History in dispute

목차 (Table of Contents)

• [Volume. 3]----------
• CONTENTS
• Preface by Robert J. Allison = xi
• Chronology by Robert J. Allison = xiii
• Agricultural Advances : Did the technological revolution benefit farmers? = 1
• Yes, the use of technology and science expanded the level of agricultural production and bettered the quality of life for farmers. / Elizabeth D. Schafer = 2
• No, the technological revolution did not benefit farmers because in the long run it destroyed the self-sufficiency of the family farm and incurred unforeseen ecological costs. / A. Bowdoin Van Riper = 5
• Atomic Bomb : Why did President Harry S Truman order the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? = 10
• The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were unnecessary for victory in World War Ⅱ and were used primarily as a tool to impress and contain the Russians. / Margaret Mary Barrett = 11
• President Truman used the atomic bombs in order to bring a quick end to the war. / Margo Dowling = 12
• Eugenics : Did the eugenics movement benefit the United States? = 17
• Yes, the eugenics movement was a Progressive-era attempt to correct social ills. / Lonna Douglass = 17
• No, eugenics was a sociopolitical effort to control minorities, immigrants, and impoverished Americans. / Elizabeth D. Schafer = 20
• FDR's Supreme Court : How did the Supreme Court weather the attempt by Franklin D. Roosevelt to increase the number of justices in response to its rescinding New Deal legislation? = 24
• Though he maintained he was not motivated by politics, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes displayed political skill in handling the Court-packing crisis by persuading conservative justices to modify their opposition to the New Deal. / Robert J. Allison = 25
• Though Franklin D. Roosevelt lost his attempt to control the judiciary, his threat pushed the Supreme Court to amend its views of constitutional power. / Lonna Douglass = 27
• Fundamentalism : What role did the fundamentalists play in American society of the 1 920s? = 32
• The power and the purposes of the fundamentalist movement have been misrepresented and oversimplified by historians. / Thomas E. Woods Jr. = 33
• The religious fundamentalists of the 1920s embraced modern life and in doing so won significant social gains. / Tona J. Hangen = 36
• Religious fundamentalists lost influence in the 1920s because the rise of mass media spread new ideas about science and society. / A. Bowdoin Van Riper = 39
• Good Neighbor : Was the United States a "Good Neighbor" toward Latin America in the 1930s? = 45
• Yes, the Good Neighbor Policy was a new beginning in U.S. foreign policy in Latin America. / J$$\ddot u$$rgen Scheunemann = 46
• No, the Good Neighbor Policy represented an ongoing effort on the part of the U.S. government to maintain U.S. hegemony in Latin America. / Erik Benson = 48
• Great Depression : Causes : What Caused the Great Depression? = 54
• The Great Depression was caused by a global economic crisis as well as poor investment practices in the United States. / Lonna Douglass = 55
• The Great Depression was caused by a decline in spending and consumption in the United States, not simply by the stock-market crash or the mistakes of the Federal Reserve. / Brett Flehinger = 57
• Great Depression : Ending : What ended the Depression-the New Deal or World War Ⅱ? = 62
• World War Ⅱ, with little help from New Deal programs, brought America out of the Great Depression. / Margaret Mary Barrett = 63
• Far from ending the Great Depression, the New Deal was an obstacle to recovery because it was not designed to restore national prosperity. / Thomas E. Woods Jr. = 65
• Great Migration : What caused the Great Migrations? = 70
• The Great Migrations of African Americans from the rural South to the industrial North was the result of economic changes over which they had little control. / Elizabeth D. Schafer = 71
• A close examination of the Great Migrations reveals a complex and diverse story of men and women making decisions based on personal considerations. / Christopher W. Schmidt = 74
• Harlem Renaissance : What caused the Harlem Renaissance? = 78
• The Harlem Renaissance was as much a political and social movement as a cultural expression of African American life. / Keith P. Griffler = 79
• The Harlem Renaissance was a cultural and intellectual expression of African American life that was also affected by white "Negrophiles." / Tracy J. Prince = 82
• Huey Long : Was Huey Long a progressive reformer or a dangerous demagogue? = 86
• Huey Long was a populist reformer who politically pursued and achieved an important social agenda. / Elizabeth D. Schafer = 87
• Huey Long was a dangerous demagogue who dominated Louisiana with an iron fist and exploited reform rhetoric. / Anthony Connors = 90
• Influenza Epidemic : Did the influenza outbreak of 1918-1919 have much impact on the United States, and why is it historically neglected? = 95
• While the Spanish flu epidemic was a significant event, its importance was overshadowed by the battles of World War Ⅰ. / Robert J. Allison = 96
• The 1918-1919 flu epidemic contributed to the hedonistic escapism of the 1920s. / Robert J. Allison = 98
• Japanese Internment : Was the internment of Japanese Americans justified during World War Ⅱ? = 102
• Yes, the internment of Japanese Americans was necessary for national security because some of them were suspected of disloyalty. / Patric O'Brien = 103
• No, the internment of Japanese Americans was an unnecessary mockery of American claims of fighting a war for freedom. / A. Bowdoin Van Riper = 106
• Lindbergh Kidnapping : Was Bruno Richard Hauptmann guilty of kidnapping and killing Charles A. Lindbergh's son? = 110
• Yes, Hauptmann received a fair trial and was guilty of the kidnapping and murder of the Lindbergh baby. / Eli C. Bortman = 111
• No, Hauptmann was convicted on the basis of fabricated evidence and without proper defense counsel ; the trial was a mockery of justice in an atmosphere of public outrage. / Eli C. Bortman = 113
• Marcus Garvey : What kind of a leader was Marcus Garvey? = 117
• Marcus Garvey is best understood as a black working-class leader who had more in common with other working-class leaders than with traditional civil-rights leaders. / Keith P. Griffler = 117
• Marcus Garvey was a complicated leader who promoted black pride and left a profound, but troubling, legacy that resembled white racism. / Robert J. Allison = 120
• Mexican Revolution : Why did the United States oppose the Mexican Revolution, and was it successful in achieving its goals? = 124
• The United States opposed the Mexican Revolution because American business interests in Mexico were threatened. / Robert J. Allison = 125
