과학적 실재론과 과학이론의 변화 = Scientific Realism and The Change of Scientific Theory

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Ⅰ. Positivism argues that the change of seientific theory is proceeded by substitution, subsumption and extension. It's argument is based on the assumption that scientific theory is logically systematized by the formal system.
Ⅱ. Kuhn and Feyerabend criticised against the positivist argument in the change of scientific theory. They argue that there are incommonsurability in the history of science. On the base of the incommonsurability. , they explain that later scientific theory does not have subsuned the older scientific theory in terms of substitution and extension. But their arguments are resulted in relativism or anarchism.
Ⅲ. Seientific realism criticizes the positivism's argument. For the instrumentalism is logically followed from the positivism's argument on the basis of assumption that there are theory-neutral observational term in scientific theory. From this point, scientific realism have accepted Kuhnian argument. But they differ in opinion with Kuhn and Feyerabend due to their relativism and anarchism. Scientific realism interpreted micro-physical theory realistically. According to their argument, a statement in the micro-physical theory corresponds to the real world like the way that a statement in the macro-physical theory corresponds to the real world. For scientific theory describes the real world. Therefore a statement in the micro-physical theory is true or false as like as a statement in the macro-physical theory. They conclude that there is convergence in the change of scientific theory.
Ⅳ. Luntley and Putnam opposed against scientific realism in that they have assumed the truth as nonepistemic (transcendental) concept. Luntley criticizes the scientific realism in the point that all statement must not be necessarily true or false. Of course, he argues that theoretical terms noninferentially refer to theoretical entities and that theoretical entities exist without the inference fron the observational statements. He devlops his arguments through the objection against instrumentalism. He accepts that a scientific statement with the effecitve procedure (e.g. epistemic skill) is true or false, but other statements with noneffective procedure necessarily must not be true or false. Therefore he accepts that there may be nondecidable sentence in scientific theory. But he says that the suggestion that there are nondecidable sentence in scientific theory does not imply that theoretical entity which theoretical term in such sentences refers to is 'not-real', but nondecidable. Also he objects that there is convergence in the change of scientific theory because convergence assumed the truth as the transcendental non-epistemic concept.
Ⅴ. Putnam agrees with Luntley in that there are absurdity in scientific realism that assumed truth as nonepistemic concept, but differently argues that there is convergence in the change of scientific theory. Putnam criticizes the arguments of the scientific realism about truth through his 'brains-in-a-vat' argument and model-theoretic interpretaion. He regards truth as ideal justification and identifies truth with warranted assertability. He explains that truth is relative to theoretical system. But he argues that there is convergence in the change of scientific theory because the stability of reference is preserved despite scientific changes by means of the principle of benefit of the doubt.
Ⅵ. As Luntley and Putnam attack on the scientific reailism, scientific realism accepts their criticism, or continuously argues that explanatory power of scientific theory assumes truth as nonepistemically primitive concept.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 들어가는 말
• Ⅱ. 과학적 실재론의 주장과 그 문제점
• Ⅲ. Luntley의 실재론적 해석
• Ⅳ. Putnam의 주장
• Ⅴ. 맺는말
• 참고문헌
• Summary