불법거래행위(不法去來行爲)와 수입제한정책(輸入制限政策) = Illegal Transactions and Import Restriction Policy

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본고(本稿)는 밀수(密輸)나 암시장(暗市場)(black market)과 같은 불법거래행위(不法去來行爲)가 발생(發生)하는 원인이 제한적(制限的) 수입정책(輸入政策)에 있다는 주장(主張)의 타당성(妥當性)에 대하여 분석(分析)하고 있다. 암거래상품(暗去來商品)과 합법교역상품(合法交易商品)이 똑같은 가격(價格)으로 거래되는 경우에는, 수입자유화(輸入自由化) 결과(結果)로 수입단가(輸入單價)가 하락하면 국내생산공급(國內生産供給)과 암거래(暗去來)가 감소하고 수입량(輸入量)이 증가하여 합법교역(合法交易) 암거래(暗去來) 대체효과(代替效果)가 발생한다. 그러나 암거래(暗去來)와 합법거래(合法去來)가 이원적(二元的)으로 운용(運用)되는 경우에는, 암거래상품(暗去來商品)과 합법교역상품(合法交易商品) 사이의 상대가격변화(相對價格變化)는 두 상품수요(商品需要)에 대한 대체효과(代替效果)와 소득효과(所得效果)를 유발한다. 따라서 수입가격하락(輸入價格下落)으로 합법교역상품(合法交易商品)의 상대가격(相對價格)이 하락하면 합법교역상품(合法交易商品)에 대한 수요(需要)가 증가하나 암거래상품(暗去來商品)의 수요(需要)에 대해서는 부(負)의 대체효과(代替效果)와 정(正)의 소득효과(所得效果)가 발생하는데, 대체효과(代替效果)를 소득효과(所得效果)가 상살(相殺)하는 경우에는 수입정책완화(輸入政策緩和)의 암거래억제효과(暗去來抑制效果)가 나타나지 않는다. 반면 직접적인 암거래규제강화(暗去來規制强化)는 암거래행위(暗去來行爲)의 위험비용(危險費用)을 증가시키므로 암시장가격(暗市場價格)이 상승하고 암거래행위(暗去來行爲)가 위축(萎縮)되는 효과(效果)가 발생한다. 이와 같은 결과는 제한적(制限的) 수입정책(輸入政策)이 유발하는 잠재적(潛在的) 초과수요(超過需要)뿐만 아니라 면세수입증가(免稅輸入增加)에 따르는 잠재적(潛在的) 초과공급(超過供給)이 암시장(暗市場)의 생성(生成)을 유발한다는 전제(前提)로부터 도출되었다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Illegal transactions such as blackmarketing and smuggling allegedly result from too restrictive trade policies. A recent U.S. Senate hearing on the blackmarketing of American goods imported into Korea for the purpose of supporting United States troops and their dependents stationed in Korea concluded with the allegation that Korea's highly restrictive trade practices are responsible for the emergence of the black market. It has also suggested that the removal of such restrictive trade policies would eliminate black market activities. This study addresses the relationship between trade policy and blackmarketing by investigating whether trade liberalization results in the reduction of illegal transactions, and whether the eradication of blackmarketing indeed improves social welfare. When both legally imported goods and illegally exchanged items command the same price, trade liberalization, meaning a decrease in tariff rates or an increase in import quotas, will increase the quantity of legal imports at the expense of illegally transacted goods on the black market. But the price of legally imported goods usually differs from that of illegally sold ones. In this case, a change in the relative prices of these two groups of goods due to a change in trade policy will give rise to income, as well as substitution, effects. Initially, a decrease in the import price due to a decrease in import tax rates or an increase in the allotted quota will reduce illegal transactions, since the decrease in the import price will induce the substitution of legal imports for illegally exchanged, but otherwise, identical goods. On the other hand, the demand for the illegally transacted goods will rise, because of the income effect of the reduced import price. Thus, assuming the positive income effect overwhelms the negative substitution effect, the demand for illegal goods will increase, thwarting the reduction of blackmarketing through trade liberalization. Yet, stepping up the enforcement measures which are geared to preventing blackmarketing itself will drastically reduce the extent of illegal transactions, since it increases the cost of blackmarketing and hence the price of the illegally transacted goods. What this study suggests is that the emergence of the black market in Korea should be attributed more to the excessive supply of duty-free goods imported through U.S. commissaries and exchanges than to the excessive demand for foreign goods. On the other hand, blackmarketing, in most cases, improves economic welfare, since it constitutes an increase in the "actual" amount of imported goods. Suppressing blackmarketing through stepped-up enforcement methods is beneficial only when the substitution effect of the legally transacted goods resulting from the increase in the price of the illegal goods prevails, since the increase in the demand for legal imports must override the decrease in the demand for black market goods as well as the negative income effect.