• Despite President Woodrow Wilson's desire to influence political events in Mexico, American involvement had little direct impact on the Mexican Revolution. / Lonna Douglass = 128
• Narcotics : What led to the war on drugs? = 132
• The first war on drugs was provoked by white America's fears of Asians, who were perceived as drug traffickers. / Joseph Gabriel = 133
• The origins of the war on drugs had more to do with American economic goals in China than domestic problems. / Robert J. Allison = 135
• Native American New Deal : Was the Indian New Deal a major change in federal policy toward Native Americans? = 139
• Yes, the Indian New Deal was a dramatic change in federal policy, allowing Native Americans to develop their own governments and economic policies. / Carlos Turpin = 139
• The Indian Reorganization Act, while implementing some important changes in political and social rights for Native Americans, was also designed to protect first the interests of the U. S. government. / Malinda Maynor = 142
• New Deal : Was Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal actually "New"? = 147
• Yes, the New Deal represented a fundamental break with the past because it paid attention to people previously ignored in the political process. / Christopher W. Schmidt = 148
• No, the New Deal was a continuation of earlier government policies, mainly intended to preserve the capitalist system. / Robert J. Allison = 151
• New Deal And Farmers : Were New Deal policies detrimental to American farmers? = 156
• Yes, New Deal agricultural policies contributed to the decline of family farms in the United States by not improving their economic status. / Elizabeth D. Schafer = 157
• No, the New Deal stabilized American farm prices, but the conditions faced by American farmers were beyond the control of any government program. / Robert J. Allison = 160
• New Woman : Who was the "New Woman?" = 165
• The New Woman of the Progressive era(1890-1915) represented a popular culture idea embraced by women that marked a shift in the role of the family in American society. / Clara Bouricius = 166
• The New Woman of the late nineteenth century was constrained by the culture's concern with body consciousness. / Keren R. McGinity = 169
• The 1920s : How normal were the 1920s? = 174
• The 1920s were years of great prosperity for the United States. / Robert J. Allison = 175
• The 1920s were not a "normal" decade at all, but a new period of social activism reflected in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments and by participation in international peace conferences. / Brett Flehinger = 177
• 1930s Civil Rights : What was important about the 1930s Civil Rights struggle? = 181
• In the 1930s African Americans joined with radical forces in the American labor movement in a broad social campaign against economic injustice as the majority of white union members feared blacks and tried to keep them out of the unions. / Keith P. Griffler = 182
• Though the Scottsboro case of 1931-1936 caused deep divisions in the Civil Rights movement, the prosecution of nine black youths for rape also helped revive that movement by exposing discriminatory practices in the Southern courts. / Robert J. Allison = 185
• 1930s Labor Movement : Did the labor movement miss an opportunity for obtaining advances in the 1930s? = 190
• Yes, by allying itself with the Democratic Party, the labor movement missed opportunities for more-radical advances in the 1930s. / Edmund F. Wehrle = 191
• No, organized labor achieved substantial gains in the 1930s, providing its membership with a new level of security. / John Klusinske = 194
• Progressive Era Women : Was the Progressive Era empowering for women? = 197
• Yes, participation in a major progressive reform-Prohibition-actively politicized and empowered Progressive Era women. / Margaret Carroll-Bergman = 198
• No, even the few women who wielded power did so within a gender-specific discourse that was ultimately defeating. / Elisabeth Nichols = 200
• Progressive Movement : Was the Progressive movement really progressive? = 204
• Yes, the Progressives of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were genuine reformers who sought democratic solutions to the problems of industrialism. / Glen Gendzel = 205
• No, Progressivism was a middle-class attempt to remake the world in its own image rather than broadening the political voice of minorities and promoting acceptance of different cultures. / Robert J. Allison = 208
• Racism In World War Ⅱ : Did American racism manifest itself at home and abroad during World War Ⅱ? = 213
• During World War Ⅱ the United States practiced racism against people of color in general, and against Japanese Americans and African Americans in particular. / Josephine C. Bresnahan = 214
• World War Ⅱ provided an opportunity for black Americans to pursue full equality with white Americans by providing jobs and positions for minorities in the military. / Lonna Douglass = 217
• Red Scare : Was the "Red Scare" after World War Ⅰ a reaction to a genuine communist or anarchist threat, or was it a government attempt by the Wilson administration to silence domestic critics? = 221
• The postwar Red Scare was an overreaction to the Socialist Party, which was already in serious decline, and the threat of communism was exaggerated. / Margaret Mary Barrett = 222
• The Palmer raids were a legitimate response to a real threat posed by the American Communist Party and its controllers in Moscow. / Robert J. Allison = 223
• Sacco and Vanzetti : Were Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti treated fairly by the American justice system? = 228
• Sacco and Vanzetti were denied a fair trial and were executed because of prejudice against foreigners and anarchists. / Eli C. Bortman = 229
• The American system of justice does not offer justice, but instead, as anarchists such as Sacco and Vanzetti discovered, is designed to punish those who will not conform. / Judith A. Barrett = 232
• Theodore Roosevelt : Was Theodore Roosevelt a great president? = 240
• Yes, Theodore Roosevelt was one of America's greatest presidents because he enhanced the power and prestige of the position and broadened the role of the United States in the world. / Elizabeth D. Schafer = 241
• No, although Theodore Roosevelt presented himself as an energetic reformer, he was in fact bent on transforming the presidency into an engine of personal power. / Thomas E. Woods Jr. = 244
• United States and the Jews : Could the United States have saved more European Jews during World War Ⅱ? = 250
• The U.S. government understood the position of Jews in Nazi Germany but chose to ignore their plight. / J$$\ddot u$$rgen Scheunemann = 251
• The U.S. government believed the best way to save European Jews was to win World War Ⅱ quickly, not to attempt small-scale rescues or to bomb concentration camps. / Margo Dowling = 254
