KCI등재
Russia’s Approaches to the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program: Between Multipolarity and Breakup Of the Nonproliferation Regime
저자
이고르 흐리프노프 (미 조지아대학교)
발행기관
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
2009
작성언어
English
주제어
등재정보
KCI등재
자료형태
학술저널
발행기관 URL
수록면
81-111(31쪽)
KCI 피인용횟수
3
제공처
Russia’s post-Soviet record regarding the DPRK is lackluster and rife with inconsistencies, ranging from the alienation of its former ally in the East to the rapid resumption of cooperation in 2000 and a series of proactive, though mostly unsuccessful moves toward a comprehensive solution of the crisis, with denuclearization as a top priority. This renewed attention to North Korea was largely driven by Russia’s new geopolitical concept of a multipolar world, whose major objective was to counterbalance the hegemony of the United States. This concept became a building block of the rapprochement between Russia and China from the late 1990s through the early 2000s and provided solid ground for bilateral cooperation on defusing the crisis.
As Russia reasserted its global interests and restored its economic power during this period of time, the Korean crisis ceased to be a relatively freestanding issue for Russia. Rather, it became closely interwoven with other global problems and concerns that Russia has been dealing, often affecting higher-priority issues for Moscow. On the one hand, Russia’s approach to the standoff on the Korean Peninsula appears to derive from its threat perception of the United States and its regional policy, as well as carefully calibrated moves focused on the potential implications of a Korean solution for Russia’s far more strategically valuable interests in Iran. On the other, they are a careful balancing act in the growing shadow of China, the regional hegemon with a stake in a solution to the Korean crisis on terms consistent with its own interests.
There is no doubt that both Russia and China oppose the DPRK nuclear program and are committed to the nonproliferation regime, though they do not feel directly threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons. They believe that a solution to the crisis lies more with Washington than anyone else but wish to avoid near-worst-case scenarios associated with a regime collapse or change, which would likely create a massive flow of refugees into Russia and China. The resultant regional realignment might also bring U.S. troops to both countries’ borders, which would be a frightening scenario for Russia, which already confronts the continuing prospect of further NATO expansion.
This business-as-usual routine, a vicious circle in which tough measures to punish the DPRK led only to further escalation from the embattled communist regime, can be broken. It will be possible when Russia and by the same token China grasp the new, serious risks to themselves posed by the geopolitical fallout from the spring 2009 tests. As Japan proceeds on the road to a radical revision of its constitutional fundamentals to allow militarization, South Korea modernizes and expands its armed forces, and the United States reinforces its military presence and preparedness in the region, Russia and China will have to treat the changing geopolitical balance in response to North Korean threats with appropriate urgency, innovative diplomacy, and persistence. The paper will review one future option open to Russia in its new search for a solution.
Russia’s post-Soviet record regarding the DPRK is lackluster and rife with inconsistencies, ranging from the alienation of its former ally in the East to the rapid resumption of cooperation in 2000 and a series of proactive, though mostly unsuccessful moves toward a comprehensive solution of the crisis, with denuclearization as a top priority. This renewed attention to North Korea was largely driven by Russia’s new geopolitical concept of a multipolar world, whose major objective was to counterbalance the hegemony of the United States. This concept became a building block of the rapprochement between Russia and China from the late 1990s through the early 2000s and provided solid ground for bilateral cooperation on defusing the crisis.
As Russia reasserted its global interests and restored its economic power during this period of time, the Korean crisis ceased to be a relatively freestanding issue for Russia. Rather, it became closely interwoven with other global problems and concerns that Russia has been dealing, often affecting higher-priority issues for Moscow. On the one hand, Russia’s approach to the standoff on the Korean Peninsula appears to derive from its threat perception of the United States and its regional policy, as well as carefully calibrated moves focused on the potential implications of a Korean solution for Russia’s far more strategically valuable interests in Iran. On the other, they are a careful balancing act in the growing shadow of China, the regional hegemon with a stake in a solution to the Korean crisis on terms consistent with its own interests.
There is no doubt that both Russia and China oppose the DPRK nuclear program and are committed to the nonproliferation regime, though they do not feel directly threatened by North Korean nuclear weapons. They believe that a solution to the crisis lies more with Washington than anyone else but wish to avoid near-worst-case scenarios associated with a regime collapse or change, which would likely create a massive flow of refugees into Russia and China. The resultant regional realignment might also bring U.S. troops to both countries’ borders, which would be a frightening scenario for Russia, which already confronts the continuing prospect of further NATO expansion.
This business-as-usual routine, a vicious circle in which tough measures to punish the DPRK led only to further escalation from the embattled communist regime, can be broken. It will be possible when Russia and by the same token China grasp the new, serious risks to themselves posed by the geopolitical fallout from the spring 2009 tests. As Japan proceeds on the road to a radical revision of its constitutional fundamentals to allow militarization, South Korea modernizes and expands its armed forces, and the United States reinforces its military presence and preparedness in the region, Russia and China will have to treat the changing geopolitical balance in response to North Korean threats with appropriate urgency, innovative diplomacy, and persistence. The paper will review one future option open to Russia in its new search for a solution.
분석정보
연월일 | 이력구분 | 이력상세 | 등재구분 |
---|---|---|---|
2023 | 평가예정 | 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증) | |
2020-01-01 | 평가 | 등재학술지 선정 (재인증) | KCI등재 |
2019-12-01 | 평가 | 등재후보로 하락 (계속평가) | KCI후보 |
2016-01-01 | 평가 | 등재학술지 유지 (계속평가) | KCI등재 |
2012-01-01 | 평가 | 등재 1차 FAIL (등재유지) | KCI등재 |
2009-01-01 | 평가 | 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) | KCI등재 |
2008-01-01 | 평가 | 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) | KCI후보 |
2007-01-01 | 평가 | 등재후보학술지 유지 (등재후보1차) | KCI후보 |
2006-01-01 | 평가 | 등재후보 1차 FAIL (등재후보1차) | KCI후보 |
2005-08-01 | 학술지등록 | 한글명 : 전략연구외국어명 : STRATEGIC STUDIES | KCI후보 |
2004-01-01 | 평가 | 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) | KCI후보 |
기준연도 | WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) | KCIF(2년) | KCIF(3년) |
---|---|---|---|
2016 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.66 |
KCIF(4년) | KCIF(5년) | 중심성지수(3년) | 즉시성지수 |
0.71 | 0.69 | 0.847 | 0.6 |
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