프랜차이즈 시스템의 소유구조 결정요인 = 이론과 증거

국문 초록 (Abstract)

가맹본부는 자신의 전략적 선택에 의해 소유구조를 결정한다. 자원희소이론, 대리이론, 거래 비용이론, 혼합소유이론 등 경제학과 경영학 분야의 다양한 이론은 가맹본부가 경제적 효율성을 높이고 수익 잠재력과 생존가능성을 극대화하기 위해 소유구조를 선택하는 것으로 보고 있다. 본 연구는 소유구조에 관한 다양한 이론을 가맹본부의 전략적 선택 관점에서 비교ㆍ설명하는 한편, 기존 이론에서 프랜차이즈 시스템의 소유구조를 결정하는 핵심변수로 다루어지고 있는 가맹본부의 역사, 규모, 거래특유투자, 불확실성, 위험공유성향 등이 직영점 비율에 미치는 영향이 이론에 따라 상이할 수 있음을 가설의 형태로 제시하고 이를 실증분석을 통해 검증하고 있다. 국내 543개 프랜차이즈 브랜드에 대한 정보공개서 자료 분석결과, 가맹본부의 존속기간, 종업원 수, 영업개시 소요기간, 가맹사업기간 역수, 로열티 부과여부는 직영점 비율과 긍정적 관계를 맺는 반면 총점포수와 가맹점의 지리적 분산도는 부정적인 관계를 맺는 것으로, 초기투자규모와 가맹계약기간 역수는 유의적인 관계를 맺지 않는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 이러한 분석 결과를 토대로 프랜차이즈 시스템의 소유구조와 관련한 이론 및 방법론적 시사점을 제시하고 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The ownership structure of a franchise system is determined by the franchisor’s strategic choice. A close look at the extant theories and perspectives in economics and management such as resource scarcity theory, agency theory, transaction cost analysis, and mixed ownership theory reveals that firms choose their ownership structure for the sake of economic efficiency, profit potentials, the chance of survival, and other strategic concerns.
The present study, on the basis of strategic choice perspective, reviews the divergent theories of a franchise system’s ownership structure and its determinants, thus providing a theoretical framework for comparing the contradictory arguments along the several critical dimensions. We also developed and tested the conflicting hypotheses regarding key determinants of ownership structure including firm’s age, size, transaction-specific investments, uncertainty, and risk-sharing propensity.
Using a FDD (Franchise Disclosure Document) data set of 543 Korean franchisors, we found that the years in business, the total number of employees, days of training, the inverse of the years of franchising, and the requirement of royalty payment have positive relationships with the proportion of company-owned outlets to total number of outlets. On the other hand, the proportion of company-owned outlets was found to have negative relationships with the total number of outlets and the extent of geographic dispersion of outlets, but to have no significant relationships with the initial investment required and the inverse of contract length. Based on the findings, we provide several theoretical and managerial implications for studying ownership structure of franchise systems.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 이론적 배경
• Ⅲ. 연구모형의 설정
• Ⅳ. 실증 분석
• Ⅴ. 결론 및 시사점
• 참고문헌
• Abstract

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