• Urban Bosses : Were the big-city bosses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries an obstacle to progress? = 259
• Political bosses benefited the people in cities they ran and effected some important achievements such as hospitals, bridges, and other large construction projects. / Michael Mezzano Jr. = 260
• The problems created by urban political bosses outweighed any services they provided. / Marion Case = 263
• Washington and Du Bois : Whose approach, Booker T. Washington's or W.E.B. Du Bois's, was most effective in achieving rights for African Americans at the turn of the century? = 267
• W.E.B. Du Bois's advocacy of protest for civil and political equality set the standard for future black activism and paved the way for the Civil Rights Movement. / William Jordan = 268
• Booker T. Washington's late-nineteenth-century policies of self-help and responsibility provided a wise course for black Americans in the early twentieth century by avoiding social agitation. / Robert J. Allison = 271
• References = 275
• Contributors' Notes = 285
• Index = 287
• [Volume. 4]----------
• CONTENTS
• Preface by Dennis Showalter = xiii
• Chronology by Dennis Showalter = xix
• Aircraft Carriers : What role did the aircraft carrier play in World War Ⅱ? = 1
• Aircraft carriers were decisive naval weapons in World War Ⅱ, especially in defeating Japan in the Pacific and protecting convoys across the Atlantic. / William J. Astore = 2
• The aircraft carrier was only one of several weapons in the Allied arsenal. It was relatively unimportant in the European theater and less important in the Pacific than codebreaking and the island-hopping policy. / Duane C. Young = 4
• American Troops : Did American soldiers in World War Ⅱ have a strong sense of fighting for a cause? = 9
• Yes, while American soldiers, sailors, and airmen fought for a wide variety of reasons, one primary motivation was a strong sense of fighting for a worthwhile cause. / Curtis S. King = 9
• No, during World War Ⅱ Americans often enlisted in the military for patriotic reasons, but once they entered combat they fought for the survival of themselves and their comrades. / Cole C. Kingseed = 12
• Appeasement : Was appeasement the right policy for Great Britain and the other Western powers to follow in the 1930s? = 16
• Yes, appeasement was the right policy because it was based on traditional perceptions of foreign interests and a rational assessment of military means and political will. / Robert McJimsey = 17
• No, appeasement of the Axis powers led directly to World War Ⅱ, and it was unnecessary because Germany did not yet have the military strength to oppose France and England. / Duane C. Young = 18
• Blitzkrieg : Was Blitzkrieg a successful strategy? = 23
• Yes, Blitzkrieg worked so well that armies have used it successfully throughout the second half of the twentieth century. / James S. Corum = 24
• No, the early successes of Blitzkrieg during World War Ⅱ were less the result of German martial acumen than of their opponents' incompetence or unpreparedness. / Robert L. Bateman Ⅲ = 27
• Catholic Church : Could the Catholic Church have been more effective in opposing the policies of the Nazi State? = 33
• Yes, the Catholic Church compromised its integrity and its claim as guardian of moral law by not taking a firm stand against Nazi policies. / George P. Blum = 33
• No, there was little that the Catholic Church could have done to oppose the Nazi menace without endangering even more people. / Dennis Showalter = 38
• Churchill : Was Winston Churchill a great war leader? = 40
• Yes, Winston Churchill's strategy of attacking the Germans on the periphery and delaying a main European invasion enabled Britain to survive World War Ⅱ. / John Wheatley = 41
• No, Churchill's vision of grand strategy, which emphasized peripheral operations, lacked the practical and economic foundations needed for it to succeed. / Robert McJimsey = 42
• Conventional War : Were the demands of conventional front-line combat approaching the practical limits of human endurance by 1945? = 46
• Yes, the front-line combat soldier reached the limits of his endurance in World War Ⅱ ; he was denied the periods of rest experienced by soldiers in earlier wars, and he had to cope with the severe psychological demands of modern warfare-demands that most soldiers could endure for only about six months. / William R. Forstchen = 47
• No, despite the grueling conditions of front-line combat in World War Ⅱ, victors and vanquished alike found ways of coping that allowed them to continue fighting effectively right up to the end of the war. / Harold R. Winton = 50
• Eastern Front : Was the failure of German armed forces in the East inevitable? = 53
• Yes, the Germans were not organizationally or doctrinally prepared for the scale of warfare called for on the Eastern Front. / Robert L. Bateman Ⅲ = 54
• No, failure in the East was not inevitable, but deteriorating morale, harsh weather conditions, and economic limitations helped to defeat the Wehrmacht in Russia. / Michael S. Neiberg = 57
• Eisenhower : Was Dwight D. Eisenhower an effective military leader? = 61
• Yes, Eisenhower was an effective military leader who brilliantly led the Allied Expeditionary Force to crush the Wehrmacht in western Europe. / Cole C. Kingseed = 62
• No, at best Eisenhower was an effective coordinator of Allied resources ; he remained too removed from actual battle to be called a leader. / Adrian Lewis = 65
• Fall Of France : Was the fall of France in 1940 inevitable? = 70
• Yes, the speedy collapse of France was inevitable because of divisive politics and low national morale. / Dennis Showalter = 71
• No, with better political leadership and military organization France could have defeated Germany in 1940. / Eugenia C. Kiesling = 73
• Fascism : Is fascism fundamentally different from National Socialism? = 77
• No, fascism is a nationalistic political movement that exalted race, promoted economic modernization, and demanded violent suppression of all opposition - like National Socialism. / Dennis Showalter = 78
• Yes, although both fascism and National Socialism came out of the upheaval of World War Ⅰ and tapped into nationalist sentiments, Nazism was driven by racist doctrine. / Benjamin Zarwell = 80
• German Army Atrocities : Was the Wehrmacht an active and willing participant in German war atrocities? = 85
• Yes, the Wehrmacht was an active and willing participant in German war atrocities, because Nazi indoctrination and racism encouraged German soldiers to view the enemy as less than human. / Michael S. Neiberg = 86
• No, German war atrocities were usually carried out by special units, not the Wehrmacht ; in addition, antipartisan actions were often viewed by German soldiers as acceptable interpretations of the rules of war. / Stephen G. Fritz = 88
