베트남의 남·북 통합 : 그 한계와 방향 Its Limitations and Future Directions = Integration of the North and South Vietnam

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Prior to the forced absorption/unification of the capitalist South Vietnam by the communist North Vietnam, the country had two critical opportunities for unification under what might called a nation-state system in a modern sense. In both instances, efforts towards unification were aborted due to deal-making among outside powers rather than internal reasons. Naturally, these instances represent sources of bitter frustration for the communist North Vietnam, which had played a leading role in the nations unification process.
When the Viet Minh forces finally won the resistance war against the United States after almost three decades of fighting in 1975, they were able to liberate the South and unify the divided fatherland in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreement.
Even in a quarter century after unification, however, the integration of the North and the South remain limited to physical and political integration, without any semblance of psychological or chemical integration among its peoples. Why is this happening? And what are the factors that might limit full North-South integration down the road?
First of all, explanations that highlight historical and cultural factors point to potential causes for divisiveness that existed long before unification. That is, Vietnam is not a homogeneous country both ethnically and culturally. The country came into being after the 15th century when North Vietnam, with its Chinese cultural background, conquered and consolidated mid and Southern Vietnam, which had an Indian cultural background; hence, the ethnic and cultural dissimilarity between the North and the South.
Also, the Southward advancement policy pursued persistently by the North evinced a culturally destructive pattern of forcefully evicting or assimilating the natives. The policy caused the buildup of a great deal of resentment among the Southern people towards their Northern conquerors.
On the other hand, the Northern perception of the South was one of fearful concern that if left to their own devices, the Southerners could attempt to split off at anytime, or collude with foreign powers and turn hostile towards them. To forestall such danger, the logical thing to do was to keep a tight rein on the Southerners within the reach of their whips. It was also along this line of logic that the so-called Northernization of the South was carried out.
The North Vietnamese suspicions toward the South persisted in a post-unification climate and helped to breed conflict rather than building harmony in a true sense.
Second, some views point to the arrogance and ideological self-righteousness of the unifier, i.e., the North communist leadership.
The process leading to the liberation of the South may be characterized as a struggle by the successors of Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh to tap into the peoples unity and resources to liberate South Vietnam, a country that had reactionarily aligned itself with imperialist capitalists. The ideological basis for the struggle was a mix of communist ideology and a deep-rooted patriotism among the Vietnamese.
What this means is that communism was not an end, in and of itself, but rather a means to the liberation of the South. In this regard, it can be said that the Souths liberation was made possible less by the superiority of communist ideology than the departure of the foreign powers that had immorally allied with the South.
It seems that the Communist leadership became intoxicated by their victory in the war against the United States and came to believe that nothing was unattainable for them. Emboldened, they went on to pursue a ruthless campaign of communizing the South after its own image in the decade following unification. Such radicalism however, did not help to further the integration of the North and South, and brought about a disastrous economic downfall. The mistakes of the leadership in the strategies they chose for integration resulted in a serious backlash from both the Northern and Southern people, and eventually cornered the Communist leadership into a desperate situation where they needed a dramatic breakthrough. In response to this, the 6th Communist Party Convention adopted the Doi Moi (reform) policy in December 1986. This, however, was akin to putting a bandaid on cancer.
Third, the communist leadership downplayed psychological elements, such as the culture of fatalism and dignity deeply ingrained in the Vietnamese sentiment, therefore failing to reap desirable results in terms of integration. In other words, the Communist leaderships reliance on a strategy of integration by force prevented them from realizing true integration.
Fate is a deep-rooted idea that has dominated the consciousness of the Vietnamese for centuries. This concept, closely related to the idea of karma in Buddhist culture, can be turned into a source of powerful energy if directed to political causes.
After the Communist unification, the South Vietnamese mixed the shame of defeat with their sense of fatalism, Which proved to impair the integration process. For about a decade after the unification, the Southern people responded to the Communist leaderships forcefully implemented communization process with an extremely passive que cera, cera attitude. This locked the country in a situation where nothing ever worked, nothing ever failed. As such, the policies of the party and the government lost their effectiveness in all sectors.
The culture of dignity was another factor that impacted North-South integration in a significant manner. The idea of dignity is based on talent and virtue. Naturally, it is in conflict with forceful actions. The greater the use of force, the greater the threat to the authority of dignity.
As such, the harsh thought-reform movements imposed upon the capitalist Southern people backed by a campaign of force-based terror by central policymakers sabotaged the integration process at a fundamental level. For instance, the collaborators of the defeated Southern government were forced to serve in re-education camps a move that was widely regarded as revenge rather than education by the Southern people and fed the enormous, silent resentment. In other words, the liberation of the South was perceived as domination by the South, rather than unification. Insofar as such perception persists, it will be difficult to take North-South integration beyond the physical and political level to attain true harmony.
It can be argued that the future of Vietnams North-South integration is depandent on the sophisticatedness with which policymakers handle the overall actual and potential elements involved in the integration process.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 통일인가? 지배인가?
• Ⅱ. 분단으로 가는 길
• 1. 일본의 패망과 분할점령
• 2. 제네바 협정과 통일의 연기
• Ⅲ. 통일의 달성과 남·북 통합
• 1. 통일직후의 비상조치
• 1) 군관위원회(Ban Quan quan)와 접수위원회(Ban Tiep Quan)
• 2) 사상개조 수용소(재교육장 Trai cai tao)
• 3) 사회정화와 신경제지구
• 2. 통합의 달성과 딜레마
• 1) 정치 통합
• 2) 경제 통합
• 3. 새로운 혁명: 도이머이
• Ⅳ. 남북통합 : 한계와 방향