCI등재
ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE, MALAPPORTIONMENT, AND ONE PARTY DOMINANCE IN JAPAN
저자
Hickman,John C. (Political Science at the University of Iowa) ; Kim,Chong Lim (Political Science, Comparative Legislative Research Center at the University of Iowa)
발행기관
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
1992
작성언어
English
KDC
309.000
등재정보
SSCI,SCOPUS,KCI등재
자료형태
학술저널
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5-25(21쪽)
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소장기관
We have examined one widely accepted conventional wisdom about party politics in Japan. It holds that the long-standing LDP dominance is attributable to the electoral system which confers an appreciable advantage to the electoral system which confers an appreciable advantage to the ruling party. Drawing upon the data gathered from ten national elections, 1963-1990 we have subjected the thesis to a systematic empirical test. The test led us to focus on the LDP's relative electoral advantage, the degree of malapportionment and how it helps "manufacture" a majority for the LDP, and the difficult issue of whether the LDP manipulates the system to its own advantage.
By and large, the conventional wisdom has well withstood our rigorous test, suggesting that the thesis is essentially correct. There is no question that the LDP has derived the largest benefit from the existing electoral system. As a vote-seat conversion machine, the LDP has been the most efficient.
The results of the most recent election, held on February 18, 1990 reaffirm our general point. The LDP won less than a majority hare of the vote: 46.1 percent, but it attained a clear majority in the House of Representatives, with 53.7 percent of the seats.
Malapportionment is both large and unfairly skewed in favor of the ruling party. The value of a vote in an overrepresented district is as much as five times greater than the vote in a underrepresented district, and the LDP controls almost all of the overrepresented rural districts. Popular support for the LDP has steadily fallen since 1963: its vote shares dipped consistently below the 50 percent level throughout the 60s, 70s, and 80s, which purt LDP dominance at risk. But the party has survived and continude in power, in part due to the safety margin created by the malapportionment. The magnitude of malapportionment has changed very little over the years despite several reapportionment efforts. The ICV scores we have computed earlier for the ten elections substantiate this claim. Japan's electoral system falls far short of the ideal of equal representation. The LDP has done too little and acted too late to bring any appreciable improvement each time it implemented an electoral reform. All of the circumstantial evidence that we have reviewed points to the subtle, highly effective LDP manipulation of the system. But subtlety does not absolve the LDP of the charge that is makes deliberate use of the system to protect its dominant position. It has delayed long overdue reapportionment reforms and ensured that the limited reapportionments undertaken would not damage its seat share. When the inequities in the electoral system have been challenged as unconstitutional, the conservative Supreme Court has responded in a manner that facilitates the LDP's dual strategy of delay and minimal reform.
Thus far, the conventional wisdom was formulated on the basis of interesting but piecemeal evidence, consisting of episodic cases and ad hoc observations. Comprehensive attempts to bring systematic data and rigorous analysis to bear on the issue were rare. Our aim is to close the gap between interpretation and evidence. The analysis has yielded results which place the thesis on a more secure empirical foundation.
In an absolute sense, all electoral systems are complex and unique mechanisms. But when viewed in comparative perspective, the perplexing array of elements comprising the electoral system for the Japanses House of Representatives, including a ballot system that is neither pure SNTV or preferential voting, low district magnitude in which each district elects one to six members, and an electoral formula based on a plurality rule constrained by a threshold requirement, means that it can have no close relatives. Although quite difficult to tackle, it would be extremely interesting to trace the relative effect of each of these electoral elements on the party politics and on the configuration of Japan's legislative politics. Such research would obviously require a large scale comparative study in the fine tradition of Douglas Rae (1967) and later continued in the work of Katz (1980), Taagepera and Shugart (1989), and King (1990). In a single country study lied ours, answers to the above question are beyond our reach.
Despite adoption of the plurality rule and low district magnitude, the electoral system as a whole has worked in a manner that is more congenial to small parties than Anglo-American systems employing single member districts and plurality rules. Anc Japan's break-even point occurs at the level nearly equivalent to those in countries using versions of PR systems. If a small party manages to mobilize sufficient support to cross the break-even point, not only can it establish an electoral niche, but it can also prosper, free-riding on the benefits of the "Matthew Effect." While it is true that the LDP has been the largest beneficiary from the electoral system, it is also fair to say that the same system has not punished small parties as severely as in some other countries. In light of the evidence we have presented, there is no longer any doubt that the electoral system has helped shape Japan's multiparty system as it exists today, with the added twist that it gives a decisive edge to the LDP's legislative dominance.
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