• German Conquests : Did the Germans finance their war effort by military conquest? = 95
• Yes, military conquest was an effective method of using the land and labor of occupied territories for the German war effort. / Stephen G. Fritz = 95
• No, the territories occupied by Germany yielded only poor industrial and agricultural products as well as inefficient troops. / Daniel Lee Butcher = 100
• Hitler As War Leader : Was Adolf Hitler a competent war leader? = 104
• Yes, although Hitler made many mistakes, he must be credited with some good strategies, especially at the beginning of the war. / Robert Citino = 105
• No, Hitler proved less than competent in managing the war. He made major strategic blunders, and he ignored major responsibilities while he concentrated on minor issues. / Geoffrey P. Megargee = 108
• Hitler's Aggression : Could Adolf Hitler have been deterred from launching WWII? = 113
• Yes, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States could have successfully contained Adolf Hitler by military and political means. / Michael A. Boden = 114
• No, Adolf Hitler could not have been stopped from initiating World War Ⅱ because neither France nor Great Britain had the commitment or capability to thwart him. / Regan Hildebrand = 116
• Hitler's Foreign Policy : Was Adolf Hitler a revolutionary German leader in his foreign policy? = 122
• Yes, Adolf Hitler employed a radical approach to foreign policy, eschewing traditional balance-of-power politics for an ideologically based plan to dominate the world and eliminate races he considered inferior. / Robert T. Foley = 122
• No, Adolf Hitler's foreign policy falls within traditional European practice, and World War Ⅱ was the result of bungled policy on the part of his opponents, which he simply took advantage of. / David Spires = 125
• Holocaust : Complicity : Did local populations in Nazi-occupied territories play a significant role in Nazi atrocities? = 129
• Yes, local populations played a significant role in Nazi atrocities for a variety of reasons, ranging from ideological to criminal. / R. L. DiNardo = 129
• No, the actions of local populations were insignificant in terms of the instigation and extent of Nazi atrocities. / Daniel Inkelas = 132
• Holocaust : Theories : Which of the explanations of the origins of the Holocaust is more compelling-the intentionalist or functionalist interpretation? = 136
• From the beginning of his political career, Adolf Hitler had as his intention the elimination of all Jews from Europe. / Daniel Inkelas = 137
• The functionalist interpretation of the origins and events of the Holocaust is most compelling, because Hitler seemed to have considered relocation of Jews rather then extermination as late as 1941. / Edward B. Westermann = 139
• Italian Campaign : How important to Allied strategy was the invasion of Italy? = 143
• Though not without controversy, the decision to invade Italy was useful for the overall strategy to defeat Germany because it forced Adolf Hitler after 1944 to fight on three fronts. / George F. Hofmann = 144
• The invasion of Italy had no strategic value and represented a drain on both men and mat$$e'$$riel for the Allies. / Michael S. Neiberg = 148
• Japanese Way Of War : Was the Japanese military unnecessarily brutal during World War Ⅱ? = 151
• Yes, the Japanese exceeded the bounds of acceptable military conduct during World War Ⅱ, adopting a newly modified soldiers' code that required fanatical aggressiveness. / William J. Astore = 152
• No, although the Japanese committed atrocities on and off the battlefield, their code of behavior was a consequence of traditional social and institutional mores. / Dennis Showalter = 154
• Lend Lease : Was Western economic aid essential for the Soviet war effort? = 157
• Yes, Western economic aid to the Soviet Union ultimately shortened World War Ⅱ by a year or more and helped the Russians turn the momentum of the war in 1943. / Michael S. Neiberg = 157
• No, Western economic aid was important but not decisive in determining the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front. / Robert F. Baumann = 160
• Luftwaffe : Was the Luftwaffe an effective military instrument? = 163
• Yes, the Luftwaffe was a well-trained, effective air force, especially in the early years of the war, despite poor leadership at the highest levels. / James S. Corum = 163
• No, the Luftwaffe was not an effective air force because it was not designed for a war of attrition. / Daniel B. Ginsberg = 167
• MacArthur : Was Douglas MacArthur a great American general of World War Ⅱ? = 171
• MacArthur was a masterful battlefield tactician who employed maneuver and surprise to defeat the enemy and avoided the wasteful slaughter of his own troops. / John Wheatley = 172
• MacArthur was an overrated general who failed to provide an adequate defense of the Philippines and later mismanaged the recapture of the archipelago. / Dennis Showalter = 175
• Montgomery : How successful was General Bernard Law Montgomery as a general? = 177
• Bernard Law Montgomery was a great general who understood the need for marshaled strength and the limitations of his troops. He never suffered a serious defeat by the Germans. / Daniel Lee Butcher = 178
• Bernard Law Montgomery's success in World War Ⅱ was more the result of his personality and position as an "outsider" in the British military establishment than his battlefield prowess. / Guy LoFaro = 180
• Nazism And Religion : Were the churches in Germany in the 1930s quiet accomplices of Adolf Hitler and Nazism? = 185
• Yes, Adolf Hitler's threat to crush the churches frightened church leaders into granting implicit support for his regime. / Robert T. Foley = 186
• No, neither the Protestant nor Catholic Church collaborated with Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime ; in fact, the churches actively opposed and undermined state initiatives relating to religion. / Michael A. Boden = 188
• Patton : Is the reputation of General George S. Patton Jr. as a master of military strategy deserved? = 192
• Yes, Patton was a military leader of the first rank, distinguished by his charismatic leadership, his vision, and his mastery of armored warfare. / Guy LoFaro = 193
• No, though Patton became a master tactician of mobile warfare and a practitioner of the operational level of war, he was not as effective as a military strategist, the highest responsibility of a general in wartime. / George F. Hofmann = 196
• Rommel : Was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel overrated as a general? = 200
