「리베르만」論爭과 實際 = Liberman's Theories and Its Practices
저자
姜濱口 (서울大學校商科大學 韓國經濟硏究所)
발행기관
서울大學校商科大學 韓國經濟硏究所(INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY)
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
1966
작성언어
Korean
KDC
320.5
자료형태
학술저널
수록면
89-128(40쪽)
제공처
소장기관
Ⅰ. Introduction
The idea has been accepted for a long time that profit is what keeps going capitalist enterprises and economy. Under capitalism, therefore, the pursuit of maximum profit seems to be its aim without preestablishing any kind of coordination with or program for the whole of society. This kind of reasoning remains true, even if one favours the theory of the purpose of enterprise that has been developed in recent years, the most outstanding scholar in this field being P.F.Drucker, who refuses maximization of profit as the purpose of enterprise by replacing it by "adequate profit" as the first responsibility towards society. In the same way the emerging of managerial society does not oppose the above reasoning either, because the parts played by the capitalist so far will only be taken over by the managers of industrial enterprises.
For these reasons it is astonishing that the notion of profit, characteristic of capitalist society, is being introduced into the socialist economy of USSR. The association of the terms of "profit" and "communism" has, at first glance, a shocking effect. The introduction of profit has come about after a series of discussions, the contents of which have been called Libermanism. Liberman, professor at the University of Kharkov, becomes the exponent of new theories in 1962 and after the personal changes at the Kremlin, the discussions of Libermanism are led with more fervour while experiments with a number of his new ideas are being carried through.
We have, therefore, reasons to ask: Are the USSR going to let themselves inspire by capitalism and are they trying to adopt profit as a motor for social production? Does this mean a confession of failure concerning economic planning practised until now? Reality is less spectacular: there is no economic revolution in the USSR. The experiments carried out now are rather meant to improve planning than to undermine its foundations. If profit is being introduced into this system its function is very different from that in capitalism.
Ⅱ. Evaluation of P.F.Drucker's Theory of Profit
P.F.Drucker thinks that his theory about profit and profitability may be applied regardless of any difference in economic or social systems. Thus, according to him, "profit figures are the only thing the management has to go by when it makes his decisions-in a collectivist and planned as well as in a free-enterprise economy. They are inevitably the first yardstick and gauge of performance." And "profitability operates as much under collectivism as under individualism, under government control and government ownership as in a free-enterprise system."
The validity of this indiscriminating application is dubious. Profit under socialism, admitted and considered necessary already by Lenin, is clearly subordinated to the principle of planned national economy. The fact that all enterprises in the USSR are nationalized makes profit outside planned economy impossible. And therefore the fulfilment of the plan is "the first yardstick and gauge of performance." Consequently, profit, being "a necessity of survival" to the enterprise for Drucker, need not be so under socialism. The enterprise or its survival does not depend on the profit it makes but rather on the decision of a state which may even close down a profitable enterprise if it is thought necessary. Moreover, there may be enterprises operating with a deficit foreseen in the plan. Under the planned economy therefore, profit is not "the first social responsibility as well as its first duty toward itself and its workers." Drucker further defines profit as "the risk premium that covers the costs of staying in business-replacement, obsolescence, market risk and uncertainty." and that "profit insures the supply of future capital for innovation and expansion." But if an enterprise estimated as important within the plan should not have made the profit estimated in the plan itself, the state will take over the risk premium and supply of future capital. Moreover, there cannot exist any market risk under socialism because there is no free or capitalist market.
Finally, we may state that Soviet enterprises, even if they range within the scale of self-financing, are not and will probably never be absolutely autonomous. They all depend on the national plan. In this case, Drucker's theories can only be applied to industrial enterprises in capitalist countries. The fundamental difference stems from the fact that capitalist enterprises work in a system of free market and liberal economy, while socialist enterprises are working principally for the realization of the plan.
