中央銀行의 獨立性에 관한 小考 = NEED FOR CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

1. What is meant by an independent monetary authority―that is, what is the meaning of the term "independent central bank"? Is it desirable for a central bank to be independent? If so, in what degree should it be independent? What is an ideal relationship of a central bank with the Treasury, the President, and the Legislature? These questions are extremely vital for a developing country seeking an efficiently functioning central bank.
2. For most developing economies, as well as for advanced ones, a central bank means the institution of supplying currency, of controlling the amount of money, and of regulation the amount and structure of credit for the economy's rapid growth and development along with the stability of domestic prices and foreign exchange rates.
Before the First World War, when the conviction that a gold standard system can automatically guarantee the internal and external equilibrium of an economy was prevalent, maintating the external value of money was the most important task of central banks. The world-wide economic crisis which followed the First World War, however, forced most central banks to divert their primary attention to stabilization of domestic prices.
The economic catastrophe of 1930s made the central bankers of advance nations confront the hard task of eliminating unemployment. And after the Second World War the newly independent conutries strived for the efficient monetary system with the properly functioning central bank charged with mission of providing a stable monetary environment, which is essential to a sound economic development.
An efficient central bank should rationally share the authority to formulate and execute economic policies with other institutions of Government. And so some questions arise: how much authority should it have, and in what degree should it be autonomous?
3. Fist of all, however, what is central bank independence? Independence of whom?
ⅰ) Central bank independence can mean its independence of the Treasury. There can be two cases sufficing this condition.
ⅱ) It could also mean central bank independence of the Legislature.
ⅲ) There can be cental bank independence of the President as the Chief Executive.
4. The traditional argument for central bank independence is that, if independent, the central bank will stand against inflation and financial irresponsibility in Government. History tells of many treasuries which have turned money issue to pay their bills when taxes were inadequate. In fact, major inflations of the modern world have all come with large governmental deficits covered by the issue of new money. It is asserted, therefore, that treasuries have a natural propensity to resort to inflation, however well intentioned their minsters may be, while central bankers are basically conservative and have an anti-inflationary bias.
Another argument is based on the presumption that the entire political process is inherently inflationary. It is always easier, according to those who espouse central bank independence of the Legislature, for Congress to spend money than to raise taxes; politicians are inherently financially irresponsible.
Lastly, there is an argument that an independent central bank is needed to prevent the President from going too far with expansionary economic policies, for the President himself is also not to be trusted on financial matters.
5. On the contrary, those who oppose central bank independence emphasize the need for coordination and consistency between monetary and other economic policies and the importance of economic growth over price stability. H. G. Johnson has clearly summarized the argument as follows:
For one thing, freedom of a central bank from direct political control would expose the central bank to subtle and sustained political pressures and force it to become a political animal on its own behalf.
Secondly, the position of the central bank as controller of money supply would inevitably bias the independent central bank toward an inordinate emphasis on preservation of value of money and to an underemphasis or neglect of other objectives, such as high employment and economic growth.
Thirdly, the methods of monetary management, which involve the central bank concentration its attention on money market conditions, interest rates, and bank reserve positions and lending, rather than on performance of the economy in general, are extremely conducive to the behavior pattern of overaction and delayed correction of error.
6. What is an ideal central bank for a developing economy? The writer is convinced that an ideal central bank for a developing economy should be as follows:
ⅰ) The central bank should be independent of the Treasury. It should have a sufficient authority to check the natural propensity of the Treasury to resort to inflationary methods to finance development.
ⅱ) The independent central bank, however, should not mean a monetary authority independent of the President. The President should have an authority to coordinate the fiscal and monetary policies and to check an excessive conservativeness of the central bank.
7. The Bank of Korea's complete independence of the Ministry of Finance will contribute to a more rapid and sound development of the Korean economy. The following are a few suggestions for the purpose:
ⅰ) The status of the Monetary Board should be elevated; its chairman should be the Governor of the Bank of Korea, rather than the Minister of Finance. And the Governor of the Bank of korea should be responsible only to the President directly.
ⅱ) The bank to Korea should regulated the entire functioning of the whole financial system of the country: it should be able to control the activities of non-bank financial intermediaries as well as monetary system and should have a voice in formulation and execution of fiscal policies which would have cleary visible influences on the money supply and the structure of financial assets of the economy.
ⅲ) The Finance Minister's staying out of the membership of the Monetary Board would be of help for stabilization of monetary environment, since it would give the Bank of Korea greater independence of the Ministry of Finance.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 1. 序言
• 2. 獨立性의 意味
• 3. 肯定的인 主張
• 4. 否定的인 主張
• 5. 理想的인 中央銀行―低開發國의 경우―
• 6. 우리 나라의 경우
• 7. 要約과 結論