한국 기업의 임원 간 연봉격차 (Executive pay slice)와 조세회피의 관계 = Relation between Executive Pay Slice and Corporate Tax Avoidance in Korean Firms

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Based on a sample of 1,324 firm-year observations of firms listed on the KOSPI from 2013 to 2016, our study investigates the relationship between executive pay slice and corporate tax avoidance from an agency perspective. Executive pay slice could be driven either by agency problems due to poor governance or be driven by optimal decision making of firms. Bebchuk et al.(2011) and Kwak and Kim(2017) suggest that the CEO pay slice reflects agency problems, since powerful CEOs can influence boards to increase his compensation. Nonetheless, executive pay slice could result from optimal decision making by boards. We distinguish between two potential explanation by examining whether executive pay slice is positively associated with tax avoidance, a well established means of manager rent extraction. We perform a 2SLS estimation to examine the relationship between executive pay slice and corporate tax avoidance. Our study find that tax avoidance is positively associated with the executive pay slice. This supports the findings of Bebchuk et al.(2011) and Kwak and Kim(2017) that view pay slice as a proxy for self-interested behavior of managers. We also find that positive association is driven only by Chaebol firms, suggesting that executive pay slice does not reflect agency problem in non-Chaebol firms. Our paper analyzes pay slice among executives of Korean firms and thereby extends the findings of prior literature based on the pay slice among executives of US firms. Furthermore, we find that the positive association between executive pay slice and tax avoidance exists only for Korean Chaebol firms-firms that have a higher probability of rent extraction. Our paper also contributes to the executive compensation literature by examining the specific mechanism in which executive pay slice leads to manager rent attraction, using tax avoidance of firms.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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