Ⅲ. Liberman's Theories and the Controversy Concerning Libermanism
In order to overcome difficulties in USSR economy and management, Liberman suggested the following points of a reform:
The national economic council and the regional economic councils (Sovnarkhozes) must radically improve the means of supply of material as well as of technical needs of enterprises, the present hierarchy bringing about an attitude of irresponsibility.
Individual enterprises must be authorized to fix their plans independently. Plans enforced from above that only consider the output, force enterprises to dissimulate their reserves and keep them from operating according to their full capacity. Instead of having the Gosplan fix very strict plans annually, its powers would be reduced to only drawing up general outlines being forwarded through the sovnarkhozes. They would contain mainly control numbers and stretch over a period of two or three years.
In order to make planning more attractive, enterprises should have the possibility to get into direct contact with suppliers and consumers within the limits set by the control indices.
The managers would have large influence and, after having consulted with their own committees of production, would have the right:
To determine the structure and the personnel of the enterprise within the general frame of members and salary budget assigned to them by the Gosplan;
To refix salaries more or less raised above the standard type salary;
To refix prices in order to enhance the functioning of any section of the enterprise;
To extend loans for housing projects and other social services.
These propositions are directed towards a large decentralization. Their main importance would be to make the managers, up to now blind executives of a strict plan, real heads of enterprises.
These propositions of Liberman have been attacked by two sides; by those reproaching him of going to far and by those thinking his suggestions of reform insufficient. The conservative theorists hold the opinion that the index of profit proposed by Liberman is not applicable in all enterprises of different sections and they favour a less strict system of leaving a certain margin for each case where the plan has to be adopted. For them a general spirit of reconciliation in economic administration would be sufficient to dissolve
a too rigid tutelage. The result, according to them, would both benefit the fulfilment of the plan and safeguard the rights of the enterprises.
Other more progressive theorists, e.g., Nemchinov, a menber of Academy, criticize that Liberman has not brought up any new idea concerning the formation of prices, nor the fiscal system of the enterprises. Moreover the index of profit does not show anything but the relation between profit and productive capital. It shows a result but does not go into the details of production. The relationship of subordination of the enterprise under the planning authority must therefore be changed and the enforced plan has to be substituted by a plan based on a mutual contract. The volume of production and the provided quality would no longer be considered as a task but as an obligation originating in the freely negotiated contract between the planning offices and the enterprises. Secondly, prices should be remunerative, according to quality, novelty of a product, etc. In the third place, an enterprise must be able to obtain, without too long delay, all equipment and material necessary for its production. Last, not least, the mentality of the managers has to be trans formed; they must learn to care personally for economic administration of their productive capital.
Ⅳ. Experiences with Libermanism and the Contents of Economic Reforms in the USSR The procedure of putting theoretical suggestions into experimental application has more and more often been practiced in USSR in many fields. These experiments have not only been carried through in the case of Libermanism, but also, e.g., applying to forms of organization for operation in enterprise, new methods of financing, techniques of accounting, methods of establishing plans for enterprises, reforms of the premium system, new systems for encouraging innovations, etc. But the experiment that roused rumours in capitalist countries, speaking of a "return to the free market," "sovereignty of the consumer," "abandoning of planning," was the one that dealt with direct contracts between supplying enterprises and their customer enterprises. This method has been applied for the first time in two enterprises, "Bolshevichka" and "Maiak", which are both manufacturers of ready-made clothes. The plan was made up for them after contracts had been signed with the customer. This means that both enterprises make first contracts with retail firms that have, on their side, to respect the demands of their customers. The contracts define the quantity, the quality, the prices etc. of the product. The plan is approved afterwards by the central planning offices. Moreover, both enterprises are free to choose whatever method of execution they want and are thus freed from the habitual normalization in the field of use of raw material, labour, etc. Finally, the result of their activities is evaluated according to the ealization of their production plan (as before) and to the level of their benefit (new system).
After six months of experimenting in both enterprises, positive results have been announced. Consequently, the government seems to follow the same way now, extending the application of reforms to a greater number of other enterprises. It decided also in favour of a progressive reform towards greater subtlety in economic organisms and lans. The philosophy of this reform program consists in assuring harmony between national planning and balanced management of individual enterprises.
