임의적립금의 적립목적과가치관련성의 관계 = Relationship between purposes of retained earnings appropriations and value relevance

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Net income is closed to unappropriated retained earnings at the end of fiscal years and then unappropriated retained earnings is distributed to the shareholders in the form of dividends. Another way to appropriate retained earnings is to internally reserve for specific purposes, such as expansion of business, research and development, marketing, and so on. Hence, the purposes for which retained earnings are appropriated are likely to reveal the managers’ intention as to how they will use retained earnings in the future.
In practice, appropriated retained earnings can be classified into three categories based on the purposes of appropriations: retained earnings appropriated for firm growth (GROWTH REA), retained earnings appropriated against business loss (LOSS REA), and retained earnings appropriated for unclear purposes (NEUTRAL REA). GROWTH REA include retained earnings appropriated for growth or expansion of the firm, such as foreign market development, R&D, or business expansion. LOSS REA include retained earnings appropriated for losses arising in the ordinary course of business.
Prior research suggests that firm value is determined by cash flows from assets in place and growth options and that firm value increases with growth options of the firm. This indicates that if retained earnings appropriations reflect management’s strategic plans as to how to use retained earnings, the purposes for which retained earnings are appropriated are likely to have different value relevance. GROWTH REA displaying the firm’s plan for future growth are likely to have higher value relevance than LOSS REA or NEUTRAL REA. Thus, this study examines whether value relevance of REA differs across the purposes of appropriations.
Furthermore, growth opportunities of firms are likely to affect value relevance of GROWTH REA. Prior research suggests that managers of firms with excess cash flows have incentives to invest in less profitable investment projects. This indicates that excessive GROWTH REA can have a negative effect on firm value in the absence of profitable investment opportunities. Thus, value relevance of GROWTH REA is likely to decline when the firm’s growth opportunities are low. Prior research also suggests that firms tend to rely on internal finance when they have difficulties in external finance. Thus, value relevance of GROWTH REA is likely to increase when firms have financial constraints. Moreover, the literature shows that independent investors with high stakes have incentives to monitor management. This suggests that managers may be more cautious not to overly reserve GROWTH REA when firms have independent investors with high stakes. In this case, GROWTH REA are likely to reflect more realistic investment plans, which in turn leads to higher value relevance of GROWTH REA. Thus, this study investigates whether value relevance of GROWTH REA decreases when firms have low growth opportunities and increases when firms have constraints in external finance and when firms have independent investors with high stakes.
The results reveal that firms properly appropriate retained earnings in line with the intended purposes, indicating that appropriated retained earnings reflect managers’ strategic plans for the future. The coefficient of GROWTH REA is significantly positive and significantly higher than that of NEUTRAL REA, indicating that value relevance of GROWTH REA is higher than that of NEUTRAL REA. In contrast, the LOSS REA coefficient is insignificant. Value relevance of GROWTH REA decreases when firms have lower growth opportunities. For the KOSPI market, value relevance of GROWTH REA declines when firms have difficulties in external finance and increases when firms have institutional investors with high stakes. This study contributes to the literature by investigating value relevance of appropriated retained earnings.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

기업은 이익이 발생하면 주주들에게 배당으로 배분하는 대신 특정 목적에 사용하기 위해 임의적립금으로 적립하여 사내에 유보할 수 있다. 따라서 임의적립금의 적립은 기업이 이익을 미래에 어떤 목적으로 사용할지에 대한 의사표시라고 할 수 있다. 임의적립금은 적립목적에 따라 크게 기업의 성장이나 확장을 위해 적립하는 성장목적적립금과 미래 영업활동을 수행하는 과정에서 발생할 손실에 대비하여 적립하는 손실대비적립금 및 적립목적이 불분명한 기타임의적립금으로 구분할 수 있다. 본 연구는 그 적립목적에 따라 임의적립금의 가치관련성이 다른지를 분석한다.
실증분석 결과, 성장목적적립금은 기업가치와 유의한 양의 관계를 보이는데 이는 성장목적적립금이 클수록 기업가치가 증가함을 의미한다. 반면, 손실대비적립금은 일반적으로 기업가치와 유의한 관계가 없는 것으로 나타난다. 성장목적적립금의 계수는 기타임의적립금의 계수보다 유의하게 높게 나타나는데, 이는 기업 성장을 위한 목적으로 적립금을 적립하는 경우 적립목적이 불분명한 적립금보다 가치관련성이 높다는 것을 의미한다. 그런데 성장목적적립금의 가치관련성은 기업의 성장가능성이 낮으면 감소하는 것으로 나타난다. 또한, 유가증권시장의 경우 성장목적적립금의 가치관련성은 재무적 제약이 있으면 감소하고 외국인 투자지분율이 높으면 증가하는 것으로 나타난다. 이러한 결과가 코스닥시장에서는 나타나지 않는다. 본 연구의 결과는 임의적립금의 적립목적이 기업가치 결정에 유용한 정보를 반영하고 있음을 보여준다.

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