KCI등재
이례적인 현상으로서의 KEDO : 핵확산금지에 대한 제도적인 접근방법 An Institutional Approach to Nonproliferation = KEDO as an Anomaly
저자
홍소일(洪素逸) (고려대학교 일민연구원)
발행기관
학술지명
권호사항
발행연도
2003
작성언어
Korean
주제어
KDC
390.000
등재정보
KCI등재
자료형태
학술저널
발행기관 URL
수록면
141-168(28쪽)
제공처
소장기관
The main objectives of this article are as follows: first, it argues that KEDO is a unique approach to preventing nuclear proliferation. Second, it demonstrates that KEDO is a semi-institutionalized multilateral security organization in Northeast Asia. Third, it examines whether KEDO has been successful in fulfilling its objectives of freezing and eventually dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons program, stopping North Korea from withdrawing from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and inducing North Korea to comply with IAEA safeguards. Finally, it tests whether KEDO can be replicated in other cases of nuclear proliferation. In other words, can it serve as a model in other regions?
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is an anomaly. It is an anomaly not only from a U.S. global nonproliferation approach perspective, but also as an international organization. Why did the US. nonproliferation approach to North Korea not result in sanctions as in the cases of India and Pakistan, or in war as in the case of Iraq? Why did U.S. efforts to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions lead to a multilateral solution unlike the nuclear cases of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus that were settled on a bilateral basis? What is KEDO‘s organizational character? Is KEDO an international financial consortium as characterized in the Geneva Agreed Framework, a technical/energy organization or a security institution? Finally, contrary to common wisdom that there is no "structured" or "principled"multilateral security organization in Northeast Asia, this article will argue that KEDO has served as a semi-institutionalized multilateral security organization in the Northeast Asian region. With the advent of the second nuclear situation in North Korea, KEDO currently stands at the crossroads of either suspending or terminating its project altogether.
Since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of second-generation proliferators has become one of the major threats to international peace and stability. In general, U.S.-led international responses to proliferation have been based on the threat or the actual use of force. If the United States opted to forego the use of force and settle the problem peacefully, the settlement usually resulted in the form of a bilateral solution. Despite the growing number of new-generation proliferators, KEDO marks the first case in which multilateral efforts have been organized to deal with a specific nuclear proliferation problem on the demand side. It is the first multilateral organization whose mission is to deliver inducements to the proliferating state, North Korea. This article, therefore, examines U.S. nonproliferation responses to Iraq, India, Pakistan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to demonstrate the uniqueness of KEDO. It will also test whether KEDO can be replicated in South Asia where there has been a clear lack of an organized nonproliferation response.
This article will argue that nonproliferation efforts in the case of North Korea led to the creation of KEDO because of the following causal factors: the security environment surrounding the region, as well as the Korean peninsula, U.S. policies towards North Korea, and the characteristics of the North Korean regime. The strategic environment as well as U.S. policies towards North Korea made multi-level diplomacy inevitable in the context of the North Korean nuclear problem. These are the causal factors that led to the unique nonproliferation response of KEDO. Because of the unique security environment surrounding the Korean peninsula and South-North Korean relations, "multi-level diplomacy" is unavoidable for settling such major issues as nuclear nonproliferation. Multi-level diplomacy is a complicated process of "two-level games" of diplomacy and domestic politics, involving multiple players on the state, bureaucratic, and individual levels, as well as involving international organizations. Multi-level diplomacy, however, complicates the diplomatic process and constrains policy options for the states involved. The characteristics of the state are especially important in the area of weapons of mass destruction. Depending on who has nuclear weapons, the level of threat perception changes. North Korea's decision to withdraw from the international agreement on nonproliferation and its nuclear development program not only posed a serious threat to South Korea, the United States, and other neighboring countries, but also to the stability of the nonproliferation regime.
Even after almost eight years since KEDOs inception, there is no consensus yet on how to characterize the organizational type of KEDO. Policy-makers and international relations scholars diverge in their views in that some characterize KEDO as an international financial consortium, while others see it as a confidence-building measure, a technical or energy organization, or an institution. The second objective is, therefore, to demonstrate that KEDO is a semi-institutionalized multilateral security organization and not just a service or a technical organization, providing energy to North Korea. In general, KEDO is regarded as a technical or energy organization, performing a service function of supplying light-water reactors and heavy fuel oil to North Korea. Despite the importance and uniquenessof its tasks, KEDO has not received much attention as an international organization, let alone as a security institution. In those cases when it did, KEDO only appeared in newspaper headlines when the North Korean regime engaged in provocative acts, violating the spirit of the Agreed Framework and jeopardizing its smooth operation.
As of April 2003, North Korea is no longer a member of the NPT, and the nonproliferation institutions are no longer able to check North Korea's activities on proliferation matters. The fate of KEDO will depend on how the nuclear situation in North Korea is resolved. The prevailing view is that KEDO will be either suspended or terminated altogether. If U.S.-DPRK manages to reach a viable political solution on the nuclear problem, however, policy-makers could consider not only continuing KEDO's project but also strengthening the organization Given the investment made by KEDO members in North Korea, its presence in North Korea, its ongoing work on the construction site, and its experience in negotiating with the North Koreans, it should be further strengthened rather than dissolved. By strengthening the organization, it could serve as a full-blown security institution, acting as a Northeast Asian nonproliferation institution If North Korea agrees to verifiable inspections and stop its nuclear weapons program, there could be a redefinition of KEDO. For example, the organization could be strengthened with an inspection and a monitoring mechanism. The monitoring activities could be carried out in cooperation with the United States, the United Nations and the IAEA The U.S. could support the organization's monitoring activities with its advanced technical capabilities, such as intelligence gathering and surveillance system. If it were politically and technically not viable to create an independent monitoring mechanism within KEDO, the U.S. could share its intelligence on North Korea's nuclear activities with KEDOs Executive Board members. In the future, this would enable KEDO, instead of the United States, to confront North Korea with the intelligence on its nuclear activities or on other acts of violation. North Korea would then be forced to deal with KEDO rather than with only the United States. This would also ensure the continued role of South Korea, Japan as well as other members of the international community in North Korea's nuclear problem.
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