Arms procurement decision making . v.2

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Preface = ⅸ
• Acknowledgements = ⅹ
• Acronyms = xi
• 1. Introduction / Ravinder Pal Singh = 1
• Ⅰ. Background = 1
• Ⅱ. Strengthening the role of society in monitoring defence policy = 2
• Ⅲ. The policy-making and review cycle = 4
• Ⅳ. The scope, method and conduct of the study = 6
• Table 1.1. Oversight of military functions and the components of military power = 3
• Table 1.2. The policy-making and review cycle = 5
• Table 1.3. The four major themes of this study = 6
• 2. Chile / Francisco Rojas Aravena = 9
• Ⅰ. Introduction = 9
• Ⅱ. The background to arms procurement decision making = 10
• Ⅲ. The present arms procurement system = 17
• Ⅳ. The defence budget and socio-economic aspects = 21
• Ⅴ. Technical and industrial problems = 28
• Ⅵ. Behavioural or organizational issues = 32
• Ⅶ. Conclusions : the ideal decision-making process for arms procurement in Chile = 37
• Figure 2.1. The Chilean Ministry of Defense = 10
• Figure 2.2. The defence advisory agencies in Chile = 14
• Figure 2.3. The stages of the arms procurement process in Chile = 16
• Figure 2.4. The budget law process in the Chilean Congress = 24
• 3. Greece / Stelios Alifantis and Christos Kollias = 39
• Ⅰ. Introduction = 39
• Ⅱ. National security priorities and arms procurement experience : a historical overview = 41
• Ⅲ. Defence planning = 44
• Ⅳ. Arms procurement decision making = 51
• Ⅴ. The defence budget process = 56
• Ⅵ. The defence industrial and technology base = 58
• Ⅶ. Democratic oversight = 62
• Ⅷ. Conclusions = 66
• Figure 3.1. US influence on defence and security policy in Greece during the early post-World War Ⅱ years = 42
• Figure 3.2. The organization of the Greek Ministry of National Defence = 46
• Figure 3.3. The organization of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff = 48
• Figure 3.4. The drafting of the Greek medium-term arms procurement programme = 50
• Figure 3.5. The organization of the Greek General Directorate of Armaments = 60
• Figure 3.6. Procurement decision making in the Greek Armaments Programmes Directorate = 61
• 4. Malaysia / Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam = 67
• Ⅰ. Introduction = 67
• Ⅱ. The structure of the defence organizations = 68
• Ⅲ. National security concerns and defence planning = 72
• Ⅳ. Arms procurement planning = 76
• Ⅴ. The defence budget and financial planning = 81
• Ⅵ. Defence industrial aspects = 86
• Ⅶ. Checks and balances = 91
• Ⅷ. Conclusions and recommendations = 95
• Figure 4.1. The Malaysian Ministry of Defence = 70
• Figure 4.2. The organization of the Malaysian Armed Forces Council = 71
• Figure 4.3. The Malaysian tender and procurement process = 78
• Figure 4.4. The Malaysian annual budget cycle = 82
• Figure 4.5. Malaysian financial planning under the five-year plan = 84
• Figure 4.6. The Research and Development unit of the Malaysian Defence Science and Technology Centre = 88
• Appendix 4A. Offset arrangements between Malaysia and the German Naval Group = 104
• 5. Poland / Pawel Wieczorek and Katarzyna Zukrowska = 106
• Ⅰ. Introduction = 106
• Ⅱ. The management of national security and defence planning = 106
• Ⅲ. The arms procurement decision-making process = 115
• Ⅳ. Arms procurement procedure = 116
• Ⅴ. Financial planning and the defence budget = 119
• Ⅵ. The Polish defence industry = 122
• Ⅶ. Factors influencing arms procurement = 131
• Ⅷ. Democratic oversight = 136
• Ⅸ. Conclusions : an `ideal type' of arms procurement decision- making process for Poland = 139
• Figure 5.1. Organization of the Polish Ministry of National Defence, July 1999 = 108
• Figure 5.2. The Polish defence policy-making sequence = 113
• Figure 5.3. The Polish defence planning process = 114
• 6. South Africa / Gavin Cawthra = 142
• Ⅰ. Introduction = 142
• Ⅱ. Arms procurement under apartheid and during the transition to democracy = 143
• Ⅲ. The current arms procurement process = 148
• Ⅳ. Financial and budget questions = 162
• Ⅴ. Techno-industrial questions = 165
• Ⅵ. Organizational and behavioural issues = 172
• Ⅶ. Towards an `ideal type' of arms procurement decision-making process for South Africa = 175
• Table 6.1. Arms procurement decision making in South Africa, 1961-94 = 144
• Table 6.2. Defence R&D expenditure in South Africa, 1987-96 = 171
• Figure 6.1. The structure of the South African Ministry of Defence = 152
• Figure 6.2. The arms procurement decision-making process in South Africa = 153
• Figure 6.3. Strategic planning in South Africa = 154
• Figure 6.4. The organizational structure of Armscor = 158
• Figure 6.5. Evaluation of arms systems in South Africa = 163
• Figure 6.6. The interweaving of defence and civilian technology in South Africa = 170
• 7. Taiwan / Chih-cheng Lo = 180
• Ⅰ. Introduction = 180
• Ⅱ. Formulating the national security and defence strategy = 182
• Ⅲ. The arms procurement decision-making process = 191
• Ⅳ. The budget planning and programming process = 199
• Ⅴ. Defence technology and industrial considerations = 204
• Ⅵ. Legislative and public-interest monitoring = 209
• Ⅶ. Conclusions = 216
• Table 7.1. Select major arms orders by Taiwan, 1990-98 = 189
• Table 7.2. The stages of arms procurement in Taiwan = 193
• Table 7.3. Percentage of offsets in selected arms transfers, 1980-92 = 204
• Table 7.4. Taiwan's decentralized scientific R&D institutions and agencies = 206
• Table 7.5. Weapons produced by the Taiwanese CSIST, 1980-98 = 208
• Figure 7.1. The organizations involved in security and arms procurement decision making in Taiwan = 192
• Figure 7.2. Investment outline programme and system analysis process of weapon acquisition in Taiwan = 194
• Figure 7.3. The organization of the Taiwanese Military Procurement Bureau = 198
• Figure 7.4. Flow-chart of the military budget process in Taiwan = 201
• 8. Comparative analysis / Ravinder Pal Singh = 217
• Ⅰ. Introduction = 217
• Ⅱ. Military and politico-security issues = 217
• Ⅲ. Defence budgets, financial planning and audit = 224
• Ⅳ. Techno-industrial questions = 230
• Ⅴ. Organizational behaviour and public-interest issues = 235
• Ⅵ. Good governance, public accountability and secrecy = 241
• Ⅶ. Recommendations for the future = 245
• Ⅷ. Conclusions = 248
• Annexe A. Research questions = 249
• Annexe B. Abstracts of the working papers = 269
• Annexe C. About the contributors = 280
• Index = 289