• Yes, Rommel has been vastly overrated as a general and as an opponent of National Socialism. He owed his rise to fame in large part to his close association with Hitler, and his exaggerated reputation as a military leader was a rationalization to explain embarrassing defeats by the British in Africa. / Eugenia C. Kiesling = 201
• No, though Rommel was not a brilliant strategist, he was a superb tactician and battle commander at the operational level. / George F. Hofmann = 204
• Second Front : Should the Second Front have been opened earlier than June 1944? = 208
• Yes, the Second Front should have been opened earlier than June 1944 in order to satisfy the promise made by the Western allies to the Soviets and to promote trust among the Americans, British, and Soviets. / Mary Kathryn Barbier = 208
• No, although the Allies wanted to open a second front, the Americans were inexperienced and unprepared for a cross-Channel invasion, while the British favored attacks on the periphery of German occupied territory. / Adrian Lewis = 212
• Segregation In The Military : Can the segregationalist policies of U.S. armed forces during World War Ⅱ be justifified on the grounds that integration would have impeded the war effort? = 216
• Yes, the U.S. armed forces were justified in concentrating on the destruction of fascism over racism, because fascism was a far more insidious evil that threatened the extermination of a race. / William R. Forstchen = 217
• No, the U.S. armed forces were not justified in their segregationalist policies. Those policies damaged morale and excluded from combat a badly needed fighting corps. / Dale E. Wilson = 220
• Spanish Civil War : Should the West have intervened on the side of the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War? = 223
• Yes, the Western democracies should have intervened in the Spanish Civil War to protect vital interests, including financial investments and strategic positioning. / Daniel Kowalsky = 224
• No, Western intervention would have been fruitless because the outcome of the Spanish Civil War was a foregone conclusion. / James S. Corum = 227
• Stalin : Was Joseph Stalin a great war leader? = 232
• Yes, Stalin was a great war leader who inspired his people, organized the national economy, and led the Soviet Union to victory over the Germans. / Greta Bucher = 233
• No, Stalin led his nation to victory over the Germans by imposing an inhumane and indefensible policy of terror. / John Wheatley = 236
• Tanks : Were American tanks inferior to their German and Soviet counterparts? = 238
• Yes, American tanks were inferior to both German and Russian tanks in most particulars, although comparisons of characteristics are meaningless outside of the complete strategic and operational contexts, in which armored fighting vehicles are only part of a complex system. / Douglas V. Johnson Ⅱ = 239
• No, American tanks were not as inferior as is frequently asserted. They were deficient only in certain performance aspects that were often not vital from a broad perspective. / Charles M. Baily = 241
• No, while Soviet tanks were the best overall vehicles in World War Ⅱ, the American M-4, produced in large numbers, was not designed to engage the larger German tanks. The M-4 was used by the Allies properly, and it helped to win the war. / Robert M. Citino = 244
• No, U.S. tanks were generally superior to most German models and only slightly inferior to Soviet ones. / William J. Astore = 247
• U.S. Asia Policy : Did U.S. boycotts and economic sanctions push Japan to World War Ⅱ? = 253
• Yes, U.S. economic sanctions against Japan were viewed as a threat to economic and territorial expansion by the Japanese military, who then felt compelled to adopt a plan to acquire needed resources and fight the United States if necessary. / Dennis Showalter = 254
• No, the economic embargo imposed on Japan by the United States was more of a pretext than a real factor in the coming of World War Ⅱ, as the Japanese had a long-standing plan to expand their empire in the Pacific. / Grant T. Weller = 256
• Ultra : Was the role of Ultra decisive in the outcome of the war in Europe? = 260
• Yes, Ultra was decisive because it gave the Allies crucial information about enemy strategic plans, troop dispositions, and logistics. / Dennis Showalter = 261
• No, although Ultra had significance it was only one aspect of Allied intelligence efforts. / William Kautt = 262
• Versailles Treaty : Was the Treaty of Versailles responsible for the rise of Hitler and Nazism in Germany? = 266
• The terms of the Versailles agreement were too harsh on Germany, contributing to the economic depression and revival of nationalism that occurred during the Weimar Republic. / Michael A. Boden = 267
• The rise of Hitler and Nazism in Germany was more the result of structural weaknesses inherent within the Weimar political system than of the humiliating terms of the Versailles treaty. / Robert T. Foley = 270
• Vichy France : Did the Vichy government in France willingly collaborate with the Germans? = 275
• Yes, the Vichy government provided help to the German war effort and the German campaign to eliminate French Jews and resistance fighters. The Vichy regime viewed the German invasion as an opportunity to establish an authoritarian government in France. / Eugenia C. Kiesling = 276
• No, the policies and actions of Vichy France were pragmatic attempts to maintain French sovereignty despite German domination. / Dennis Showalter = 278
• Wehrmacht : Was the reputation of the Wehrmacht for military superiority deserved? = 281
• Yes, in mechanized warfare, especially the use of advanced tanks and combined arms strategy, the Germans were superior to their Allied opponents. / Robert M. Citino = 282
• No, a myth of German superiority was promoted to make the Wehrmacht look better and to excuse its defeats. / Dennis Showalter = 285
• References = 289
• Contributors' Notes = 299
• Index = 301
• [Volume. 5]----------
• CONTENTS
• Preface by Dennis Showalter = xiv
• Chronology = xix
• Airpower : Was Allied airpower decisive in World War Ⅱ? = 1
• Yes, although airpower did not win the war, its broad effectiveness made it a decisive factor in the outcome of World War Ⅱ. / Conrad C. Crane = 1
• No, airpower was an important adjunct to the Allied war effort, but it was not decisive in defeating the Axis powers. / Michael Perry May = 3
• Airborne Forces : Did the airborne forces of World War Ⅱ require resources that could have been better applied elsewhere? = 10
• Yes, airborne units, although useful adjuncts to military force, required huge human and mat$$e'$$riel allocations that did not result in significant victories. / Robert L. Bateman Ⅲ = 11
• No, the airborne infantry was an innovation that, when put to the test during World War Ⅱ, contributed significantly to operational success in the Mediterranean, European, and Pacific theaters. / G. A. Lofaro = 14