Ⅴ. Evaluation of the Soviet Economic Reform and Its Problems
Even if we can speak of great revisions in Soviet economy we must however delimit it. All measures towards reform are neither concerned directly with the principle of planned centralization nor, of course, with the fundamental principle of the state as owner of the means of production. Doubtlessly the reform gives a greater margin of initiative to the managers, but the planning offices continue, directly or indirectly, to fix from above the prices of the majority of products, the volume and the product line. They thus control important factors of profit variation. Therefore, with or without Liberman, the enterprise is not entitled to plan independently its rentability.
In order to fully understand the dimensions and the limits of these reforms it is necessary to get some insight into the reasons underlying these changes. For several years a low efficiency could be observed in USSR economy. The rhythm of production increase had, in the past, been due to an extensive development of economy (extension of the quantity of production, like increase in productive capacity by construction of new units and enlarging of old ones, increase of labour for industrial production, etc.) However, having exhausted these extensive sources, it seemed to become more and more necessary to stress intensive means of development in order to assure a larger output. Roughly speaking, the system of planned management was judged to be incapable of speeding up this process. It was considered rather as an obstacle towards quick development.
In other words, Soviet economy has, in recent years, suffered from serious deficiencies in its production structure. These influenced at the same time the "macrostructure" (the proportion between diverse branches of production) as well as the "microstructure" (the relation between the various categories of production within a certain branch). Therefore many signs of distortion in the relation between the production structure (supply) and real needs (demand) began to make themselves felt more and more. In practice there was a prolific stock of articles not immediately necessary to demands of daily life(an alarming increase of unsold material was the result), while the list of lacking or insufficiently supplied goods became longer and longer. Unrealistic and unilateral plans have been an obstacle for the rationalization of production and distribution. On the other hand, it is not for the central planning office to discover concrete means for better production and even less to assure rational exploitation. Therefore, it was necessary to radically change the correlation and interdependence between the socialist planning system in USSR, the enterprises and the market.
In order to adopt these revisions efficiently the solution of the following problems is prerequisite:
(a) As the realization of the plan remains the supereme objective of a Soviet enterprise, the central and the control organizations will continue to interfere directly or indirectly with the management. But even if a great flexibility and subtlety is aimed at within this system, it will always remain difficult to assure them practically, especially in a large country like USSR.
(b) The enterprises used to collect money for their sales, but the amount did not represent the real value of the merchandise, for prices did not correspond to its value. The formation of prices was based on a subjective decision by the state, so that the relation between prices did not correspond to relations of values. That is why certain enterprises made deficits while others had large profits, without taking into consideration the question of good or bad anagement. If, under these circumstances, the notion of rentability is introduced, all prices have to be revised first. But this is a task of immense complexity.
(c) The socialist market is different from the capitalist or free market. In order to assure the productivity and rentability of enterprises they should be able to act according to the situation and the needs of the market. However, in USSR, even the market is a product of the plan deciding the general trend of development of this same market. It is, of course, not always possible to guarantee a healthy mechanism of the market for the central planning offices. Therefore, the market is easily a victim of the subjectivity of the state.
(d) Formerly the planning authorities in USSR believed that the means of production could not be productive because they did not render and added value. They would only have to be replaced or reproduced, which would be the same as depreciation. But the present Soviet economists think that the disposition of productive capital should not be free, but that enterprises must pay a certain amount, besides the depreciation, corresponding to the normative efficiency coefficient of investment. They therefore hold it necessary to impose taxes or some kind of interest rates on the capital. These propositions aim at assuring a more rational usage of productive capital. As a matter of fact, the capital given free of charge led to an irresponsible attitude of the managers and to waste of equipment.
(e) It is a difficult though necessary task to change the attitude of the managers who were only used to blindly obey orders. In order to stop the enormous factor of stagnation that has crept into hierarchical machine, a spectacular change in spirit and method seems to be more necessary than detailed reforms.
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