가결산 실적수정과 이에 대한 정정공시의 결정요인 = Earnings Revisions in Final Announcements from Preliminary Release: Determinant of Corrective Disclosure

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Firms should disclose their preliminary earnings as soon as internal process of preparation of financial statements are ended to obey the disclosure requirement of supervisory institution. This is for relieving the information asymmetry between firms and the stakeholder. By the way preliminary earnings are revised very often after an audit. Furthermore, despite the preliminary earnings is revised, almost of firms are not make a corrective disclosure. It would be advisable to make a corrective disclosure on revision of preliminary earnings, when the preliminary earnings are revised. However it is not mandatory for firms to make a corrective disclosure. It is discretion of firm whether or not to make a corrective disclosure over revision of preliminary earnings.
Some firms make a corrective disclosure that their preliminary earnings are revised after audit while others do not. The decision on whether or not to make corrective disclosure over revision of preliminary earnings is significant in the point of information asymmetry. It is important to make a voluntary corrective disclosure over revision of preliminary earnings in that it can help to mitigate information asymmetry. If firms do not disclose the fact that preliminary earnings are revised, most investors would be unaware of earnings revision until final earnings are announced in annual report. Furthermore this can give some investors opportunity for arbitrage trading. Like this, undisclosed information can irrigate information asymmetry and cause problem of adverse selection. Stakeholder are concerned about firms’ disclosure quality. They worried that firms are trying deceive them by revise preliminary releases furtively, and omit a corrective disclosure when the preliminary earnings is revised. If that is true, the purport of supervisory authority to mitigate the information asymmetry by timely disclosure of preliminary releases would be damaged.
The situation that a piece of firms make a corrective disclosure in time whereas most of firms do not make a corrective disclosure when the preliminary releases is revised provoke the reason why some firms make a corrective disclosure whereas other firms do not. In this regard, this study examined the motivations of voluntary corrective disclosure and meanings of corrective disclosure through market response to news of earnings revision. The data of 4,669 firm-year for 7 years(2012∼2018) are analyzed. It is predicted that a materiality of earnings revision, information asymmetry, litigation risk and accounting complexity could explain determinants of voluntary corrective disclosure.
The dependant variable is measured with dummy variable which gets 1 if a firm make a corrective disclosure, otherwise 0. The materiality is measured in two ways with absolute magnitude of earnings revision and qualitative materiality of earnings revision. The latter is dummy variable which gets 1 if the sign of earnings numbers has turned after earnings revision, otherwise 0. An information asymmetry exasperates an information cost which in turn undervalues a market valuation of firm. Therefore undervalued firms trying active policy in information disclosure to mitigate the information asymmetry. These activities would be result in a voluntary corrective disclosure of earnings revision. An information asymmetry is measured with three variables; a book-to-market ratio, a numbers of financial analysts who present a earnings forecast of the firm and share of foreign investors. A firm which has risk averse members in board of director or conservative auditor are more sensitive in disclosing corporate information to alleviate litigation risk. A litigation risk is measured with two variables; a ratio of numbers of outside director to total numbers of board member and an excess audit hour, a difference between actual audit hour and normal audit hour. An accounting complexity makes delay in announcement of preliminary earnings numbers which in tur...

국문 초록 (Abstract)

기업들은 감독당국의 공시요구에 따라 혹은 외부이해관계자들에게 신속히 기업정보를 제공하기 위해 가결산 실적을 공시한다. 그러나 이것은 감사되지 않은 수치이므로 사후에 수정될 수 있고 실제로 수정이 자주 발생한다. 수정된 실적은 중요한 투자정보이므로 적시에 외부에 공시될 필요가 있다. 그러나 실적수정에 대한 정정공시는 의무가 아니며 기업의 자율적 선택에 따른다. 이로 인해 실적이 수정되었더라도 정정공시를 누락하는 기업이 더 많은 상황이다. 실적이 수정되었을 때 이에 대한 정정공시를 하는지 여부는 정보비대칭의 관점에서 중요한 의미가 있다. 정정공시가 없으면 대부분의 투자자들은 나중에 최종재무제표가 발표되어서야 이를 알게 된다. 반면 어떤 투자자는 미공개정보를 이용하여 차익거래의 기회로 활용하기도 한다. 이처럼 가결산 실적이 수정되었는데 이에 대한 정정공시가 없으면 정보비대칭이 악화되고 역 선택의 문제를 야기할 수도 있다.
이에 본 연구는 가결산 실적이 수정되었을 때 어떤 기업들이 자발적으로 정정공시를 선택하는지 정정공시의 결정요인을 분석한다. 이를 위해 최근 7년(2012년~2018년)간 가결산 실적이 수정된 상장기업 공시자료 4,669건을 분석하였다. 본 연구에서는 가결산 실적이 수정되었을 때 이에 대한 정정공시를 선택하는 결정요인으로 수정의 중요성, 정보비대칭, 소송위험, 회계복잡성 등을 제시하였다. 분석에 의하면 이 요인들은 가결산 실적수정이 있을 때 이에 대한 자발적인 정정공시를 선택할 가능성을 유의하게 설명하는 것으로 확인되었다.

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