• Allied Strategy : Did Dwight D. Eisenhower's broad-front strategy in northwest Europe offer better possibilities for rapidly defeating Germany than Bernard Law Montgomery's single-thrust approach? = 19
• Eisenhower's broad-front approach was the least risky and quickest way of defeating the German army because it forced a war of attrition : / Harold R. Winton = 20
• Montgomery's single-thrust approach offered the best possibility of defeating the Germans, but this strategy was undercut by his personality, the failure of Operation Market Garden, and the slow advances of British ground forces. / John F. Votaw = 22
• The Allies : Was the postwar collapse of the Allies' coalition inevitable? = 27
• Yes, the grand coalition of the Allied powers was doomed to collapse after World War Ⅱ because it was built only on the common interest of defeating the Axis ; mutual mistrust and postwar self-interest caused the Cold War. / Grant Weller = 28
• No, the collapse of the grand coalition was not foreordained ; it was caused by the United States breaking from its pattern of traditional isolationism after the war and the Soviet policy of territorial expansion, among other factors. / Frederick W. Kagan = 31
• Anglo-American Disputes : Was the Anglo-American dispute over strategic priorities in the European theater significant? = 34
• Yes, the Allies genuinely differed on war plans, as Britain was determined to preserve its global status while attacking German-held territory along the periphery, while the United States desired a more direct and speedy resolution of the European conflict. / Frederick W. Kagan = 35
• No, despite minor disputes over priorities in the European theater, the Allies agreed on overall strategy and generally implemented the plans made early in the war, while the major differences concerned timing and level of preparation for the cross-Channel assault. / Mary Kathryn Barbier = 37
• Anglo-American Relations : Was there a mutual trust between the Americans and British during World War Ⅱ? = 41
• Yes, the Americans and British had an amicable partnership during World War Ⅱ as they planned and executed strategy together. / Daniel Lee Butcher = 42
• No, the relationship between the Americans and British during World War Ⅱ was characterized by self-interest although they shared a common desire to defeat the Axis. / Steve Waddell = 44
• Atomic Bomb : Was the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki justified? = 48
• Yes, the U.S. atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justified because the Japanese were determined to defend their homeland to the last man in order to raise the human cost for Allied victory and induce a negotiated peace. / Michael Perry May = 49
• No, although the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was justified and morally defensible, the attack on Nagasaki was, in its haste, a morally indefensible result of bureaucratic ineptitude. / William J. Astore = 52
• Auschwitz : Should the Allies have bombed the railroad facilities and crematoriums at Auschwitz and other death camps? = 56
• Yes, the Allies should have bombed the death camps and more aggressively opposed the Holocaust in order to save lives and send a message of condemnation to the Nazis. / William R. Forstchen = 57
• No, Allied bombing raids on the death camps would have been difficult without inflicting heavy losses on the inmates and would have slowed the war effort by diverting airplanes needed for military targets. / Dennis Showalter = 59
• The Axis : Did the Axis powers cooperate effectively during World War Ⅱ? = 62
• The failure of the Axis powers to coordinate their war efforts critically impeded their conduct of the war. / Richard L. Dinardo = 63
• It was logistically beyond the capabilities of the Axis powers to cooperate in more than a limited fashion, and it was perhaps a better strategy for them to fight "parallel wars." / Dennis Showalter = 66
• The Balkans : Did a refusal to invade the Balkans in mid 1944 represent a missed opportunity for the Western Allies to end the war sooner and gain control of Eastern Europe? = 68
• If British prime minister Winston Churchill had prevailed in his Balkan strategy the Western Allies would have wasted valuable resources and alienated the Soviet Union. / William R. Forstchen = 69
• An invasion of the Balkans by the Western Allies would not have prevented Soviet domination of the area after World War Ⅱ. / Gordon W. Rudd = 71
• If the Western Allies had invaded the Balkans, the war would have ended sooner and much of Eastern Europe would not have fallen under Soviet domination. / Brian R. Sullivan = 74
• Battle Of The Atlantic : Has the significance of the Battle of the Atlantic been exaggerated? = 79
• Yes, the Allies were able to replace lost shipping rapidly and develop new antisubmarine technologies. / Dennis Showalter = 80
• No, the Battle of the Atlantic was decisive because its outcome determined not only the survival of Britain but also the ability of the Allies to conclude the war in Europe successfully. / Kathleen Broome Williams = 82
• Bomber Offensive : Was the Allied bombing of enemy cities such as Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo necessary? = 86
• Yes, Allied incendiary attacks against large urban centers were necessary to destroy valuable industrial and communications centers. / Michael Perry May = 87
• No, the Allied aerial onslaught against enemy cities was not only ineffective, it also provoked a counterproductive moral backlash-predicted by critics at the time-that has tainted the Western use of airpower ever since. / Conrad C. Crane = 89
• Bombing Of Civilians : Was Allied and Axis utilization of strategic bombing in World War Ⅱ based essentially on pragmatic considerations? = 93
• Yes, while moral factors played a certain role in policy formation and target selection, the tendency on both sides was to extend the scope of bombing operations even at the cost of increasing civilian casualties and collateral destruction. / James S. Corum = 94
• No, the final incendiary and atomic attacks on Japan were an exception to an otherwise general effort to impose some restraints, however limited they may have been, on aerial bombardment. / Conrad C. Crane = 98
• Chemical Warfare : Why were chemical weapons not used in World War Ⅱ? = 101
• International norms and military doctrine were the primary reasons why chemical weapons were not used in World War Ⅱ. / Jeffrey W. Legro = 102
• Fear of retaliation prevented the European powers from using chemical weapons, while the United States shunned their use on moral grounds. / Mark R. Stoneman = 104
• Emperor Hirohito : Was Emperor Hirohito of Japan responsible for fostering his nation's aggression in World War Ⅱ? = 108
