Domestic Constraints and the Imposition of Economic Sanctions

국문 초록 (Abstract)

제재부과국 정부의 국내 통제력은 경제제재 이행을 결정하는 요인으로 작용하는가? 본 연구는 제재부과국 단일 행위자에 초점을 맞추어 제재결정 이행에 미치는 국내정치적 요인을 분석한다. 이는 제재부과국과 피제재국 간 전략적 상호작용에 주목하는 선행연구들이 제재의 성패 요인 분석에 주목하는 데 비하여 상대적으로 부과국의 제재결정과 이행 간 요인연구가 활발히 이루어지지 않았음에서 착안한 것이다. 경제제재의 성공과 실패를 예상하기에 앞서 부과국의 제재결정이행이 선행되어야 함을 고려한다면, 경제제재 연구에서 부과국과 피제재국 간 전략적 상호관계뿐 아니라 부과국의 제재이행 요인이 우선적으로 분석되어야 한다. 이를 위해 본 연구에서는정부가 국내 이익집단 등 경제전반을 효과적으로 통제할 때 그렇지 않은 경우보다 경제제재 결정 및 이행이 수월할 것이라고 예측하였다. 검증을 위해 저자들은 본 연구의 이론적 기반인 공공선택이론에 입각하여, 경제제재 이행결정에 미치는 정부의 국내경제 통제능력을 측정하고 있다. 구체적인 측정 방안으로 1) 정부의 국내 상위 10위권내 기업 중 공기업 비율이 높을수록, 그리고 2) 정부 독재 정도가 높을수록 경제제재 이행이 진행된다는 가설을 제시한다. 즉, 정부의 국내 상위기업에 대한 지분율과 독재 정도가 상대적으로 높을수록 정부의 경제전반 통제능력이 강하다는 가설을 수립하고 각 변수에 대한 경험적 검증을 실시하였다. 각각의 두 요인이 경제제재 이행에 대해 통계적으로 유의한 양의 상관관계를 입증한다는 점에서, 본 연구의 결과는 정부의 공기업 소유 정도와 비민주적 성향이 높을수록 경제제재 이행확률이 높다는 연구 가설을 증명하고 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

What explains the decision to impose economic sanctions for coercive purposes? In this article, we seek to uncover the domestic political and economic conditions under which a sender state is more likely to resort to sanctions in a dispute with a target state. Since sanctions can be considered an arbitrary instrument of government intervention in international trade and finance, which has little to do with business interests, it is in the interests of domestic business to intervene in the decision to use sanctions. We argue that (1) the capability of the sender government in controlling its business sector and (2) constraints that result from domestic political institutions provide key conditions that explain the imposition of sanctions. We test our argument using the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions and Correlates of War data. Findings lend robust support for our theory that the sender state is more likely to use sanctions as the sender state’s ability to control its domestic economy increases with few veto constraints in policymaking process.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Abstract
• Ⅰ. Introduction
• Ⅱ. Theory and Hypotheses
• Ⅲ. Data, Variables and Method
• Ⅳ. Results and Discussion
• Ⅴ. Conclusions
• References
• 논문요약

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