형량이론과 기본권논증 : 원칙이론의 형량개념에 대한 비판

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The purpose of this study is to analyze the concept of Balancing(Abw？gung). Balancing is an crucial device of legal reasoning. A Balancing of norms or values is required in order to establish a priority among them. It is much used as a tool to apply fundamental rights. However, The method of balancing is controversial in various respects concerning the rationality of balancing.

The rational justifiability of balancing is thus so important in legal and constitutional theories. This study especially discusses approaches of Principle Theory(Prinzipientheorie), developed by R. Alexy. Principle Theory provides some models and formulations in order to establish conditions for the rational balancing in constitutional theories. Then, it raises the question whether Principle Theory presents general rationality requirements.

The concept of Balancing shall be tested by meta-theories of legal reasoning. Rationality in legal reasoning are possible in principle. It asks which conditions must be fullfiled for legal decisions to be rational. Legal Reasoning is not only determined by formal aspects but also by substantive aspects. The formal one consists in a deduction from given premisses, while substantive one aims at the justification of the premisses. The problems are whether it can be rationally justified. In order to answer this question this study outlines the major ideas of legal reasoning: Cohrence, consistency, Universalizability and Defeasibility. These requirements determine the structure of legal reasoning. Because the deductive scheme does not exist for its own sake but to these requirements, it is not excluded that these principles can also be observed by balancing. But the non-deductive scheme should be a scheme that is subordinated to the deductive one.

The approach of Principle Theory can be understood as a form of non-deductive reasoning. Balancing can denote non-deductive reasoning in general, or it can mean a special form, which is represented by the Law of Balancing. Principle Theory is based on the interpretation that fundamental rights as principles, which can be expressed by optimization commands. The conception of Balancing is concisely by the Weight Formula. Thus it raise the question whether legislative discretion is sufficiently considered.

Therefore, this study discusses how constitutional courts apply the conception of balancing and fundamental rights. It is observed that courts largely do no apply optimization commands or the Law of Balancing. In the most of the recent cases, proportionality reviews do not exhibit a principle-based structure. It is surely possible to reconstruct some cases in Principle Theory. But assumptions of Principle Theory cannot be accepted as an suitable legal theory.

It leads to analyze the assumptions of Principle Theory which concern cognitive demands. The Law of Balancing and the Weight Formula requires cardinal scales of variables. It, however, is doubted that cardinal scaling can be rationally performed, at least in constitutional law. This explains why most cases do not follow the approach of Principle Theory. Reasonings concerning Fundamental Rights are not capable to fulfil the cognitive demand of this approach.

This study provided an another view of decision theory. The notion of satisficing can be considered as an alternative to optimization. It seems to be a suitable explanation of constitutional cases. Therefore, the proportionality principle can be reconstructed as a lexicographical procedure. All of its sub-principles can be applied with ordinal scales. One would have to manage highly demanding cognitive requirements to follow the approach of Principle Theory. The satificing is easier to manage, for it is less demanding.

Principle Theory is likely to erode dogmatic structures of fundamental rights and to eliminate legislative discretion. Optimization commands justify the best solution. So legislative discretion cannot be ensured by incorporating it as a formal principle, because a formal principle always can be optimized with substantive principles by courts.

The distinction between rules and principles is not convincing, because it is questionable that the distinction is not clear as Principle Theory proposes it. It is unable to establish definite limits to fundamental rights. The conception of Optimization structually prevents the construction of definite limits of fundamental rights in severe self-contradictions.

Principle Theory does not respect the binding force of fundamental rights, so it leads to an equivocation of the constitution. Especially the doctrine of constitutional state that is related to Principle Theory can be a reason to erode political bodies and powers.

Finally, Principle Theory is not a suitable for legal reasonings concerning fundamental rights, for it transforms rights to moldable entities and thus justify violations of fundamental rights. It has not provided any proper justification for standards of legal reasonings and constitutional systems.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 제1장 서론 1
• 제1절 연구의 목적 1
• 제2절 연구의 범위와 방법 3
• 제2장 형량과 법적 논증 7
• 제1절 문제의 제기 7
• 제2절 법적 논증으로서 기본권논증 8
• 2.1 법적 논증의 대상과 법률적 삼단논법 9
• 2.2 법적 논증의 모델 15
• 2.3 법적 논증의 이념과 과제 21
• 제3절 법적 논증의 합리성과 대화이론 34
• 3.1 법적 논증의 합리성 비판: 규칙회의론 35
• 3.2 법적 논증과 대화이론 41
• 제4절 원칙이론과 형량의 구조 51
• 4.1 포섭공식의 내용과 한계 51
• 4.2 형량의 의미와 원칙의 개념 55
• 4.3 충돌법칙 58
• 4.4 중요도공식 58
• 4.5 원칙이론과 재량의 문제 62
• 제3장 형량결정의 구조 64
• 제1절 서론 64
• 제2절 형량의 기본적 적용구조 66
• 2.1 비례성원칙의 개념과 구조 66
• 2.2 비례성원칙의 내용과 적용방식: 독일의 경우 69
• 제3절 삼등급모델과 중요도공식의 적용구조 82
• 3.1 삼등급모델의 개념과 구조 83
• 3.2 중요도공식 90
• 3.3 중요도공식의 확장 94
• 제4절 재량과 형식적 원칙의 문제 97
• 4.1 정교화된 등급구분의 가능성 97
• 4.2 구조적 재량과 인식재량 99
• 4.3 입법자의 인식재량과 인식적 형량법칙의 적용구조 103
• 제4장 형량이론의 합리성 개념 107
• 제1절 합리성개념의 다의성과 경제적 합리성 107
• 제2절 효용이론과 합리성 109
• 2.1 효용의 개념 110
• 2.2 기수적 척도와 서수적 척도 112
• 2.3 기대효용의 계산 114
• 제3절 중요도공식과 효용이론의 관계 119
• 3.1 중요도공식과 기수적 서열 119
• 3.2 기수적 척도의 문제점 128
• 3.3 비판과 재비판 133
• 3.4 요약 136
• 제4절 형량과 제한적 합리성 137
• 4.1 제한적 합리성의 의의 137
• 4.2 최소만족의 개념 140
• 4.3 중요도공식과의 비교 142
• 4.4 휴리스틱과 기본권논증의 관계 145
• 제5절 소결 153
• 제5장 형량이론과 헌법국가 155
• 제1절 서론 155
• 제2절 원칙이론의 방법론적 문제점 157
• 2.1 원칙이론의 기본전제와 헌법이론적 효과 157
• 2.2 기본권논증의 구조와 원칙이론 159
• 2.3 형량과 중단규칙 163
• 2.4 형량과 도그마틱적 구조 165
• 2.5 형식적 원칙의 기능 167
• 제3절 형량이론과 민주주의 170
• 3.1 원칙이론과 권력분립의 논거 170
• 3.2 형식적 원칙과 재량의 문제 173
• 3.3 최적화의 재정의 175
• 3.4 구조적 재량과 형량교착상태 177
• 3.5 행위규범과 통제규범의 구분이론 180
• 3.6 입법에 대한 사법심사의 정당성 문제 182
• 제4절 기본권의 성격과 형량 185
• 4.1 규칙과 원칙의 구분이론 분석 185
• 4.2 규범적 측면 195
• 제5절 소결 211
• 제6장 결론 213
• 참고문헌 218