범위 허용주의는 허용 불가능한가? = Is Intrapersonal Permissivism impermissible?

국문 초록 (Abstract)

모든 증거 상황에서 임의의 명제에 대한 합리적인 믿음은 유일할까? 허용주의자는 그렇지 않다고 주장한다. 이러한 허용주의는 크게 범위 허용주의와 비범위 허용주의로 나뉠 수 있다. 그런데 허용주의와 관련된 최근의 논의에서 범위 허용주의는 큰 주목을 받지 못하고 있다. 그렇다면 과연 범위 허용주의는 받아들일만한 이론이 아닌가? 본 논문에서 필자는 범위 허용주의가 성립하는 것으로 보이는 증거 상황을 제시한다. 만약 이러한 증거 상황이 그럴듯한 것이라면, 범위 허용주의와 그것이 함축하는 바에 대한 진지한 고찰이 요청된다고 할 수 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Permissivism says that for some total evidence, there are multiple doxastic states, any one of which an agent with that total evidence can rationally take. Regarding Permissivism, we can distinguish the following two types of Permissivism: Intrapersonal Permissivism and Interpersonal Permissivism. In contrast to Interpersonal Permissivism, Intrapersonal Permissivism is not much defended in the recent permissive rationality literature. Is there any good epistemic reason not to take Intrapersonal Permissivism seriously? In this paper, I provide two evidential situations in which Intrapersonal Permissivism appears to hold. If one of the evidential situations is plausible, we might need to reconsider Intrapersonal Permissivism and what it implies.

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