• Yes, Hirohito was an advocate of Japanese aggression in the Pacific, despite the limited role he played in day-to-day political and military decisions. / Dennis Showalter = 109
• No, Hirohito had little influence on the Japanese decision to go to war and on the conduct of military affairs because constitutional and political constraints limited his role as emperor. / John M. Jennings = 110
• European Response : Did the Western powers take appropriate action to stop the rise of Adolf Hitler? = 114
• The European states had their own internal problems and showed a willful blindness to the rise of Adolf Hitler. / Duane C. Young = 114
• Diplomatic options were inadequate to block Hitler's bold initiatives that led to the outbreak of the war. / Robert McJimsey = 118
• The Generals : Did German generals on the whole outperform their American and British counterparts? = 122
• Yes, German generals were clearly superior to their American and British adversaries, and it was only Adolf Hitler's meddling in operational details and overwhelming Allied superiority that compensated for the lackluster performance of senior Allied commanders. / Harold R. Winton = 123
• No, while German and American generals were roughly equivalent in the field, senior American generals were superior in developing broad strategies. / Wade Markel = 126
• Hitler And The United States : Was it wise for Adolf Hitler to declare war on the United States after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor? = 131
• Yes, Adolf Hitler's declaration of war on the United States was the correct decision in the context of his worldview and war aims. / Mark R. Stoneman = 132
• No, Adolf Hitler's decision to wage war against the United States was based on a poor assessment of American economic and military might. / John Wheatley = 135
• Hitter's Army : Did the Wehrmacht reflect Adolf Hitler's ideology? = 137
• Yes, the organization, training, and indoctrination of the Wehrmacht made it into Hitler's army. / Stephen G. Fritz = 138
• No, unlike the officer class, the majority of the rank and file of the Wehrmacht was not committed ideologically to Hitler. / R. L. Dinardo = 142
• Ho Chi Minh : Should the United States have attempted to establish a favorable relationship with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh in 1945? = 145
• Yes, the United States missed an opportunity to establish a favorable relationship with Ho Chi Minh, because he was a nationalist unlikely to fall easily under the sway of the Soviets ; moreover, Vietnamese independence was a stated goal of the Atlantic Charter. / David M. Toczek = 146
• No, there was little chance of the United States establishing a favorable relationship with an independent postwar Vietnam because Ho Chi Minh was a communist and the Americans needed French support in the Cold War. / William H. Kautt = 148
• Holocaust : Mass Murder : Was the Holocaust a specifically German atrocity? = 151
• Atrocities on a massive scale during World War Ⅱ were perpetrated by several warring nations as a matter of state policy. / William R. Forstchen = 152
• There was something particularly and specifically German about the Holocaust and other mass killings of World War Ⅱ. Based on the authoritarian and exclusionary traditions of the Nazi Regime, such atrocities could only have happened in Germany. / Edward B. Westermann = 154
• Holocaust : The System : Was the Holocaust different from other cases of genocide? = 159
• Yes, when compared to other cases of genocide only the Holocaust combined the planned, total annihilation of an entire community on the basis of the quasi-apocalyptic, quasi-religious principles that were the core of National Socialism. / Thomas Pegelow = 160
• No, the Holocaust was not unlike other attempts at racial genocide ; in the past century more than 120 million people have been annihilated under similar circumstances. / Edward B. Westermann = 163
• Imperial Systems : Did the British and French view World War Ⅱ as the beginning of the end for their respective empires? = 168
• Yes, although the British and French saw World War Ⅱ as the beginning of the end for their empires, they marshaled all their colonial resources to defeat the Axis. / Deborah A. Shackleton = 169
• No, the British and French hoped to retain, if not reform, their colonial systems after World War Ⅱ. / Dennis Showalter = 171
• Italy : To what degree did Italy hinder the Axis war effort? = 175
• The inability of Italy to counter the Allies in the Mediterranean gradually drained German strength from the Eastern Front. / Brian R. Sullivan = 176
• Italian strategic blunders, poor training, inadequate equipment, and military defeats greatly harmed the Axis war effort. / William J. Astore = 179
• Japanese Internment : Was the internment of Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians during the war justified? = 183
• Yes, although the selective internment of citizens and resident aliens of Japanese descent was a racist policy, it was also necessary to hinder espionage and acts of sabotage. / Dennis Showalter = 184
• No, the internment of Japanese in the United States and Canada was not justified because they had committed no wrongdoing and were no threat to either nation's security. / F. H. Min Min Lo = 186
• Nationalist China : Did Western support of Nationalist China during World War Ⅱ represent a wasted effort? = 191
• Yes, resources committed to support for Nationalist China could have been used to more quickly defeat Germany. / Timothy Cheek = 192
• No, U.S aid to Nationalist China was not a waste, as it helped pull Japanese troops away from the South Pacific. / Hans Van Der Ven = 195
• Naval Treaties : Was it wise for signatory nations to agree to the interwar naval disarmament treaties? = 201
• Yes, in the context of the unsettled world situation, the interwar naval disarmament treaties were a well-advised effort to avoid a new, unrestrained arms race ; forestall future conflict ; and promote the economic stability of the signatories by a voluntary reduction of their naval forces. / Kathleen Broome Williams = 202
• No, the interwar naval disarmament treaties were unwise. The Japanese broke the letter and spirit of agreements, secretly building a superior navy, but the compliance of Western allies reduced the threat to Japan. / Duane C. Young = 205
• Nazi Rise To Power : Was the German population a willing supporter of the Nazi regime? = 210
• Yes, the German people willingly supported Adolf Hitler because he brought to the country law and order, economic prosperity international recognition, and assurances of future greatness. / Robert T. Foley = 210
• No, many Germans were coerced into supporting the Nazi regime and opposed Hitler's policies. / Thomas Pegelow = 213
• Nuremberg : Should the Nuremberg Trials have been held to establish the guilt of Nazi war criminals and sentence them? = 218
