공매도가 기업의 이익조정에 미치는 영향
저자
발행사항
진주 : 경상대학교 대학원, 2018
학위논문사항
학위논문(박사)-- 경상대학교 대학원 : 회계학과 회계학 2018. 8
발행연도
2018
작성언어
한국어
주제어
발행국(도시)
경상남도
기타서명
The Effects of Short-Selling on Earnings Management
형태사항
iii , 83 p. : 삽화 ; 30 cm
일반주기명
지도교수: 유순미
UCI식별코드
I804:48003-000000026708
소장기관
In Korea, currently, the short selling market continues to dramatically grow following the development of the capital market. It is expected that in the nation, short selling will more and more influence the capital market thanks to increased volume of Korean hedge funds, foreigners’ increased investment in short selling and personal investors’ increased interest in short selling. Especially, however, a series of short selling-related incidents that recently took place have given more fuels to disputes over the particular method of securities trading in the equity market and increased public demands for the check-up and enhancement of the existing short-selling systems.
Short selling is a practice of securities trading in which one sells stocks that he doesn’t have to a buyer and, when share prices fall, buy the securities back to reimburse. In Korea, only covered short selling is allowed. For covered short selling, the short sellers have to borrow the stocks before they make short sale transaction.
On one hand, short selling can make the capital market more efficient because it provides market liquidity when stock prices decrease, prevents those prices from excessively rising or improves the value relevance of stock prices. But on the other hand, short selling may have an adverse effect on the capital market by causing an excessive downfall in stock prices.
Short selling also affects corporate managements decisions as well as capital market. Some recent studies show that short selling influences management’s decision-makings related to investment or disclosure.
The purpose of this study was to analyze the effect of short selling on earnings management by determining relationships between short selling and the corporate executive’s decision-making related to earnings management. For this purpose, the study reviewed both short selling data, especially the volume and value of the selling, for companies that were listed in the securities market of this country from Jan. 2012 to Dec. 2016 and earning management for those businesses that was measured using the modified Jones model, analyzing how short selling influenced earnings management by the executive in the corporations.
In Korea, one of the representative corporate characteristics is that there are chaebol enterprises that both ownership and management are controlled by controlling shareholders. Using circular shareholding system, controlling shareholder can hold strong control power and cross-ownership disparity(Song, 2009). In this vein, there’s research evidencing difference in earnings management behaviors between conglomerates or chaebol and the other companies.
This study investigated whether there’s difference in the effect of short selling on earnings management between local conglomerates and non-conglomerates. It also analyzed how that effect varies depending on control-ownership disparity with reference to prior research that control-ownership disparity makes different businesses have different behaviors of earnings management.
The findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, it was found that there’s a negative(-) directionality between short selling and discretionary accruals, but with no statistical significance. This finding doesn’t comply with prior research that short selling is possible to control the corporate executive’s earnings management.
Second, this study conducted the regression analysis, where the variable of interaction between chaebol as conglomerates and short selling to find that the regression coefficient for the same variable is significantly positive(+) and that in other types of businesses than chaebol, a significant negative(-) correlations exist between short selling and earnings management. This implies that no existence of negative correlations between short selling and earnings management in Korea, unlikely to be seen in other countries, is due to the fact that the nation’s capital market is heavily dependent on chaebol. Short selling is more often practiced by sizeable businesses that have lots of outstanding stocks issued because it involves buying the sold shares back and then reimbursing with them. Presumedly, thus, conglomerates are much influential to short selling.
Third, another regression analysis, where the variable of interaction between control-ownership disparity and short selling was put, was made here to show that the regression coefficient for that variable was significantly positive(+), suggesting that as far as conglomerates having high control-ownership disparity are concerned, there’s no effect of earnings management decrease by short selling. This supports the entrenchment hypothesis that businesses with high cross-ownership disparity will infringe minority shareholders’ interests by performing increased earnings management for major shareholders’ own profits. But it doesn’t support prior research that more short selling leads to more decrease in earnings management or, in other words, short selling has an effect of controlling earnings management.
Recently, a series of incidents involving short selling have made the public opinion of that selling extremely bad. Under this circumstance, the fact that short selling provides the corporate executive with information for decision-making related to earnings management, found here, confirms how useful short selling is. And the fact that the effect of short selling on such decision-making as above varies depending on corporate governance and ownership structure, also found in this study, suggests that if financial authorities want to newly establish or revise the systems and regulations of short selling, they need to consider corporate characteristics.
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