시장경쟁은 기업에 어떠한 영향을 미치는가? = 산업집중도와 기업가치 및 부채비율의 관계에 관한 실증연구

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Assuming an inverse association between market competition and industrial concentration, this study empirically investigates how industrial concentration affects firm values and debt ratios. We have analyzed 3,380 observations of 845 non-financial firms that have been consistently listed on the Korea Exchange from 2008 to 2011. Following the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice and FTC, we divide the sample data into three sub-groups based on the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) values: unconcentrated (i.e., competitive) market if the HHI value is less than 1,500; highly concentrated (i.e., monopolistic or oligopolistic) market if the HHI value is greater than 2,500; or moderately concentrated market if the HHI value lies between 1,500 and 2,500. In doing so, we find that the relationships among the degrees of market competition, firm value, and debt ratios are quite clear and significant in the Korean market. Our empirical results based on regression analyses are as follows. First, industrial concentration affects firm values negatively in an unconcentrated market but, affects the firm values positively in a highly concentrated market. This finding suggests that greater competition among firms enhances firm values in an unconcentrated market. It also suggests that nearly monopolistic or oligopolistic firms can more easily increase their firm values as the competition further decreases. Second, industrial concentration affects debt ratio positively in an unconcentrated market, but, affects it negatively in a highly concentrated market. This implies that fierce competition in an unconcentrated market generally influences firms to be hesitant in using debt financing, whereas lower levels of competition lead to firms increasing their debt ratios due to having less pressure of bankruptcy. In contrast, in a highly concentrated market in which the competition is originally less intense, a further decrease in the market competition encourages the firms that already have market power to decrease their debt ratios because, they have enough internal capital to sustain and operate their business without increasing their debt. The robustness tests support the indications of the regression analysis results. For a group with a low (high) level of industrial concentration determined by their HHI values, industrial concentration is shown to behave positively (negatively) with firm value and negatively (positively) with debt ratio. In other words, the firm-level effects of industrial competition are dichotomous in a cross-section of firms with varying market influences. Our findings have the following implications. First, industrial concentration and firm value have a non-linear relationship. In an unconcentrated market as Nickell(1996) points out, market competition leads firms to perform better. However, in a concentrated market, lower competition increases the value of firms that have monopolistic powers. Second, our finding suggests that the optimal capital structure might be related to the degree of market competition. Finally, the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf(1984) can be supported by our findings

참고문헌 (Reference)

• 1 박경서, "외국인투자자가 한국기업의 경영 및 지배구조에 미치는 영향" 한국금융연구원 20 (20): 73-114, 2006
• 2 길재욱, "외국인 매매정보가 시장에 미치는 영향" 한국경제의 분석패널 11 (11): 1-47, 2005
• 3 류두진, "시장경쟁정도와 기업의 배당에 관한 연구" 한국기업경영학회 19 (19): 255-277, 2012
• 4 박경서, "상품시장에서의 경쟁과 기업지배구조의 상호작용이 투자와 배당에 미치는 영향" 한국재무학회 24 (24): 483-522, 2011
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• 10 Department of Justice, "Horizontal Merger Guidelines"
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