• Yes, the enormity of Nazi crimes demanded a public trial where those responsible were formally accused and their guilt established. / William R. Forstchen = 219
• No, the Nuremberg Trials were the victor's justice, complete with improper judicial proceedings, inadequate opportunities for defense, and no appeals process. / Norman J. W. Goda = 221
• Operation Barbarossa : Was it prudent for Germany to invade the Soviet Union in 1941? = 226
• Yes, Germany invaded the Soviet Union when it did because the Soviet military leadership had been gutted ; the Red Army was stunned by its losses in Finland ; the Wehrmacht was at its zenith ; and Joseph Stalin continued to believe in the Russo-German nonaggression pact of 1939. / Michael S. Neiberg = 227
• No, Adolf Hitler should have sent more forces to North Africa in 1941 and invaded the Middle East, providing his army with much-needed oil before attacking the Soviet Union. / Brian R. Sullivan = 229
• Operation Dragoon : Was the invasion of southern France in 1944 strategically effective? = 235
• Yes, the invasion of southern France was important for obtaining control of needed ports, drawing German attention from the Normandy invasion, and introducing Free French forces into the war. / Gordon W. Rudd = 236
• No, although Operation Dragoon was militarily a triumph and diplomatically important for Free French forces, it was a strategic failure because it allowed Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, which in turn helped set the stage for the Cold War. / Daniel Lee Butcher = 239
• Resistance Movements : Were resistance and partisan movements decisive in bringing about the defeat of Germany in World War Ⅱ? = 243
• Yes, resistance fighters and partisans contributed significantly to the military defeat of Germany by undermining morale, disrupting transportation, tying down troop formations, and providing intelligence. / Mark R. Stoneman = 244
• No, although resistance and partisan movements did help boost national pride and distract enemy troops, they were not decisive in bringing about the defeat of Nazi Germany. / William H. Kautt = 246
• Roosevelt : Was Franklin D. Roosevelt a great war leader? = 249
• Yes, Franklin D. Roosevelt was an astute and effective war leader, who picked excellent military subordinates, prepared the United States for war, and helped orchestrate an effective grand strategy and maintained close ties to Britain. / William J. Astore = 250
• No, Franklin D. Roosevelt was not a great war leader because he too easily followed the British lead, favored the Navy over the Army, and let his personal feelings interfere with policy, especially with regard to General Douglas MacArthur. / John Wheatley = 252
• Submarine : Did submarines play an important role in World War Ⅱ? = 255
• Yes, German U-boats waged a relentless campaign against shipping in the Atlantic, seriously threatening Allied efforts in North Africa and Europe, while in the Pacific, American submarines played a vital role in defeating Japan by destroying the enemy's merchant fleet and cutting off imports to the home islands. / Kathleen Broome Williams = 256
• No, submarines absorbed more resources and suffered greater losses in World War Ⅱ than their combat successes justified. / Sarandis Papadopoulos = 259
• The Tokyo Trials : Were the Tokyo Trials of accused Japanese war criminals conducted fairly? = 263
• Yes, the trials of Japanese war criminals were fairly administered, and the defendants had ample representation and appeals. / Norman J. W. Goda = 264
• No, the Tokyo Trials were essentially without legal validity ; they were conducted as retribution against the Japanese for initiating the war. / John M. Jennings = 267
• Unconditional Surrender : Was it wise for the Allies to demand the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan in World War Ⅱ? = 270
• Yes, the demand for unconditional surrender was a wise policy despite the questionable claims that it cost the Allies additional resources and casualties to win the war. / Curtis S. King = 270
• No, unconditional surrender was not a wise policy, especially in relation to the defeat of Japan, but Harry S Truman's desire to follow Franklin D. Roosevelt's course, the availability of the atomic bomb, and the need to placate American feelings forced Truman to seek total defeat of the enemy. / Gian P. Gentile = 274
• U.S. Combat Effectiveness : Were U.S. ground troops less effective than the Germans and the Japanese? = 278
• Yes, defects in organization and leadership made American combat divisions significantly inferior to German and Japanese units in World War Ⅱ. / John F. Votaw = 279
• No, experience and an effective use of firepower made American ground forces superior to their enemies. / Wade Markel = 283
• U.S. Isolationism : How did U.S. isolationism contribute to the cause of World War Ⅱ? = 288
• U.S. isolationism led Britain to continue policies of appeasement that made war inevitable. / William N. Denman = 289
• The principle significance of isolationism was its encouragement of the Axis belief that the United States would do nothing of substance to challenge aggression. / Grant T. Weller = 292
• U.S. Marines : Was the "island hopping" of the U.S. Marines in the Pacific theater an effective strategy? = 295
• Yes, U.S. Marine strategy in the central Pacific kept the Japanese off balance and effectively isolated island defenders during the American advance toward Japan. / Dennis Showalter = 296
• No, resources given to the island-hopping campaign could have been better spent supporting the U.S. Army's advance through the Philippines, the D-Day invasion of Normandy, and a submarine blockade of Japan. / William H. Forstchen = 299
• Women's Role : How important was the role of women in World War Ⅱ? = 302
• Women were significant contributors to the war effort in Allied countries and helped win the conflict. / Kelly Sirota = 303
• Although women contributed in home-front roles, they did not significantly affect the conduct of World War Ⅱ. / Greta Bucher = 306
• Yalta : Did the Yalta conference represent an Anglo-American capitulation to Soviet occupation in Eastern Europe? = 309
• Yes, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt, both concerned with protecting their own national interests, capitulated to Soviet demands in Eastern Europe even before the Yalta conference, and Joseph Stalin was buttressed in this situation by his Red Army control of the region. / Regan Hildebrand = 310
• No, the Yalta agreement was a compromise designed to continue cooperation among the Allies and to prevent them from turning their armies on each other after defeating Germany. / Greta Bucher = 313
• References = 317
• Contributor Notes = 331
• Index = 333